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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of environmental governance reform in China. It investigates how new 
governance policies and arrangements are being introduced in order to overcome problems 
associated with China’s sizable environmental protection ‘implementation deficit’. Using an 
analytical framework based on ‘good governance’ criteria of accountability, transparency, 
participation, and rule of law, it focuses on developments within China’s environmental state, 
which includes state agencies and their policies, and civil society, incorporating environmental 
protection NGOs, citizen activists, and the media. Based on in-depth, qualitative research, this 
thesis examines several aspects of environmental governance reform in China: attempts to 
make local officials pay greater attention to environmental issues, formal public participation 
legislation and mechanisms, information disclosure, and ‘private interest’ activism.  
 
This thesis identifies interactions between the environmental state and civil society as vital in 
establishing new, more participatory governance processes. Through acting as ‘policy 
pioneers’, environmental activists can consolidate governance reforms emanating from the 
environmental state, and promote new governance norms. At the same time, however, this 
thesis identifies significant obstacles to the establishment of a more inclusive ‘governance’ 
approach to environmental protection in China that goes beyond Party-state institutions and 
actors. For this reason, it challenges the argument that China’s system of environmental 
governance is likely to converge any further with those observed in western liberal 
democracies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
China’s Environmental Challenge 
China’s economic reforms that began in 1978 have been viewed as remarkably successful 
in terms of raising living standards, attracting foreign direct investment, and establishing 
China as a major global actor. According to official Chinese figures, the country’s GDP 
grew at an annual average of 9.6 per cent from 1979-2004 (Xinhua News Agency, 9 
January 2006), and the World Bank (2005) has calculated that 400 million Chinese were 
lifted out of extreme poverty between 1981 and 2001. By 2005, China was ranked 
number 72 on the World Development Index compared with a ranking of 108 in 1979 
(World Bank and SEPA, 2007). 
 
These remarkable achievements have, however, come at a significant environmental cost. 
Various academics, international agencies, and western media organisations have 
provided in-depth accounts detailing China’s environmental challenge. This dissertation 
does not seek to replicate these studies (see Smil, 1993, 2004; Edmonds, 1994; World 
Bank, 2001; UNDP, 2002; Murray & Cook, 2002; Economy, 2004a; Cann et al, 2005).1 
However, for the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to briefly highlight the nature, 
scale, and implications of China’s environmental challenge.  
 
Environmental Degradation in China 
It is widely acknowledged that severe water and air pollution has accompanied China’s 
impressive reform-era economic growth. In the period between 2001 and 2005, an 
average of 54 per cent of the water in the country’s seven major rivers was officially unfit 
for human use (World Bank and SEPA, 2007). It is estimated that over 300 million rural 
Chinese lack access to clean water (China Daily, 23 May 2005), while 70 per cent of 
rivers and lakes, and 90 per cent of groundwater in urban areas, suffer from 
                                                   
1 The New York Times’ ‘Choking on Growth’ series is a salient example of the western media’s increased 
interest in China’s environmental degradation.  
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/08/26/world/asia/choking_on_growth.html (last accessed 16 July 
2008). 
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contamination (Li, 2006; Yan, 2006). Meanwhile, the reliance of China on coal for 
approximately 70 per cent of its electricity generation has serious implications in terms of 
air pollution. According to the World Bank, 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are 
in China (The Epoch Times, 10 June 2006). Almost one third of the country is affected by 
acid rain (UNDP, 2002: 28). Whereas 2 per cent of cities suffered from highly acid rain 
(with pH below 4.5) in 2000, this had increased to 10 per cent of cities in 2004 (OECD, 
2007: 19). Moreover, China is the world’s number one emitter of sulphur dioxide, its 
emissions of which rose by 27 per cent from 2000-2005 (Reuters, 10 January 2007) 
despite a pledge by the central government in 2001 to reduce emissions by 10 per cent in 
the period from 2002-2005 (Economy, 2007). 
 
Other serious environmental problems facing China include desertification, erosion, and 
biodiversity loss. Desertification in China is caused primarily by excessive land 
reclamation and increasing livestock numbers in affected areas (World Bank, 2001: 18). 
According to an official from the State Forestry Administration, China’s annual rate of 
desertification dropped significantly, from a rate of 10,400 square kilometres at the end 
of the 1990s to approximately 3,000 square kilometres since 2001 (Asian Development 
Bank, 2006). However, the problem remains serious and it is estimated that the 
livelihoods of about 400 million people are under threat from the encroaching Gobi, 
Taklimakan, and Kumtag deserts (Ibid.). For the past few years, Beijing has increasingly 
suffered from severe sandstorms in the springtime that are caused by desertification in 
China’s western provinces (Jiang, 2007). Furthermore, China has the world’s highest 
ratio of potential to actual desertified land (World Bank, 2001: xv). China is one of the 
world’s most biodiverse countries in the world. However, between 1992 and 2004 the 
number of plant species under threat grew tenfold, to the extent that currently 20 per cent 
of native plants are considered at risk (Botanic Gardens Conservation International, 
2007). 
 
China’s environmental impact is global in scale. This has already been documented 
through acid rain originating in China falling on the Korean peninsular and Japan (Kim, 
2007). Trans-boundary pollutants from China have been detected as far away as the west 
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and east coasts of the USA (Ibid.). Perhaps most worryingly, the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency released a report claiming that in 2007 China 
overtook the US as the world’s single largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and that it 
accounted for two-thirds of global growth in greenhouse emissions in the same year 
(International Herald Tribune, 13 June 2008).  
 
It is also important to note that China has made significant progress related to certain 
aspects of environmental protection. It has decoupled the emissions of several pollutants, 
including nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide, as well as municipal and industrial waste, 
from economic growth (World Bank, 2002; OECD, 2007). Furthermore, during the 
reform period China significantly improved its energy efficiency (Rosen & Houser, 
2007). However, the country’s environmental problems remain acute due to the rapid 
speed of China’s economic development, its size, and poor per capita endowment of 
natural resources (Ho, 2006). According to geographer and expert on China’s natural 
environment Vaclav Smil (2004: 144), ‘if a simplifying verdict [regarding China’s 
environmental record] were still sought, I would summarise the record, without being 
alarmist, as genuinely disquieting’. 
 
Political Implications of China’s Environmental Degradation 
The environmental problems that have emerged and/or intensified since the start of 
China’s reform period have growing implications in terms of human health, economic 
growth, and social order. As a result, they also have serious implications for the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), which, since 1978, has staked much of its legitimacy on 
maintaining economic growth and social stability.  
 
Environmental issues exert a huge financial cost on China. In 1997, the World Bank 
estimated that the cost of pollution in China was equivalent to 3.5-8 per cent of GDP per 
annum (Economy, 2004a). China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) has put 
the cost of pollution at 8-13 per cent of annual GDP (Pan, 2006). Vaclav Smil (2004: 
188) has argued that the financial cost exerted by China’s environmental degradation 
could be as high as 15 per cent of GDP. More recently, a 2007 report authored by the 
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World Bank and China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)2 suggested that 
the financial cost of air and water pollution in 2003 was between 2.68 and 5.78 per cent 
of GDP (World Bank and SEPA, 2007). China’s leadership is concerned that 
environmental issues might jeopardise the country’s continued economic development. In 
his keynote address to the 2007 National Party Congress, President Hu Jintao 
acknowledged that, ‘our economic growth is realised at an excessively high cost of 
resources and the environment’ (Reuters, 15 October 2007). And, one environmental 
protection government official was quoted as saying that, ‘the environmental problem has 
become a key bottleneck for social and economic development’ (The Guardian, 11 
January 2007).  
 
There appears to be a growing correlation between public health issues in China and 
environmental pollution. Estimates place the annual number of premature deaths 
attributable to air pollution between 300,000 (OECD, 2006: 11) and 750,000 (The 
Financial Times, 2 July 2007).3 Water pollution has been associated with rising cases of 
cancer in certain areas (World Bank and SEPA, 2007), and media reports have 
documented a growing number of so-called ‘cancer villages’ where localised high rates 
of cancer are blamed on heavy pollution (China Daily, 10 May 2004). The health impacts 
of pollution are one reason why China’s environmental problems are partly manifested in 
growing public unrest. Official figures show that in recent years the number of pollution-
related disputes in China has increased by 30 per cent annually, reaching 50,000 in 2005 
(China Daily, 4 May 2006). Public order disturbances related to environmental issues 
have increased to the extent that, in the words of MEP Minister Zhou Shengxian, ‘the 
high occurrence of environmental accidents and the issue of pollution has become a 
‘blasting fuse’ for social instability’ (South China Morning Post, 3 January 2007). 
 
                                                   
2 After being promoted in 2008, SEPA became the MEP. For more details, see Chapter 2. Except where 
necessary for purposes of clarification, this thesis the term ‘MEP’ when referring to China’s central 
government environmental protection agency both before and after this reorganisation.  
3 It was reported that a World Bank report included, and then later, at the request of the Chinese 
government, omitted this higher figure due to the latter’s concern about possible social unrest (The 
Financial Times, 2 July 2007). 
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China’s Environmental Protection ‘Implementation Deficit’ 
As various scholars have noted, the Chinese Party-state has taken measures to address the 
country’s environmental problems (Jahiel, 1998; Mol & Carter, 2006). As Chapter 2 
notes in more detail, in the early 1970s the central authorities took the first steps towards 
establishing a nationwide environmental protection bureaucracy. The central government 
has also promulgated a comprehensive body of environmental protection laws, 
regulations, and standards. At present, the central-level MEP is replicated at the local 
government level in the form of Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) that exist at 
the provincial, city, district, county levels, as well as some townships (Jahiel, 1998: 758-
9), creating a nationwide environmental protection bureaucracy. EPBs are charged with 
enforcing environmental laws and regulations. According to one count, China has 
promulgated 20 environmental statutes, over 40 State Council regulations, 500 standards, 
and over 600 other documents that create legal norms concerning various environmental 
issues, as well as over 1,000 local level environmental laws (Ferris Jr. & Zhang, 2005: 
75-6). This body of legislation comprises what has been described as, ‘one of the region’s 
most dynamic environmental law frameworks’ (Ibid.: 75). And yet, it has been claimed 
that, although China’s environmental protection framework has helped reduce the rate of 
environmental degradation, it has failed to enhance environmental quality in the face of 
rapid economic growth (Ma & Ortolano, 2000; World Bank, 2001; Lo & Fryxell, 2005; 
Shi & Zhang, 2006).  
 
Deficiencies in China’s system of environmental governance are an important factor why 
the country’s environmental situation remains serious. China’s initial system of 
environmental governance, which it started to develop in the early 1970s, was largely 
based on a top-down, command-and-control regulatory approach similar to the 
‘traditional policy paradigm’ (TPP) that emerged in European and North American 
countries from the late 1960s (Carter, 2007). In many ways, this approach, which 
concentrates environmental protection in the central bureaucracy, with power and 
knowledge concentrated in the hands of officials and technical experts (Dryzek, 1997), 
was well-suited to China’s planned economy and authoritarian political system (Palmer, 
1998: 807).  
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However, in common with other countries that have employed regulatory approaches to 
environmental protection, it has been found that China suffers from a significant 
environmental protection ‘implementation deficit’ (Lo et al, 2006; Van Rooij, 2006a, b; 
OECD, 2006; Economy, 2007). An implementation deficit occurs ‘when legislative and 
policy intent is not translated into practice’ (Weale, 1992: 17). Enforcement of 
environmental protection legislation in China is so lax that, according to leading 
environmental lawyer and academic from the China University of Political Science and 
Law Professor Wang Canfa, China’s environmental regulations are only enforced 10 per 
cent of the time (Xinhua News Agency, 6 October 2005). Although this appears to have 
been a somewhat crude estimate, it does suggest that experts view the enforcement 
problem as being a severe one. Others have suggested that, although China’s 
implementation deficit has narrowed over time, this has been insufficient to overcome 
environmental degradation due to rapid economic growth (Lo et al, 2006). 
 
To a large extent, China’s serious implementation deficit can be explained by 
deficiencies in its predominantly regulatory approach to environmental protection. 
Scholars have identified various interacting factors that limit the enforcement of 
environmental legislation in China (Lo et al, 2006). Although these are examined in 
greater detail in the next chapter, the main shortcomings in China’s system of 
environmental governance are briefly summarised here. 
 
Scholars have identified the weak position of EPBs in the bureaucracy as a major 
impediment to environmental enforcement (Jahiel, 1997, 1998; Ma & Ortolano, 2000; 
Economy, 2005). EPBs come under the direct influence of local government officials 
who, since the early stages of the reform period, have been given powerful economic and 
career incentives to maximise economic growth (Whiting, 2001). This prioritisation of 
economic growth is often cited as contributing to lax enforcement of environmental 
legislation (Lieberthal, 1997; Oshita & Ortolano, 2006; Van Rooij, 2006a, b). In some 
cases, local governments turn a blind eye to polluters and prevent EPBs from carrying out 
their enforcement duties, especially when these polluting companies are important for the 
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local economy (Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Van Rooij, 2006a; Economy, 2007). Poor 
enforcement is further exacerbated by ‘local protectionism’ (difang baohu zhuyi), 
whereby some local officials ignore environmental legislation in order to protect their 
own industries from external competition so as to maximise local economic growth (Van 
Rooij, 2006a). 
 
It has also been shown that EPBs lack resources, including financial and human 
resources, in order to effectively carry out their enforcement duties (Chan et al, 1995; 
Economy, 2005; Li, 2006). According to one estimate, as much as 50 per cent of 
polluting activity takes place outside the monitoring capabilities of enforcement officials 
(Shi & Zhang, 2006). Another problem with China’s environmental protection regulatory 
system concerns vague and ambiguous environmental legislation that is also frequently 
out of touch with local realities and therefore difficult to enforce (Alford & Shen, 1997; 
Lo & Fryxell, 2005; Beyer, 2006; Van Rooij, 2006a, b). Although EPBs can fine 
polluters, these fines are often lower than the cost of installing or running pollution 
control equipment (Lotspeich & Chen, 1997, Economy, 2007).  
 
Finally, China suffers from a series of wider ‘governance deficits’, including a lack of 
official accountability, public participation, and transparency, and weak rule of law 
(Howell, 2004b). These factors impede the effective enforcement of environmental 
legislation. It is widely acknowledged that environmental public participation and 
information disclosure is insufficient. As a result, the public is limited in the extent to 
which it can hold local officials to account (Lo & Leung, 2000; Lo & Tang, 2006; 
Economy, 2007). 
 
The environmental protection implementation deficit is not uniquely a Chinese problem. 
As the next section discusses, it has been argued that many advanced industrial nations 
are in the process of introducing new governance processes and policies in order to 
overcome the limitations associated with a regulatory command-and-control approach. In 
the past ten years a similar trend has been observed in China. Various scholars have 
shown that the Chinese authorities are introducing environmental governance reforms 
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that are also intended to overcome some of the deficiencies in the country’s 
predominantly regulatory approach. For example, and as discussed in greater detail 
below, Neil Carter and Arthur Mol (2006) have suggested that China’s system of 
environmental governance is showing signs of convergence with those in OECD 
countries. They suggest that this is manifested in greater flexibility and decentralisation, a 
stronger environmental state and greater environmental protection capacity, a shift from 
regulation to governance, and an increasing role for environmental civil society (Ibid.). 
 
Environmental Governance Reform: Moving Beyond the TPP 
This section discusses how other nations have undertaken environmental governance 
reform in a bid to overcome deficiencies associated with a regulatory approach to 
environmental protection. 
 
The ‘Implementation Deficit’ 
When developed nations first started to try and address environmental issues from the 
late 1960s onwards, the ‘traditional policy paradigm’ (TPP), also known as the ‘first 
generation approach’ became the dominant approach (see, for example, Weale, 1992; 
Durant et al, 2004; Fiorino, 2006). The TPP is centred on regulatory ‘command-and-
control’ processes, whereby regulations governing the release of pollutants are issued (the 
‘command’) and punishments levied should these be breached (the ‘control’) 
(Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002: 9).4 The status of the environment as a public good, 
which can be defined as a good whereby ‘each individual’s consumption leads to no 
subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good’,5 informed the belief 
that the environment could only be safeguarded by a strong ‘environmental state’ (Mol & 
Buttel, 2002: 2), which is defined to include state agencies and their relationships, 
legislation and policies (Mol & Carter, 2006).  
 
                                                   
4 As Carter (2007: 323) notes, the term ‘command-and-control’ is a pejorative term connoting coercive 
regulation. The widespread use of this term  represents a ‘rhetorical success of the neo-liberal backlash’ 
against environmental regulation (Ibid.: 324). 
5 Samuelson, quoted in Carter (2007: 174). 
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As Albert Weale (1992) has noted, the TPP was based on several assumptions. These 
include the view that administrative measures, devised and enforced by a specialised 
environmental department within the bureaucracy, were the best way of addressing 
environmental problems. It was also assumed that the nature of environmental problems 
was well understood and that end-of-pipe solutions were sufficient (Ibid.: 75).6 Above all, 
the TPP was founded on a belief that economic growth and environmental protection 
were mutually exclusive goals. This ‘zero-sum’ conception rendered it necessary to try 
and achieve a balance between economic and environmental considerations when setting 
pollution standards (Weale, 1992). 
 
The TPP has been credited with contributing to significant environmental improvements 
that would otherwise have been unrealised. At the same time, however, it has been 
widely criticised and is increasingly seen as incapable of resolving many problems that 
remain (Durant et al, 2004). The TPP was designed to deal with pollution from large, 
identifiable sources such as power plants and large factories (Fiorino, 2006: 11). 
However, it is ill suited to dealing both with pollution from diverse, numerous and small 
sources (Durant et al, 2004: 3), and non-point pollution such as agricultural run-off which 
does not have an easily traceable source. Further criticisms levelled at the TPP include 
that it is adversarial, reactive, heavily bureaucratic, and fragmented, and does not 
encourage firms to go beyond the minimum requirements needed to meet discharge 
standards (Ibid.).  
 
Another perceived shortcoming with the TPP is that it is prone to an ‘implementation 
deficit’ (Weale, 1992: 17). The first generation approach to environmental protection is 
administratively highly intensive. Regulators are faced with a huge number of pollutants 
as well as pollution sources that they simply lack the capacity to monitor effectively 
(Fiorino, 2006). This problem exists in developed countries, but is especially pronounced 
in developing countries, where environmental regulators often lack the financial, 
political, and human resources needed in order to effectively monitor and regulate 
                                                   
6 So-called ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions rely on dealing with pollutants after they have been discharged into the 
environment. 
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sources of pollution (Adeel & Nakamoto, 2003; Desai, 1998). Furthermore, the fact that 
regulation usually results in costs being levied on key interest groups in society (Carter, 
2007: 180) makes it difficult to successfully enforce environmental legislation when 
economic growth is a country’s main goal. In addition, environmental officials in 
developing countries are said to be particularly susceptible to rent-seeking and corruption 
opportunities associated with a regulatory approach to environmental governance 
(Brinkerhoff, 2007). This is not to say that establishing command-and-control systems 
cannot lead to environmental improvements in developing countries. Indeed, Michael 
Rock (2002b: 152) argues in relation to East Asian newly industrialising countries that 
doing so is vital in terms of improving environmental quality and management. At the 
same time, however, supplementary approaches that go beyond a regulatory approach are 
also important in order to compensate for the many drawbacks associated with the TPP. 
 
Failings associated with the TPP also feed into growing concerns regarding the nature of 
the environmental risk and the ability of nation states to address it. Partly because of 
limitations inherent in a regulatory approach to environmental protection, nation states 
have been criticised for not adequately resolving problems associated with environmental 
degradation and risk, leading to what Martin Jänicke (1990) has labelled ‘state failure’. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that, although the TPP was well suited to nations in the 
‘first phase of modernity’, which has been identified by scholars as a time when society 
was seen to be highly manageable by state regulation (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2006: 30), 
it is incapable of resolving new and complex problems such as climate change, 
biodiversity loss, and nitrate pollution that began to emerge in the 1980s (Weale, 1992; 
Fiorino, 2006). In addition, it has been suggested that citizens and governments have 
become more concerned, or ‘reflexive’ about the damaging environmental side effects of 
modernisation processes (Beck, 1994). Not only have states failed to effectively regulate 
these side effects, or ‘risks’, it has been suggested that some of these issues cannot be 
effectively solved via nation states acting alone (Van Tatenhove & Leroy, 2003).  
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Beyond the TPP 
It has been argued that countries can adopt, and indeed have adopted, new governing 
styles in order to overcome the problem of achieving policy outcomes, including in the 
environmental protection sphere (Pierre & Peters, 2000). Although policy goals might 
remain the same, states are increasingly turning to approaches and actors beyond 
traditional governmental institutions in order to better achieve these goals. The 
‘governance’ perspective, examined later on in this chapter in more detail, provides a 
framework for understanding these changing processes of governing (Stoker, 1998a).  
 
It has been argued that, in the face of inadequacies associated with the TPP, as well as 
heightened concern for environmental risk, the nation-state has had to redefine its role in 
environmental protection (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002; Durant et al (eds.), 2004; 
Fiorino, 2006; Mol, 2007). Some scholars have advocated a new approach to 
environmental protection that goes beyond the TPP. For example, it has been suggested 
that, rather than directly tackling pollution at the point that it is released, environmental 
issues should be treated more holistically, and should be integrated into wider 
development goals (Durant et al, 2004). Furthermore, it has been argued that new 
approaches that are more flexible and less confrontational, such as those relying on 
cooperation, information disclosure, market-based instruments, and incentives, can be 
effective when introduced alongside, or instead of, regulatory measures (Fiorino, 2004, 
2006). 
 
One aspect of this new approach that is particularly relevant to this thesis concerns the 
development of new relationships between the state and civil society. Van Tatenhove and 
Leroy (2003: 161) have argued that, ‘new ways of governance have (to be) developed 
within and beyond the nation-state, since the state is incapable of accommodating the 
new and global risks of contemporary society’. This process is sometimes referred to as 
political modernisation, whereby new policy instruments and closer cooperation between 
state and non-state actors are introduced in order to develop a more preventive, proactive, 
and flexible strategy to deal with environmental issues (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2006). 
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As already noted, the state was initially seen as the only institution capable of 
maintaining environmental quality due to the environment’s public good status. At this 
time, the lines between government, market, and civil society were seen as being clearly 
drawn, which resulted in the ‘political domain’ being dominated by the state (Van 
Tatenhove & Leroy, 2003: 157). Under this arrangement, the role of civil society was to 
challenge the government and private sector and hold them both to account. In doing so, 
environmental activists often adopted contentious tactics. However, after the neo-liberal 
agenda led to a shrinking of the environmental state in many industrialised nations, new 
forms of governance materialised which blurred the lines between state, market, and civil 
society (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2006: 29). Under these new governance arrangements, 
non-state actors that previously could only challenge the environmental policy making 
process from the outside have increasingly become included in this process (Bulkeley & 
Mol, 2003). As Harriet Bulkeley and Arthur Mol (2003: 144) state, ‘increasingly, non-
participatory forms of policy making are defined as illegitimate, ineffective and 
undemocratic, both by politicians and by stakeholders themselves’.  
 
It has been suggested that, rather than focus on improving regulation structures, 
governments are increasingly trying to develop new institutional arrangements between 
state and non-state actors (Glasbergen, 2007: 20). This has given rise to state-society 
arrangements such as networks, associations, and partnerships, which can be defined as, 
‘the ideas, practices and (institutional) arrangements that provide non-state actors and 
non-conventional politics with substantially more room in environmental governance’ 
(Mol, 2007: 216). In some cases, civil society may bypass the state entirely in order to 
affect better environmental outcomes. For example, if adequate information is made 
available in the public domain, citizens can target polluting companies directly 
(Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002: 196). Citizens might attempt to affect change through 
legal means, pressuring the company via consumer boycotts, or by negotiating a mutually 
acceptable solution (Kleindorfer & Orts, 1998; Stephan, 2002). In addition, some 
countries have introduced legislation that formalises public participation within policy 
instruments such as environmental impact assessment (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002: 
196). 
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It is important to note that, although some nation states have, to varying degrees, adopted 
some aspects of this new environmental governance approach, it is a highly normative 
concept. The environmental state is still seen as the most important actor in 
environmental protection, and state regulation remains a mainstay of environmental 
protection (Arts & Leroy, 2006). It has been argued that, despite entering the 
environmental protection discourse, it has proven difficult to put elements of a new 
environmental governance approach into practice (Ibid., Jordan et al, 2005). Partnerships 
between state and civil society actors often fail to live up to their theoretical promises due 
to strong state governance (Mol, 2007: 224). However, it has been argued that a more 
consensual governance approach, that has emerged in the form of new policy 
arrangements and instruments, has in some cases been ‘grafted onto’ the TPP, thus 
producing a mixture of arrangements, or hybrid structures (Durant et al, 2004; Van 
Tatenhove & Leroy, 2003: 159; Jordan et al, 2005; Arts & Leroy, 2006). Although the 
regulatory state may not have retreated, it is in the process of being reconfigured 
(Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002). 
 
Reforming China’s Environmental Governance System: Towards 
Convergence? 
Some scholars have suggested that the Chinese Party-state is attempting to improve 
environmental protection, and overcome the country’s implementation deficit, through 
introducing environmental governance reforms along similar lines to those described 
above (Mol & Carter, 2006; Mol, 2006; Carter & Mol, 2006; Martens, 2006; Shi & 
Zhang, 2006). Neil Carter and Arthur Mol (2006: 332) have argued that China’s system 
of environmental governance is currently undergoing a ‘major transformation’ that in 
some ways resembles the introduction of new environmental governance processes in 
OECD countries as examined in the previous section.  
 
Studies from the 1980s and 1990s examining environmental governance in the PRC 
unsurprisingly found that environmental protection efforts were concentrated within the 
Party-state apparatus (Ross, 1988; Sinkule & Ortolano, 1995; Lotspeich & Chen, 1997; 
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Vermeer, 1998). Although the Party-state still plays a dominant role, however, it has been 
argued that a shift away from pure reliance on regulation towards a more diverse 
‘governance’ approach is underway in relation to environmental protection in China (Mol 
& Carter, 2006; Mol, 2006; Carter & Mol, 2006; Martens, 2006; Shi & Zhang, 2006; 
Rock, 2002a, b). This is partly in response to the shortcomings in China’s system of 
environmental governance discussed above, and partly due to wider social, political, and 
economic changes brought about as a result of the reform and opening up policy (Mol & 
Carter, 2006).  
 
A number of empirical studies have emerged that analyse the changes in China’s 
environmental governance framework. They suggest that, in some cases, environmental 
governance in China is moving beyond a command-and-control approach in an attempt to 
better address the country’s rising environmental challenge and the problems associated 
with an over-reliance on top-down, regulatory approaches. Although some scholars 
analysing Chinese environmental governance reform have concentrated on economic 
(Economy, 2006) and global integration (Chan, 2004; Jahiel, 2006) issues, the main focus 
of the literature has been on the ‘environmental state’ and civil society. As a result, this 
section addresses the relevant literature relating to developments in these two spheres. 
 
China’s Environmental State 
As noted above, an important issue identified in the literature relates to the poor 
enforcement of environmental protection legislation in China, resulting in a serious 
implementation deficit. This has been partly blamed on deficiencies in the environmental 
state, including ambiguous legislation, and a lack of authority and resources (Chan et al, 
1995; Alford & Shen, 1997; Economy, 2005). In addition, pro-growth local officials have 
been blamed for obstructing effective enforcement of environmental legislation 
(Lieberthal, 1997; Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Van Rooij, 2006a). However, some scholars 
have looked at policies that have been introduced in order to strengthen the 
environmental state and overcome deficiencies in China’s predominantly regulatory 
approach to environmental protection. 
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A number of scholars have examined the extent to which shortcomings in China’s 
environmental state can be overcome by policies that aim to change the behaviour of 
local officials. If these officials can be persuaded to place more emphasis on 
environmental issues, an important barrier to the enforcement of environmental 
legislation can be overcome. Michael Rock (2002a, b) and Elizabeth Economy (2006) 
have examined attempts to encourage city mayors to prioritise environmental issues 
through the ‘Urban Environmental Quantitative Evaluation System’ (UEQES) and its 
successor, the ‘National Environmental Model City’ (NEMC) initiative, respectively. In 
the same article, Economy also introduces a preliminary analysis of China’s green GDP 
initiative.7 All of these initiatives can be seen as attempts to provide incentives for local 
officials to pay greater attention to environmental protection. Initial findings suggest that 
incentives have helped improve environmental outcomes. For example, Rock (2002b: 89) 
concludes that the success of the UEQES initiative renders the view that local officials 
merely pursue economic growth regardless of the environmental cost as overly simplistic 
and, at worst, erroneous. However, Economy (2007) has claimed that only 7-10 per cent 
of China’s cities currently meet the requirements necessary to be awarded the coveted 
NEMC status, which suggests that the provision of environmental protection incentives 
for Chinese local officials has significant limitations. 
 
As well as providing incentives for local officials to prioritise environmental protection, 
attempts have been made to strengthen the environmental state by improving the 
environmental accountability of local officials. It has been suggested that, to an extent, 
incentives such as those described above can achieve this goal. For example, Arthur Mol 
(2006) has suggested that UEQES has ensured that local officials are no longer judged 
purely on their economic and political performance, but are also judged based on 
environmental protection criteria. Another way that officials can be held to greater 
account regarding environmental issues is through the cadre assessment system.  In their 
examination of environmental governance processes in five cities in Guangdong 
province, Carlos Wing-Hung Lo and Shui-Yan Tang (2006) identify important 
                                                   
7 Green GDP aims quantify the financial cost of environmental degradation and resource depletion. It then 
incorporates this figure into traditional GDP calculations in order to produce a GDP figure that reflects the 
environmental cost of economic growth. 
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institutional transformations designed to improve the effectiveness of the local-level 
regulatory apparatus. One of these is the inclusion of environmental protection as a 
performance indicator for local officials. Lo and Tang find that this has resulted in a 
positive effect on the environment. Finally, the central government has launched 
environmental protection clean-up campaigns in order to overcome local level resistance 
to environmental protection. In her case study of one such clean-up campaign on the 
heavily polluted Huai River, Economy (2004b) finds that this campaign has failed. 
Benjamin Van Rooij (2006a), however, argues that short term environmental campaigns 
can be effective in mobilising local officials to pursue campaign goals. 
 
Environmental accountability among local officials can also be improved by the 
promotion of public participation. A lack of public participation in environmental 
governance has been widely cited as a major factor inhibiting environmental protection 
efforts in China, by scholars, international organisations, and Chinese government 
officials (Vermeer, 1998; Tang et al, 2005; Martens, 2006; World Bank, 2001; Pan, 
2004c). In order to address China’s worsening environmental situation however, some 
scholars have found that the public is being given a greater role in environmental 
protection, although they also identify various obstacles to public participation (Lo & 
Leung, 2000; Tang et al, 2005; Martens, 2006; Shi & Zhang, 2006).  
 
Only a very limited number of studies have examined the extent to which this growing 
public involvement is a result of changes in the environmental state designed to improve 
environmental accountability by facilitating formal public participation. For example, 
some scholars have noted that the Chinese government has started to promulgate 
legislation designed to increase public participation (Wang et al, 2003; Tang et al, 2005; 
Moore & Warren, 2006). This has mainly been done through the promotion of public 
participation in the EIA process, which has been facilitated by the 2003 EIA Law and its 
implementing measures. In their analysis of this new law, Wang et al (2003) note that it 
intends to incorporate public participation by legislating for public hearings, and other 
means through which planners can obtain public opinion regarding proposed projects. 
However, provisions do not go as far as those in western countries, and a lack of 
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‘political will’ at the local level has been identified as the main reason why public 
participation in EIA is still highly limited (Ibid.). Li-Jin Zhong and Arthur Mol (2008) 
have examined public hearings in the context of the setting of urban water prices. They 
claim that ‘public hearings do indicate that enhanced opportunities are provided to 
Chinese citizens to play a more formative role in environmental governance’ (Ibid.: 901). 
However, they also find that public hearings are a ‘mild’ form of public participation that 
do not affect the fundamental position of the Party-state (Ibid.).  
 
Some scholars have examined developments in China’s environmental state that aim to 
increase transparency in environmental governance by publicly disclosing environmental 
information. Greater disclosure of information can empower the public and media to 
better hold polluters and officials to account, hence reducing the implementation deficit. 
Although it is generally accepted that public (and sometimes even official) access to 
environmental information is still highly restricted, some gradual improvements have 
been noted in this regard (Qing-Jie Wang, 2005; Shi & Zhang, 2006; OECD, 2006; Li et 
al, 2008). Changhua Wu (2005) argues that officials at both the central and local levels 
have shown strong commitment to governing in a more transparent manner, and 
identifies legislation that has been promulgated with the intention of facilitating the 
disclosure of environmental information (see also Li et al, 2008). However, it is also the 
case that implementation still lags far behind, and China remains at a stage of 
‘experiment and exploration’ (Wu, 2005: 307). Hua Wang et al (2004) have examined 
environmental information disclosure in the context of China’s GreenWatch project, 
which is a pilot initiative developed by the MEP in conjunction with the World Bank. 
GreenWatch involves assessing enterprises based on their environmental performance 
before assigning them with a colour-coded grade that is disseminated to the public via the 
media. They note that successful pilot schemes were carried out in locations in Jiangsu 
province and Inner Mongolia, suggesting that information disclosure can be a useful 
policy tool in China (Ibid.).  
 
These empirical studies have identified important developments that have improved 
understandings regarding the reform of China’s environmental state. And yet there are 
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many gaps in the literature that need to be addressed. As noted above, it has been shown 
that the Party-state has taken steps to change the behaviour of local officials in order to 
improve environmental accountability. And yet only a very limited number of studies 
have addressed this issue. Although some have expressed reservations regarding the 
efficacy of policies designed to change officials’ behaviour (Economy, 2007), on the 
whole scholars have been positive regarding these developments (Rock, 2002a, b; Mol, 
2006; Lo & Tang, 2006; Economy, 2006). Existing studies have focused on relatively 
wealthy parts of China, which may result in them overstating the significance of these 
policies. An important gap that has not been explored in the literature relates to ways in 
which local officials resist attempts to change their behaviour. Or, to put it differently, 
there is a need to examine how far policies designed to make officials prioritise 
environmental issues can go in China, especially in the context of its rapid economic 
development. Although it is important to understand ways in which Party-state initiatives 
are successful in terms of changing officials’ behaviour, it is also vital to understand the 
obstacles that exist. 
 
Another key issue identified in the literature is how the environmental state is changing in 
order to facilitate greater public participation and oversight in environmental matters. It 
has been established that the Party-state has attempted to facilitate public participation 
through official channels such as public hearings, a policy that has become more 
prominent with the promulgation in 2003 of the EIA Law. Most studies have not 
addressed the impact of this legislation, although there are several exceptions (Wang et 
al, 2003; Tang et al, 2005; Moore & Warren, 2006). In addition, there is still a gap in 
understandings of exactly what type of public participation the Chinese Party-state is 
promoting, and how this is affected by China’s one-party political system. Understanding 
this through greater empirical study is important in order to evaluate the extent to which 
public participation as legislated for by the Party-state can improve environmental 
outcomes in China. 
 
A second way in which the environmental state is attempting to facilitate greater public 
participation is through improving public access to environmental information. Although 
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some studies have raised this as an issue, none has examined information disclosure 
legislation in detail. This oversight is particularly significant given important recent 
legislative developments in this area. For example, in 2007 the MEP promulgated an 
important piece of legislation, namely the ‘Measures on Environmental Information 
Disclosure (Trial Version)’. However, no studies have examined these measures, which 
have been seen as an important step towards greater transparency in Chinese 
environmental governance. This is an important gap in the literature that should be 
addressed in order to improve understandings of environmental information disclosure in 
China. In addition, existing studies examine information disclosure in China as a top-
down phenomenon (Wang et al, 2004; OECD, 2006; Li et al, 2008). None has 
investigated the extent to which public disclosure can stimulate greater public 
participation. Given that officials have cited increased public participation as a desired 
effect of information disclosure (see Chapter 5), this is an important omission in existing 
studies. 
 
Chinese Environmental civil society 
Although the Chinese Party-state remains the dominant force in environmental protection 
(Mol & Carter, 2006), it has tolerated a growing role for environmental civil society since 
the early 1990s (Lo & Leung, 2000; Ho, 2001; Economy, 2004a; Martens, 2006; Shi & 
Zhang, 2006; Yang & Calhoun, 2006). For the purposes of this thesis, civil society is 
defined to include grassroots NGOs,8 citizen activists, and the media. 
 
Since the mid-1990s, when China’s first ‘grassroots’ NGO, the Beijing-based Friends of 
Nature, was founded, scholars have taken an interest in Chinese environmental civil 
society. The majority of studies examining environmental civil society in China do so in 
the context of state-NGO relations (Knup, 1997; Saich, 2000; Yang, 2005; Cooper, 2006; 
Ho, 2001, 2007; Ho & Edmonds, 2007; Ru & Ortolano, 2008). This is partly because 
environmental NGOs are seen as one of the most active sectors of Chinese civil society 
and are therefore a good ‘laboratory’ through which to investigate state-society relations. 
                                                   
8 Chinese environmental ‘grassroots’ NGOs are organisations set up by individual citizens. They are 
differentiated from the many so-called environmental ‘government-organised’ NGOs (GONGOs) that have 
been set up by official government bodies. See Chapter 2 for more details.   
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It also reflects the significant influence that China’s authoritarian political system exerts 
over organised environmental protection groups.  
 
Studies that examine environmental civil society in the context of state-NGO relations 
have argued that the attitude of the Party-state towards environmental NGOs is 
ambiguous, or even contradictory (Saich, 2000; Ho, 2001). On the one hand, it has been 
claimed that the Party-state imposes significant constraints that continue to inhibit 
environmental NGOs (Ho, 2001; Schwartz, 2004). Arguably chief among these is the 
stringent registration process that organisations must go through in order to be officially 
recognised as a legal entity (Saich, 2000; Ho, 2001). At the same time, however, the 
Chinese government has acknowledged that it needs the help of non-state actors in order 
to overcome the country’s environmental problems by improving policy implementation 
and holding local officials to account (Turner, 2004; Shi & Zhang, 2006; Carter & Mol, 
2006). Many organisations are able to exist without going through the registration 
process as long as they do not oppose the Party-state. 
 
According to Peter Ho and Richard Edmonds (2007; see also Ho, 2007), the 
government’s ambiguous stance has contributed to a situation whereby Chinese 
environmental NGOs (and other environmental activists) are ‘embedded’ within the 
Party-state. Activists cultivate close personal ties with Party-state officials. They engage 
in self-censorship and do not show even a hint of opposition to the central Party-state. 
And yet, at the same time, activists can use their personal connections and political 
loyalty to the central authorities to exert influence with regards environmental issues. As 
a result, the concept of ‘embedded activism’ shows how China’s authoritarian political 
system both restricts and facilitates Chinese environmental civil society.9 As Ho (2007: 
195) puts it, ‘as long as [environmental activists] do not oppose the central state, many 
things are possible in China’. 
 
                                                   
9 Ho and Edmonds (2007) use the term ‘semiauthoritarian’ to characterise China’s political system. The 
vast majority of scholarly work on China, however, refers to the PRC as being an ‘authoritarian’ state. 
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Only a limited number of studies have examined the significance of civil society to 
environmental governance processes. Scholars have been somewhat ambivalent in terms 
of the emphasis they place on the impact of civil society on environmental governance. 
Mol and Carter (2006) argue that the impact of NGOs has been ‘marginal’ in terms of 
promoting environmental reforms, in contrast to their western counterparts. Jonathan 
Schwartz (2004) is pessimistic regarding the ability of grassroots NGOs to influence 
environmental governance due to significant political, funding and human resources 
constraints. However, he does suggest that ‘semi-NGOs’, which he defines as those 
NGOs registered within the Chinese academic system, are more likely to be influential 
due to their better funding, expertise, and access to government officials.10 Shui-Yan 
Tang and Xueyong Zhan (2008) argue that, although civic environmental NGOs have 
made important contributions in environmental awareness raising and education, they 
have been highly limited in terms of influencing government policy. Focusing on 
Guangzhou, Carlos Wing-Hung Lo and Sai-Wing Leung (2000) argue that Chinese 
citizens are increasingly playing a role in environmental governance by showing how 
environmental protection has, to a limited extent, extended beyond the state bureaucracy. 
However, they also point to ‘tremendous institutional constraints’ that limit the 
incorporation of public participation into environmental governance (Ibid.: 704).  
 
Other commentators have adopted a more positive position regarding the influence of 
Chinese environmental civil society. Despite acknowledging the limitations of 
environmental civil society due to the country’s authoritarian political system, they have 
stressed how in some cases it has started to become more influential in terms of affecting 
environmental governance. According to Economy (2004b), the development of a non-
state environmental sector represents ‘the most dramatic transformation in China’s 
environmental protection effort over the past decade’. She also argues that Chinese 
environmental NGOs are ‘a significant force for political reform’ (Economy, 2005). This 
has been echoed by other scholars, who have mentioned that Chinese environmental civil 
society can help advance accountability, transparency, and rule of law in China’s 
                                                   
10 Semi-NGOs are not the same as university student-run environmental groups.  
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environmental governance (Economy, 2005; Morton, 2005: 521; Carter & Mol, 2006: 
336). 
 
Several scholars argue that Chinese environmental civil society can influence 
environmental policy due to successful NGO campaigns. By far the most prominent 
example refers to NGO opposition to hydropower development in Yunnan (Mertha, 
2008). The best-known case centred on Yunnan’s Nu River. In 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao 
personally intervened and suspended plans to dam what is still one of only two un-
dammed rivers in China due to what he described as a high level of societal concern 
(Mertha, 2008; Yang, 2004; Lu, 2007; Litzinger, 2007). This campaign has been stated, 
sometimes implicitly, as a watershed in Chinese environmentalism, at least in relation to 
environmental NGOs. In his detailed study of the Nu River campaign, Michael Büsgen 
(2006: 44) concludes that, ‘the involved [environmental] NGOs have established 
themselves as a force for the promotion of pluralism and of an alternative view on 
development in China’. Andrew Mertha (2008) has examined several NGO campaigns 
against hydropower development in China. He has argued that NGO activists can take 
advantage of cleavages in China’s fragmented political system that occur along territorial 
and/or jurisdictional lines, and influence government policy by playing the role of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ (Ibid.). And yet others, such as Yiyi Lu (2007), are more circumspect 
regarding the role of NGOs in the Nu River campaign. Although she acknowledges the 
role played by civil society in this campaign, Lu (2007) also points to the important role 
played by certain Party-state officials. 
 
Although the majority of scholars examining Chinese environmental civil society have 
focused on NGOs, some have looked at the media as well as other forms of citizen 
activism. Alex Wang (2007) notes how some citizens have used the courts to successfully 
sue for compensation in relation to environmental damages. There is also evidence to 
suggest that citizens are increasingly making use of the environmental complaints system 
(Shi & Zhang, 2006; Brettell, 2008). According to Anna Brettell (2008), recent increases 
in environmental complaints suggest that institutionalised channels for voicing 
complaints are improving. Mol and Carter (2006: 161) suggest that citizen complaints 
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represent a relatively effective avenue for influencing the authorities. Yet they maintain 
that this remains a ‘poor’ form of participation (Ibid.). Elsewhere, it has been shown that 
homeowner groups have, in several small-scale cases, cited environmental legislation in a 
bid to defend their properties from local governmental developments (Zhu & Ho, 2008; 
Zhu & Wang, 2008). Finally, another way in which ordinary citizens have attempted to 
influence environmental outcomes has been through popular protest (Jing, 2000). 
 
The Chinese media has been identified as an increasingly important actor in 
environmental protection. Several studies have noted that the Chinese government is 
giving the media more leeway in its reporting of domestic environmental issues, 
especially since the early 1990s (Wen, 1998). In a case study examining media coverage 
of an environmental administrative dispute in Guangdong province, Qing-Jie Wang 
(2005: 301-2) argues that the extensive media reporting that occurred in the beginning of 
the case was unprecedented, and that ‘the news media… played a pivotal role in 
promoting or boosting transparency in the process of environmental governance’. 
However, in this case the government subsequently enforced a media blackout, 
highlighting how the media is very much subject to local state control (Ibid.). According 
to Yang and Calhoun (2007: 229), the media has contributed to the rise of what they term 
a ‘fledgling green public sphere’ where environmental discourse can take root. They 
argue that this green public sphere is shaped to a significant extent by citizens and NGOs, 
as opposed to being dominated by the Party-state. And, as Yiyi Lu (2007) has noted, the 
role of the media in the Nu River campaign was very important. 
 
Chinese environmental civil society has attracted the interest of a number of scholars. 
However, there are some important gaps in the literature. This is particularly the case in 
terms of civil society’s influence on environmental governance. One significant gap in 
the literature concerns the ways in which civil society interacts with the environmental 
state. As noted above, the Chinese Party-state has introduced top-down reforms designed 
to improve accountability and transparency through the promotion of public participation 
via media such as public hearings, and information disclosure. Although it has been 
mentioned as an issue (Tang & Zhan, 2008), no studies have investigated the extent to 
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which reform in the environmental state impacts on civil society, and affects state-society 
relations. And yet reforms such as promoting public participation and information 
disclosure appear designed to extend environmental governance to civil society. 
Likewise, no studies examine whether or not civil society can play a role in helping to 
promote and cement these reforms. Another gap in the literature concerns the extent to 
which Chinese environmental civil society can promote participation, accountability, 
transparency, and rule of law. As noted above, some scholars have claimed that civil 
society can be important in this regard. And yet they have not examined this issue in 
detail. These are significant gaps: if civil society can indeed promote better governance 
processes, it is important to understand how it does so. 
 
Another shortcoming in the literature examining Chinese environmental civil society is 
its bias towards environmental NGOs. These organisations arguably have an important 
role to play in China’s environmental governance. However, the role of ‘citizen activists’, 
or activists who pursue their goals outside of the NGO community, is also central to 
understandings of how environmental civil society affects governance. The fact that 
citizen activism has been examined to a much lesser extent than NGO activity may lead 
to distorted conclusions regarding the role of civil society in environmental governance. 
In particular, there is a need to disaggregate ‘civil society’ into different types of actor in 
order to examine the ways in which they influence environmental governance. 
 
Main Questions 
In order to address gaps in the literature identified above that relate to China’s 
environmental state and civil society, I examine the following main questions: How is the 
Chinese Party-state attempting to address the country’s environmental protection 
implementation deficit by the introduction of new governance arrangements and policies? 
What are the main obstacles to a more diverse ‘governance’ approach to environmental 
protection in the PRC? How does Chinese environmental civil society react to 
developments in the environmental state that extend governance beyond the bureaucracy, 
and what are the implications for state-society relations in the environmental protection 
sphere? To what extent do China’s environmental governance reforms examined in this 
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thesis represent a convergence with the more diverse governance arrangements that have 
emerged in some advanced industrialised nations?  
 
This thesis examines several original case studies in order to address these main 
questions. In does so by using an analytical framework that draws on the ‘governance’ 
and ‘good governance’ concepts (see below). Specifically, this thesis looks in detail at 
attempts to change local official behaviour. It does so by examining how incentives are 
being introduced for local officials to pay more attention to environmental issues via the 
green GDP initiative. It also considers the implications of a series of so-called 
‘environmental storms’ that were launched by the MEP in order to improve enforcement. 
Although environmental storms resemble traditional ‘command-and-control’ tactics, this 
case also highlights the role of the media in promoting environmental governance reform. 
This thesis also examines in detail government policies designed to increase public 
participation in the EIA process, and environmental information disclosure. It considers 
the ways in which these policies have affected Chinese environmental NGOs, and how 
these organisations have attempted to promote these policies. Finally, I examine the role 
that citizen activists played in relation to several high-profile cases of localised 
opposition to infrastructure projects in Xiamen, Shanghai, Beijing, and Chengdu. In 
doing so, I contrast these activists’ approach with that of environmental NGOs. 
 
The Governance Concept 
The governance perspective provides a useful framework through which changes in 
governing styles can be understood (Stoker, 1998a). In political science literature, the 
notion of ‘shifts in governance’ has been used in order to explain the emergence of new 
governing processes in place of, or alongside, traditional, formal, and institutional 
channels, that have occurred in the private, semi-private, and public spheres (Pierre, 
2000; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). It has been claimed that the governance 
perspective can offer fresh insights that might not otherwise be apparent (Stoker, 1998a). 
According to Pierre (2000: 241), ‘governance theory has tremendous potential in opening 
up alternative ways of looking at political institutions, domestic-global linkages, trans-
national co-operation, and different forms of public-private exchange’.  
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This thesis utilises the governance perspective in order to improve understandings of 
environmental governing processes in China. The term ‘governance’ is employed in 
different ways by various academic disciplines, and its meaning varies greatly across 
different contexts. At the heart of the governance concept lies the notion that 
‘governance’ is broader in scope than ‘government’ in that it includes non-state actors, 
including the private sector and civil society, as well as formal governmental institutions 
and actors, in the governing process (Rhodes, 2000: 61; Van Kersbergen & Van 
Waarden, 2004: 151). As a result, governance blurs the boundaries between the state and 
non-state sectors (Stoker, 1998a: 17). I adopt a definition of governance put forward by 
Gerry Stoker (1998b: 38). According to Stoker, ‘[the] essence of governance is the 
interactive relationship between and within government and non-governmental forces’. 
As Jan Kooiman (2003: 5) notes, ‘interactions as a social phenomenon, and governing 
interactions as a specific type of them, are a rich source for analysing and synthesising 
insights into many facets of governance’. 
 
As noted above, in recent years the realisation that environmental problems are becoming 
increasingly complex, diverse, and severe, has emerged. In order to address these issues 
and maintain their ability to ‘steer’ society, governments have reached out to previously 
uninvolved actors such as the market and civil society, in order that they can become 
partners in governance (Kooiman, 2003). In the field of public administration, regulatory 
command-and-control approaches are sometimes seen as the essence of ‘government’, 
whereas those that go beyond this type of approach are equated with a ‘governance’ 
perspective (Jordan et al, 2005). By extending governance beyond formal institutional 
structures, policy goals can be better achieved. 
 
Arthur Mol and Neil Carter (2006) have applied the concept of ‘environmental 
governance’ to the Chinese case. This thesis also adopts a governance perspective in 
analysing developments in China’s environmental state and environmental civil society. 
It focuses on the interactive relationship between these two spheres. For the purposes of 
this thesis, civil society is disaggregated into three main categories. I identify and 
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distinguish between two types of environmental activism in China. These are public 
interest activism, which includes NGOs and other non-state actors that work primarily on 
environmental issues for the public good. The second type of activism considered in this 
thesis is private interest activism, which incorporates groups and individuals who 
campaign primarily in defence of their own private interests when they are threatened by 
environmental issues.11 In addition, this thesis includes the media in its definition of 
Chinese environmental civil society. 
 
Good Governance 
In examining environmental governance in China, I focus on the issues of accountability, 
participation, rule of law, and transparency. In the wider literature, these issues have been 
conceptualised as ‘good governance’.  
 
The good governance concept was developed in the field of ‘international development’, 
and became prominent in development discourse from the late 1980s. Good governance 
is essentially concerned with promoting better conditions in aid recipient countries in 
order to facilitate development and ensure that aid is used effectively (Nanda, 2006: 269-
70). One way of ensuring this has been to attach political conditionalities to recipient 
countries under the rubric of good governance (Doornbos, 2003). It is precisely because 
of this that the notion of good governance has attracted controversy, with some seeing it 
as a loaded concept. For example, according to Martin Doornbos (Ibid.: 6), a central aim 
of good governance has been ‘to establish new institutional patterns of global hegemony’ 
based on Western neo-liberal values.12 
 
Adrian Leftwich (1994: 371) has attempted to differentiate between various prominent 
interpretations of good governance by identifing three levels of good governance: 
systemic, political, and administrative. The latter is closely associated with international 
                                                   
11 This distinction is borrowed from Benjamin Read (2007: 172), who uses it to distinguish between 
Chinese home-owner groups which are primarily committed to the private interest, and public interest-
oriented NGOs. 
12 According to Weiss (2000; 803), the trend of linking the ‘rolling back’ of the state in order to promote 
good governance has since given way to attempts at improving and reforming democratic institutions and 
cultivating a more active and creative non-state realm. 
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development agencies (IDAs) such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB). Due to the fact that they have been mandated as apolitical organisations, these 
IDAs have focused on achieving good governance through improving countries’ 
administration and management. In contrast, western governments acting as bilateral 
donors initially promoted good governance in more overtly systemic and political terms 
(Leftwich, 1994: 365-6), emphasising the perceived relationship between good 
governance and neo-liberal values such as democratisation, state downsizing, and free 
market economics (Minogue, 2002: 121). However, in employing the good governance 
concept, the line that separates the political from the apolitical can be blurred, making it 
difficult for IDAs such as the World Bank to separate economic considerations from 
political ones (Nanda, 2006).  
 
Good governance has received further criticism for being too vague and overly idealistic. 
George Philip (2007: 228) suggested that, ‘[The World Bank] seems to be advocating not 
so much good governance as perfect governance’. According to such a view, good 
governance is difficult, if not impossible, to attain. The concept has also been criticised 
for failing to take into account different countries’ unique historical and political 
backgrounds due to its ‘one size fits all’ tendency (Beeson, 2001; Philip, 2007).  
 
Despite these criticisms, however, the good governance criteria of accountability, 
transparency, predictability, and participation (see below) can still be usefully employed 
in analysing environmental governance reform in China. Good governance is useful 
because it can be used as an analytical yardstick for evaluating governance reform. In 
addition, as well as having entered Chinese political discourse (Yu, 2006; Zhang, 2007), 
scholars have suggested that good governance (in an administrative and managerial 
sense) is being promoted by the Chinese central government (Zhang, 2006; Zheng, 2006; 
Zhang, 2007). In keeping with the way in which good governance is employed in a 
Chinese context, this thesis steers away from the more overtly political interpretations of 
good governance. Instead, it defines good governance in administrative and managerial 
terms. 
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Despite there being no objective criteria for measuring the concept (Nanda, 2006: 269), 
there is a variety of subjective criteria in use. The World Bank (1992) has highlighted 
four mutually reinforcing and supporting ‘pillars’ that it sees as essential to good 
governance, namely accountability, transparency, predictability, and participation.13 
Accountability is essentially premised on the ability of government officials to answer for 
their actions (Sibbel, 2005: 7). Public officials should also be responsive to the entity 
from which they derive their authority to rule (Asian Development Bank, 1995: 8). 
Transparency means that the rules and functions by which a government operates are 
clear (Sibbel, 2005: 7). In addition, information is readily accessible to members of the 
public through channels including a free media and legislation that compels public 
officials to release information if requested (Asian Development Bank, 1995: 11). 
Predictability is closely associated with the rule of law. It means that laws, regulations, 
and policies are in place to regulate society, and, crucially, are applied in a fair and 
consistent manner. Also of importance is that state actors are just as answerable to the 
law as non-state actors (Asian Development Bank, 1995: 10). Finally, participation is 
concerned with providing a role for the public in development, be it by individuals or 
through NGOs. It assumes the position that governance can be improved if the people 
who are affected by development are also given influence as agents of development 
(Ibid.: 9).  
 
Proponents of good governance argue that it can facilitate the successful implementation 
of government policies. As the ADB (1995: v) argues, regardless of which policies are 
chosen by governments, good governance is required to guarantee that those policies 
result in their desired outcomes. At the same time, correct policies may not translate into 
effective action if good governance is absent (Ibid.: 4). Good governance has also been 
promoted as vital for ensuring sustainable development (OECD, 2005: 11). If 
successfully established, good governance can change the whole decision-making culture 
of a country in terms of how decisions are made and carried out (UNDP, 2002: 72). 
 
                                                   
13 This interpretation of good governance is also accepted by the Asian Development Bank. 
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Summary of the Arguments 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution in several ways. First, it seeks to document and 
analyse ways in which the Chinese Party-state is attempting to reform environmental 
governance. As noted above, although some studies have started to address these issues, 
there are several important gaps in our understandings of these reforms. This thesis 
addresses some of these gaps by introducing several in-depth case studies, which are 
based on a large quantity of previously unexamined empirical material. I argue that the 
Chinese Party-state has identified governance reform as a vital part of improving 
environmental protection. In the past few years it has continued to take steps to extend 
governance to non-state actors. It has done so by introducing policies and legislation 
designed to facilitate public participation and information disclosure. In addition, this 
thesis shows how the MEP has attempted to reach out to non-state actors, including the 
media, in order to raise its profile and promote environmental protection policies. In 
doing so, the MEP is turning to a new way of governing that is designed to overcome its 
relatively weak institutional position and supplement China’s regulatory approach to 
environmental protection.  
 
At the same time, not all governance reforms originate in the Party-state. This thesis finds 
that non-state actors also impact on governance processes. In this respect, it subscribes to 
the ‘states in society’ approach that stresses the mutually transformative nature of state-
society relations (Migdal et al, 1994). I introduce the concept of ‘policy pioneers’ in order 
to show how civil society actors can contribute to the establishment of new governance 
norms. I show how civil society can help consolidate reforms emanating from the Party-
state by ‘pioneering’ environmental governance policies. The ‘policy pioneers’ concept is 
not necessarily in conflict with existing conceptualisations of state-society relations in 
China’s environmental protection sphere, the most notable of which is Peter Ho and 
Richard Edmond’s (2007) notion of ‘embedded activism’. However, whereas previous 
studies of state-society relations in China’s environmental sphere focus on the power 
relationship between these two actors (Saich, 2000; Ho, 2001; Cooper, 2006; Ho & 
Edmonds, 2007), my employment of a governance perspective highlights important ways 
in which this relationship can be interactive and mutually beneficial. By showing how 
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environmental activists have been successful in terms of putting new policies designed to 
promote public participation and information disclosure into practice, I find that 
interactions between the environmental state and civil society are potentially important in 
terms of advancing environmental governance processes in China and promoting a 
Chinese version of ‘good governance’.  
 
This thesis makes a further important contribution to understandings of state-society 
relations by identifying and distinguishing between environmental public and private 
interest activists. As noted above, the vast majority of studies examining Chinese 
environmental civil society have focused on NGOs. In the process, these studies largely 
overlook what I define in this thesis as private interest activism. Furthermore, existing 
studies do not make a clear conceptual distinction between different forms of Chinese 
environmental activism. This thesis shows how public and private interest activists differ 
in terms of their tactics and the nature of their aims. Public interest activists view 
environmental governance reform as an important step along the road towards better 
environmental protection in China. This thesis shows how, in several cases, public 
interest activists have attempted to promote a new and more participatory governance 
approach that may provide these activists with greater means to influence environmental 
outcomes in the future. However, this may depend upon the institutionalisation of the 
reforms related to public participation and information disclosure that this thesis 
examines. As a result, promotion of these policies has become an end in itself for many 
public interest activists. On the other hand, private interest activists are arguably less 
concerned with promoting governance reform per se. Their primary concern is the 
favourable resolution of issues that affect their own private interests. And yet private 
interest activsts can also help pioneer new governance policies. Officials may respond to 
relatively contentious private interest activism by discharging their public participation 
responsibilities in order to appease these activists. At the same time, I show how private 
interest activists have put pressure on officials to incorporate their concerns into decision-
making processes. This is because these activists believe that they stand a greater chance 
of being successful if officials are compelled to open up channels for soliciting public 
opinion.   
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At the same time, I also find that civil society continues to face considerable obstacles 
despite some recent initiatives emanating from the environmental state. These obstacles, 
which arise mainly from China’s authoritarian political system, limit the extent to which 
it has been able to improve governance processes. More widely, this thesis finds that, 
despite there being some positive aspects of Chinese environmental reform, there are 
significant obstacles to the adoption of the more diverse environmental governance 
approach some have claimed is occurring in advanced industrialised nations. As a result, 
I argue that the extent to which China’s environmental protection system is converging 
with those of advanced industrialised nations is very limited. 
 
Methodology 
The findings derived from this thesis are primarily based upon a wide range of original 
Chinese language documentary materials. I draw on a large quantity of Chinese media 
reports from state-owned and private sector publications. These include interviews with 
government officials, activists, and other relevant actors, opinion pieces, and factual 
accounts referring to some of the case studies that are examined in this thesis. In addition, 
I make use of media reports from non-Chinese sources. I also refer to a large quantity of 
relevant government documents, including State Council decisions on the environment, 
and MEP legislation, policies, news circulars, and speeches. Furthermore, this thesis 
refers to a wide range of documents from public and private interest activists. These 
include documents referring to NGO campaigns that have been placed in the public 
sphere by activists, as well as some material that was obtained through personal contacts. 
These materials include NGO public announcements, letters to government officials and 
polluting enterprises, transcripts of meetings and public hearings, and various opinion 
pieces published by environmental organisations. Where relevant, I make use of materials 
from Internet blogs. 
 
Two field trips to China, from June-September 2006 and October-December 2007, were 
undertaken as part of the work for this thesis. During these trips, approximately 20 
interviews and informal discussions were held between myself and academics from 
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Chinese universities and the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences, NGO activists, 
GONGOs, and journalists. The majority of interviews are not cited in the text of this 
thesis because they did not provide information that deviated from that available in 
documentary materials. There may be several reasons why this was the case. It may have 
been that the official version of events did not deviate from the experiences of the 
interviewees. Another possible reason is that, although many interviewees were very 
welcoming towards me, it is possible that they preferred to feed me the official version of 
events rather than providing information that might jeopardise their own positions. As a 
PhD student in China I was seen as a junior figure, and did not always get the level of 
access that I hoped for. For example, although obtaining interviews with Chinese NGOs 
was not difficult, in the majority of cases I was only given access to relatively junior 
members of staff, which may have affected the quality of information that I was able to 
procure. Furthermore, in the majority of cases, I had to ‘cold call’ potential interviewees 
rather than relying on personal connections and mutual trust that might have smoothed 
this process. This may also explain why I found it difficult to talk to senior figures in 
environmental NGOs, and it certainly accounts for why I was unable to interview any 
central government officials. During my fieldwork I did begin to cultivate personal 
relationships with various environmental activists. For example, for the past two years I 
have been helping one environmental NGO translate documents from Chinese to English. 
Although I did not reap much benefit from this during my two field trips, I intend to 
continue to cultivate relations with this NGO in order to conduct further research in the 
future. 
 
I attended several events including NGO-organised journalists’ salons where journalists 
were invited to listen to presentations from environmental experts and discuss the 
implications. In October 2007 I attended an NGO conference organised by the 
government-organised NGO China Association for NGO Cooperation, in order to 
ascertain the main issues facing the NGO sector. Where relevant, these interviews are 
cited in the dissertation, although due to ethical considerations the names of interviewees 
as well as any other information that might reveal their identities have been anonymised. 
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This dissertation examines several case studies in detail. It is necessary to explain the 
choice of cases. Most of the cases that I examine were relatively high profile. The green 
GDP, environmental storm, Yuanmingyuan public hearing, Nu River case, and the cases 
of private interest activism that I look at all attracted a significant amount of media 
coverage and debate. The other case studies were lower profile but nonetheless still quite 
widely reported in the domestic media. A key factor in the choice of cases was the 
availability (or otherwise) of a large quantity of documentary materials. Due to 
difficulties in gaining access to interviewees, documentary materials were a vital source 
of information for this thesis. As a result, it was necessary to select cases for which I 
could find sufficient documentary evidence. In addition, during my fieldtrips to China it 
was these cases that interviewees saw as being the most significant in terms of explaining 
the trajectory of environmental governance reform in China. For example, the green GDP 
and environmental storm initiatives received a huge amount of interest in the Chinese 
media, which in turn made it possible for me to find sufficient documentary evidence in 
order to conduct a detailed case study. The Yuanmingyuan case was seen as an important 
test case for public participation in China, and it remains the only national-level 
environmental public hearing to have been convened in the PRC. I chose to look at 
information disclosure partly because the activists with whom I spoke during my field 
trips viewed this as a potentially important policy. Activists also discussed with me the 
perceived importance of the Xiamen anti-PX demonstrations, which led me to also 
investigate other similar cases in Beijing, Chengdu, and Shanghai. During my discussions 
with people involved in environmental protection in China, the cases that I examine in 
this thesis were referred to repeatedly as representing significant developments in 
Chinese environmental governance. This is also supported by the high level of media 
interest that accompanied these cases. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 traces the evolution of environmental 
protection efforts in the PRC. This chapter draws mainly on secondary material, as well 
as many primary materials including policy statements from the State Council and MEP, 
Chinese media reports, and official speeches, to set out changes in China’s system of 
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environmental governance before 2009. In keeping with the emphasis of this thesis, it 
focuses on the environmental state and civil society. In examining the evolution of 
China’s environmental governance system, it finds that recent trends towards a stronger 
environmental state that have been observed by other scholars are being consolidated. In 
addition, reforms identified in the literature designed to move away from a regulatory 
approach towards a more diverse ‘governance’ approach to environmental protection 
have accelerated in the past decade. However, it also suggests that merely strengthening 
the environmental state is not sufficient to ameliorate China’s environmental problems. 
Chapter 2 also looks at the evolution of Chinese environmental civil society, arguing that 
it has become more active during the past five years. 
  
Chapter 3 focuses on attempts by the central government to improve local officials’ 
environmental performance and accountability. It uses original and detailed case studies 
of two recent MEP initiatives, namely green GDP and so-called ‘environmental 
storms’.14 The former represented an attempt to institutionalise a system of green 
accounting that could ultimately supplant traditional GDP as one of the main indicators 
of cadre performance. It was hoped that this would encourage local officials to develop in 
a more environmentally friendly and resource efficient manner. Although other studies 
have already looked at China’s green GDP scheme, this chapter examines it in much 
greater detail, drawing on a wide body of empirical materials. It is also the first to 
consider why green GDP has largely failed to achieve its aims.  
 
In the period from 2005-2007, the MEP launched three ‘environmental storms’, which 
refer to a series of high-profile crackdowns on large-scale construction projects that were 
in violation of environmental legislation. Although widely reported in the media, this 
chapter presents the first scholarly account of these crackdowns. Despite having arguably 
attained their goals, environmental storms are by their very nature one-off ‘command and 
control’ campaigns that do little to change long-term behaviour. They also show how top-
                                                   
14 The term ‘environmental storm’ is adopted in this thesis reflecting its widespread use in the Chinese 
media and environmental protection circles. It should not be interpreted as a negative term, rather it is used 
to connote the sudden and aggressive sweeping away of bad environmental practice by the central 
authorities.  
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down campaigns are still a prominent feature of environmental governance in China. 
Both initiatives were made possible by heightened concern in the central leadership for 
environmental issues. In addition, they show how the MEP has been skilful in utilising 
the media in order to go beyond its institutional limitations. This chapter concludes that, 
although the two initiatives raised the profile of environment and resource issues in 
China, they also highlight the limitations inherent in top-down efforts designed to 
improve official accountability for environmental protection when economic growth 
remains the overriding priority.  
 
The extent to which the Party-state has created room for formal public participation in 
environmental protection is addressed in Chapter 4. In recent years, the MEP has argued 
that public participation should be protected and promoted as a constitutional right of the 
Chinese people. To this end, legislation has been promulgated by the MEP and the State 
Council that makes provisions for public participation in environmental protection, most 
notably through public hearings under the EIA and Administrative Licensing processes. 
This chapter documents and analyses this emerging body of legislation, suggesting that it 
aims to create a more orderly system of public participation based on the rule of law. It 
then considers what this means in practice through examining in detail the case of 
China’s first national level environmental public hearing that was held in 2005 at 
Yuanmingyuan (the Old Summer Palace) in Beijing. This is a well-known case of an 
MEP attempt to promote public participation through official channels. This chapter 
draws on a wide array of original documentary materials in order to examine and improve 
understandings of this case and its significance for environmental governance in China. It 
is the first study to examine the role played by civil society activists leading up to, during, 
and after the hearing. It argues that, although activists had close personal involvement 
with Yuanmingyuan and cared about the outcome, this was ultimately secondary to the 
goal of cooperating with the MEP in promoting and legitimising more participatory 
governance processes. Although public hearings of this type are still extremely rare in 
China, this chapter suggests that cases such as Yuanmingyuan are important as they raise 
the profile of new governance processes. However, at present formal publication does 
note represent an effective way for citizens to hold officials to account.  
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Chapter 4 also examines one aspect of the campaign against hydropower development in 
Yunnan. Public interest activists have pressed the central government to adhere to its own 
public participation legislation and convene a public hearing regarding the proposed 
hydropower development on the Nu River. And yet, these calls have not been adhered to, 
and it appears that the hydropower development on the Nu River will proceed without 
any formal public participation. This suggests that discharging public participation 
requirements as mandated by legislation is still done arbitrarily. Nevertheless, this 
chapter also suggests that officials have been influenced by civil society in relation to 
another hydropower development in Yunnan at Ahai. For the first time, officials 
presiding over a hydropower project opened up the process to allow public comments. In 
addition, NGO representatives were invited to take part in an experts’ meeting regarding 
the project. This appears to have been partly related to NGO pressure for officials to carry 
out public participation obligations in the Nu River case, suggesting that, to a limited 
degree, public interest activists are able to contribute to the establishment of new 
governance norms. At the same time, this chapter finds that public interest activists are 
better placed to promote public participation reforms emanating from the government as 
opposed to actively forming links with the genuine  ‘grassroots’. 
 
Information disclosure is viewed as a vital prerequisite to public participation. It is also 
closely linked to the transparency issue in good governance. Chapter 5 explores recent 
state policies designed to improve access to environmental information in order to 
pressurise companies and officials into improving their environmental performance. It is 
the first study of the MEP’s ‘Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure (Trial 
Version)’ which came into effect on 1 May 2008, and which compel the release of 
environmental information under certain circumstances. Chapter 5 suggests that since the 
turn of the century the Chinese government has stepped up efforts to promote 
environmental information disclosure. Moreover, information disclosure is increasingly 
being used to pressurise polluters rather than being confined to ‘state of the environment’ 
reports. 
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This chapter examines how greater information disclosure affects environmental NGOs. 
It argues that the government’s policy to promote greater transparency in environmental 
governance has legitimised the work of civil society organisations in this area. It presents 
the first scholarly case study of the first Chinese NGO involved in information disclosure, 
the Institute for Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), which was founded in 2007. The 
IPE has been hailed in sections of the western media as a groundbreaking NGO. This 
chapter, however, notes that its existence was only made possible through state approval 
of increased information disclosure. This chapter then examines two NGO campaigns 
designed to use environmental information to pressurise, or encourage, polluting 
companies to operate in a more environmentally friendly manner. In relation to the 
‘Green Choice’ campaign, it finds that multinational corporations (MNCs) have been 
held accountable by the Chinese media and NGOs to a far greater extent than domestic 
companies. Although NGOs have successfully pressurised several MNCs to pay more 
attention to environmental protection through this campaign, they have been unable to 
exert influence over the vast majority of polluting enterprises. This is mainly due to their 
use of non-contentious tactics, and highlights a limitation of public interest activism. The 
second campaign concerns an attempt by several NGOs to block the listing of Gold East 
Paper, which was set up by the paper manufacturer Asia Pulp and Paper Company 
Limited, and six subsidiary companies, on the Chinese stock exchange. Although this 
issue has yet to be resolved, this case shows the obstacles that exist with regards holding 
enterprises to account through official channels. This chapter concludes that, without 
more freedom for civil society, information disclosure is unlikely to lead to better civil 
society oversight. This in turn highlights some of the limitations inherent in a governance 
approach to environmental protection in authoritarian China. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the extent to which private interest activists can promote ‘good 
governance’ in Chinese environmental governance. It considers four previously unstudied 
cases whereby groups of citizens organised to oppose development projects partially on 
environmental grounds. The first case to be examined occurred in Xiamen in 2007. 
Residents who opposed local government plans to construct a factory manufacturing 
large quantities of the chemical paraxylene (PX) organised via the Internet and mobile 
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phones and conducted a large, but peaceful, demonstration. The second case took place in 
Shanghai in 2007, when plans to extend the city’s maglev train system to within 30 
metres of some people’s houses drew opposition resulting in a series of peaceful 
demonstrations. The third case centred on residents’ opposition to the construction of a 
waste incineration plant in the Liulitun area of Beijing. Finally, this chapter examines 
public opposition in Chengdu regarding plans to construct an ethylene plant and an oil 
refinery nearby. In the first three cases, organised public pressure that demanded a more 
transparent and accountable decision-making process appears to have helped activists win 
concessions from officials. Not only were the three projects suspended, officials who had 
initially largely ignored formal public participation requirements incorporated greater 
public participation after coming under pressure from activists. Activists in Chengdu, 
however, appear to have been less successful. Rather than engaging with citizens, local 
officials were able to contain the unrest. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that private 
interest activists can be important actors in consolidating governance reforms that 
emanate from the central state in the defence of their private interests. They are also 
important in terms of promoting accountability, transparency, rule of law, and 
participation in environmental protection. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 sums up the findings of this thesis and offers some conclusions. It 
discusses the implications of these findings in terms of China’s environmental state and 
civil society. It also examines the obsacles that hinder environmental governance reform 
in China. In addition, Chapter 7 looks at the relevance of the findings in terms of political 
reform in the PRC.  
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Chapter 2: Developments and Trends in China’s 
Environmental State and Civil Society 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, serious environmental problems have accompanied 
China’s rapid industrialisation and economic growth. In order to address these problems, 
in the early 1970s the Chinese government took its first steps towards establishing a 
comprehensive, nationwide environmental protection bureaucracy and legislative 
framework. The development and strengthening of China’s ‘environmental state’, which 
incorporates state agencies and their policies (Mol & Carter, 2006), has continued 
throughout the reform period up until the present day. In addition, as environmental 
problems have intensified, the Chinese government has tolerated the emergence of 
environmental civil society, including NGO and citizen activism, and greater media 
coverage of environmental issues. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed overview of the evolution of China’s 
environmental state, and civil society from the Maoist era up until the present day. This is 
necessary given this thesis’s focus on these two elements of China’s environmental 
governance system. In addition to drawing on a significant amount of secondary material, 
this chapter also refers to government policy documents and official communications, as 
well as media reports, in order to update the existing literature and reflect important 
developments that have occurred in the past couple of years. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, it analyses shortcomings in China’s system of 
environmental protection, focusing on issues such as the weakness of the environmental 
protection bureaucracy in terms of ranking and resources, and the difficulties associated 
with enforcing environmental legislation when confronted by growth-oriented local 
officials. It then details chronologically the main legislative, institutional, and policy 
developments relating to environmental protection in China. This chapter finds that the 
trend towards strengthening China’s environmental state, as identified by various 
scholars (Jahiel, 1998; World Bank, 2001; Economy, 2004; Mol & Carter, 2006), is 
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continuing as environmental and resource issues continue to rise up the political agenda. 
Despite this positive trend, this chapter notes that there are still fundamental weaknesses 
in China’s environmental state that have yet to be successfully addressed. Although 
policies designed to strengthen the environmental state should be welcomed, it is unlikely 
that this alone will be sufficient in order to resolve China’s environmental challenge. 
 
The second part of this chapter then examines the emergence of environmental civil 
society in China. It shows how the role of civil society actors in environmental protection 
increased throughout the 1990s. A notable success came in 2003-2004 when NGOs 
played an important role in opposing a hydropower project on the Nu River in Yunnan 
province, leading to the temporary suspension of the project by Premier Wen Jiabao. In 
addition, this chapter discusses how media reporting of environmental issues has been 
encouraged by the state, and ordinary citizens are increasingly holding officials to 
account through the complaints process. This suggests that, under certain circumstances, 
civil society can play an important role in environmental governance. However, this 
chapter also notes that the Party-state exerts considerable influence over Chinese 
environmental civil society. Environmental organisations remain constrained by a 
difficult registration process, and environmental activism can still bring ordinary people 
into conflict with government officials. Furthermore, following the prominent role of 
NGOs in pro-democracy ‘colour revolutions’ in parts of the former Eastern Bloc, notably 
in Georgia (2003), the Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), the political environment 
for NGOs in China has become more restricted. 
 
Environmental Protection in the PRC: Current Institutions and Challenges 
This section provides a brief overview of China’s environmental protection institutions at 
the central and local level, as well as considering issues related to environmental 
legislation in China. It also considers major shortcomings in China’s environmental state. 
Subsequent sections expand on some of these points. 
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Institutional Overview 
At the central level, the government body with overall responsibility for environmental 
protection is the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP).15 Its main duties include 
drafting legislation, dealing with large-scale environmental accidents, nuclear safety, and 
international cooperation in the field of environmental protection. The MEP is also 
responsible for various aspects of pollution control, including the setting of pollution 
standards (State Council, 2008). The Environmental Protection and Natural Resources 
Conservation Committee (EPNRCC), under the National People’s Congress (NPC), was 
created in 1993 and is responsible for providing regulatory proposals to the NPC 
Standing Committee (Ma & Ortolano, 2000: 14). Although the State Council is, in 
principle, the executive arm of government, it also provides draft laws to the NPC 
Standing Committee (Ibid.). In addition, numerous central government departments, 
including the National Development and Resources Commission (NDRC), State 
Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Water Resources, and the State 
Forestry Administration, affect environmental issues.16 
 
The MEP is replicated at the provincial, municipal, and county levels by environmental 
protection bureaus (EPB), which are responsible for ensuring that central level policy is 
implemented at local levels (Jahiel, 1998). More specifically, EPBs oversee those 
environmental impact assessments that do not require top-level guidance, monitor 
emissions from factories, assess and collect pollution fees, and, where necessary, take 
legal action against polluting firms (Economy, 2005: 103). At present, there are 
approximately 2,000 EPBs, employing about 60,000 personnel (Economy, 2005). As 
noted in the previous chapter (and expanded on below), EPBs come under the influence 
of local governments, which can have a negative impact on their work due to the 
prioritisation of economic growth by many local officials. Other government actors 
whose work relates to environmental issues at the local level include Local People’s 
Congresses, which create environmental statutes and which also supervise EPBs; 
                                                   
15 Unless where necessary for clarification purposes, this chapter uses the term ‘MEP’ to refer to the central 
level environmental protection agency. For information on the various incarnations of China’s central-level 
environmental protection agency, see subsequent sections in this chapter. 
16 For a comprehensive list of government departments involved in environmental protection, see Ferris Jr. 
& Zhang (2005: 73). 
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planning and economic commissions; industrial bureaus, which have a role to play in 
everyday pollution abatement; and mayors’ offices (Ma & Ortolano, 2000: 55-76). In 
addition, civil society is playing an increasingly prominent role in environmental 
protection.  
 
Environmental Legislation 
As noted in the previous chapter, China has promulgated 20 environmental statutes, over 
40 State Council regulations, 500 standards, and over 600 other documents that create 
legal norms concerning various environmental issues (Ferris Jr. & Zhang, 2005: 75-6). It 
is also estimated that over 1000 pieces of local environmental legislation have also been 
passed (Ibid.: 80). This body of environmental legislation has been described as ‘one of 
the region’s most dynamic environmental law frameworks’ (Ibid.: 75). However, China’s 
environmental legislation has also been widely criticised (Alford & Shen, 1997; Palmer, 
1998; Beyer, 2006; Van Rooij, 2006b). Environmental legislation is often vague and 
ambiguous to the extent that it frequently bears more resemblance to policy statements 
than laws (Alford & Shen, 1997: 134-5). It also suffers from a significant degree of 
overlap and contradiction (Beyer, 2006).  
 
These shortcomings are largely due to the extensive bargaining process between 
government departments that characterises the drafting of Chinese environmental 
legislation. When government departments with varying mandates bargain over the 
content of environmental legislation, laws and regulations are frequently ‘watered down’ 
(Economy, 2004: 103).17 Although Benjamin Van Rooij (2006b: 96-9) has argued that 
environmental legislation has become stricter and clearer since the 1996 ‘State Council 
Decision Regarding Certain Environmental Protection Problems’, he also notes that it 
still suffers from being weak and vague. 
 
                                                   
17 According to Benjamin Van Rooij (2006b: 71), ambitious clauses relating to information disclosure, 
public participation, and EPB reform were dropped from the final draft of the 1996 Water Pollution 
Prevention Law due to extensive bargaining. And, as Chapter 4 of this thesis notes, the watering down of 
environmental legislation is still an issue. 
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Furthermore, environmental legislation has been accused of sometimes being out of step 
with local realities. This in turn hinders enforcement. Van Rooij (2006b: 365-6) argues, 
in relation to Lake Dianchi in Yunnan, that,  
Lawmaking and enforcement failed to find a balance between the goals of 
the law and law enforcement on the one hand, and the dominant local 
interests and circumstances of the cases of behaviour such laws and 
enforcement were aiming to change, which were largely constituted by the 
local economic context, on the other. 
One problem in this regard is that there is only very limited scope for public input into the 
legislation drafting process, despite attempts in the past few years to incorporate public 
views into environmental legislation. Since the turn of the century, it has become 
increasingly common for government bodies to solicit public comments on draft 
legislation. In the environmental field, citizens and NGOs have submitted comments on 
recent pieces of legislation (see Chapter 4). A wide-ranging national survey inviting 
public comments on the environmental protection aspects of the 11th Five-Year Plan 
(FYP) is also evidence of increasing scope for public involvement in environmental 
policy making (Shi & Zhang, 2006: 288-9). However, in reality public input remains 
limited. 
 
In the past few years there have been moves to address the various weaknesses in 
environmental legislation. For example, between 2004 and 2007, 35 proposals and 
suggestions regarding the possible revision of the 1989 Environmental Protection Law 
(EPL) were submitted to the National People’s Congress and National Party Congress 
(Zhongguo Jingji Shibao (China Economic Times), 27 February 2007). MEP Vice-
Minister Pan Yue has stated that the EPL needs to be amended in order to better hold 
local officials to account in relation to environmental issues (Ibid.). And, in 2006, the 
MEP announced that it intends to formulate a national environmental policy law in order 
to overcome the problem of contradictory environmental legislation (Fazhi Ribao (Legal 
Daily), 10 January 2006).  
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China’s Environmental Protection Implementation Deficit 
As noted in Chapter 1, despite China’s comprehensive body of environmental legislation 
and nationwide environmental protection bureaucracy, it has been widely acknowledged 
that China suffers from an ‘implementation deficit’, which occurs ‘when legislative and 
policy intent is not translated into practice’ (Weale, 1992: 17).18 Although it has been 
suggested that this implementation deficit might have narrowed in recent years, this has 
not been sufficient to stimulate environmental improvements (Lo et al, 2006). 
 
China’s problems in terms of enforcing environmental legislation can be explained by 
several factors. First, and arguably most important, is the overwhelming emphasis on 
economic growth that has characterised the reform period (Edmonds, 1998; Economy, 
2007). As Eduard Vermeer (1998: 955) has argued, ‘the dominant political group stresses 
economic growth over environmental quality, even if the official policy is that “economic 
growth and environmental protection should go hand in hand, and the one should not go 
at the expense of the other”’. Maintaining high levels of economic growth has become a 
key source of CCP legitimacy in place of the communist ideology that characterised the 
Maoist period. 
 
The prioritisation of economic growth is reflected in the weak position of environmental 
protection departments in the bureaucracy, despite the strengthening of the environmental 
state during the reform period. Although SEPA was promoted to full ministerial status in 
2008 when it became the MEP, the central level environmental protection bureaucracy 
does not have direct control over its local level incarnations, namely EPBs. As well as 
answering to the MEP in a vertical hierarchy, EPBs also come under the influence of the 
local government at the corresponding jurisdictional level. This means that, for example, 
the Shandong provincial EPB is overseen by the MEP and the Shandong provincial 
government simultaneously. However, in reality local governments hold far more 
influence over EPBs than the MEP. EPBs are beholden to local governments for 
promotions and resources (Jahiel, 1998). Due to the incentives created by decentralisation 
and the economic growth imperative (see Chapter 3 for more details), local officials 
                                                   
18 For information on China’s implementation deficit see, for example, OECD (2007). 
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frequently prioritise economic growth above environmental issues (Lieberthal, 1997). 
This impacts on the ability of EPBs to carry out their enforcement obligations. 
 
Because of their weak institutional position, there is a gap between what EPBs are 
officially authorised to do and what they can achieve in practice when enterprises violate 
environmental regulations (Ma & Ortolano, 2000: 116). In reality, EPBs take a pragmatic 
approach to enforcement (Ibid.: 165). Negotiation plays a key role in fee-collection. This 
can result in the reduction or even waiving of fines for loss-making companies (Ibid.: 
119). Furthermore, courts only play a very limited role in environmental enforcement 
(Jahiel, 1998). Another important point is that mayoral offices exert considerable 
influence over EPBs. According to Xiaoying Ma and Leonard Ortolano (2000: 82), ‘an 
EPB director that attempts to challenge a mayor that violates the law runs the risk of 
being fired for violating unwritten rules about the ability of top officials to violate 
environmental laws with impunity’. It should be noted, however, that mayoral influence 
is not necessarily detrimental to the environment as some mayors do promote 
environmental protection in their jurisdictions (Rock, 2002a). 
 
As well as facing political obstacles, China’s environmental protection authorities are 
also hampered by a lack of resources. Although the promotion of SEPA to become the 
MEP increased staff numbers at the central level from 200 to 311 (State Council, 2008), 
this still compares poorly to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, which 
employs approximately 6,000 staff at the federal level in a country of similar size to the 
PRC (Lam, 2006). There has, however, been an increase in spending on environmental 
protection in the past few years. According to Mol and Carter (2006: 154) there has been 
an ‘astonishing’ increase in the amount of money invested by the government in 
environmental protection, from 0.6 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 1.4 per cent of GDP in 
2004. However, according to a 2007 report from the China Academy of Environmental 
Planning, these figures have been exaggerated by over 50 per cent, putting the current 
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amount of money invested in environmental protection at 0.6 per cent of GDP (South 
China Morning Post, 16 February 2007).19 
 
At the local level, EPBs also lack resources. It has been suggested that almost half of the 
country’s industrial economic activities take place outside the monitoring of EPBs (Shi & 
Zhang, 2006: 277). There is an acute lack of funding, especially in poorer provinces 
(Economy, 2005: 111). This in turn partially manifests itself in EPB staff numbers. For 
example, in 1999 the Shanghai EPB’s staff of 100 inspectors was responsible for 
inspecting a jurisdiction that included 20,000 factories (Ibid.: 107). In 2006, an MEP 
official was quoted as stating that environmental protection law enforcement staff needed 
to be increased from their current level of 50,000 to 100,000 or even 150,000 (China 
Daily, 16 October 2006). 
 
China’s Environmental State Under the Planned Economy 
When Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, they embarked on a policy of heavy industrialisation in 
order to modernise China based on the Soviet model. As a result, China started a 
transformation from a predominantly agrarian society towards becoming an industrial and 
manufacturing force by the end of the century. Under Mao, major cities such as Beijing 
were turned into ‘producer cities’, and planning processes largely ignored environmental 
concerns (Murray & Cook, 2002: 39).20 The proportion of national output accounted for 
by industry rose from 28 per cent in the early 1950s to 55 per cent by the end of the 
1970s (Ibid.: 40). Inversely, the share of agriculture in China’s national output fell from 
55 per cent to under 30 per cent in the same period (Ibid.). 
 
The policy of rapid heavy industrialisation had a negative environmental impact, which 
was further exacerbated by Maoist policies that brought about widespread natural 
                                                   
19 According to the South China Morning Post (10 January, 2007), some provinces class items such as the 
construction of petrol stations as investments in environmental protection. 
20 Beijing alone was home to 200 steel mills during the Maoist era, including the giant ‘Capital Steel’ 
(Shougang) plant (Murray & Cook, 2002).  
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destruction. Judith Shapiro (2001) has documented this period extensively.21 She notes 
how nature was frequently portrayed by the central government as something that could 
and should be tamed by humans in the quest for industrialisation and development. This 
sentiment was embodied in slogans of the time such as ‘people must conquer nature’ (ren 
ding sheng tian). A variety of campaigns were designed to achieve just that, including the 
reclamation of land from lakes and rivers for agricultural purposes. One campaign in 
particular, the Great Leap Forward, which was designed to propel China to industrial 
parity with the UK within 15 years, had a devastating impact on the environment as trees 
were chopped down to provide fuel for the numerous backyard furnaces.  
 
Another environmentally damaging legacy to emerge from the pre-reform People’s 
Republic was the commitment to population growth. Maoist thinking dictated that a large 
population equalled a strong country, and those who challenged this view such as scholar 
Ma Yinchu were suppressed (Shapiro, 2001).22 Rapid population growth led to increased 
deforestation, erosion, and the use of fragile land for agricultural purposes in order to 
increase the country’s food supply (Banister, 1998). Population growth is no longer a 
major contributor to environmental degradation due to the present low growth rate. 
However, it has been suggested that the need to create employment for China’s huge 
population could impact negatively on the environment, as social stability is likely to 
trump environmental concerns (Ibid.). 
 
Some laws did emerge that included clauses designed to address certain environmental 
problems during the early Maoist period, such as the ‘Provisional Outline for Water and 
Soil Conservation of 1957’ (Harashima & Morita, 2001: 4), and the ‘State Council 
Directive on Strengthening the Work of Purchases and Utilisation of Waste Products’, 
which introduced the concept of managing and recycling the ‘three wastes’ (san fei), 
namely gaseous emissions, water discharges, and industrial residue (Palmer, 1998: 789). 
In addition, it has been suggested that communes were beneficial for the environment 
                                                   
21 This paragraph is based on Shapiro (2001). 
22 Ma Yinchu was dismissed from public life after he advocated controlling population growth, but was 
rehabilitated in 1979. He inspired a popular saying in the late 1970s and early 1980s, namely ‘we lost one 
Ma Yinchu but we gained an extra 300 million people’ (China Daily, 6 January 2005). 
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through, for example, irrigation and water conservancy projects (Murray & Cook, 2002: 
46). However, the overall picture that emerges of this period is one of almost total 
disregard for the environment by the authorities. It was not until the early 1970s, after the 
worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution, that environmental issues started to emerge on 
the government’s agenda. 
 
Following the environmental neglect of the previous years, environmental management 
in China gradually improved in the 1970s (Edmonds, 1999: 641). According to Elizabeth 
Economy (2004a: 93), the beginning of state-led environmental protection in the PRC 
was prompted in part by ecological disasters in Dalian and Beijing that highlighted the 
link between environmental degradation and public health. In 1972, the coastal city of 
Dalian suffered a serious pollution incident that caused the beach to turn black and led to 
the loss of millions of kilograms of fish. At around about the same time, fish from the 
Guanting Reservoir that had been contaminated by polluted water appeared in Beijing 
markets (Ibid).  
 
Perhaps significantly, these incidents roughly coincided with China’s increasing 
engagement with the outside world following the isolationism that characterised the early 
years of the PRC.23 China’s reengagement with the international community enabled 
Premier Zhou Enlai to sanction the participation of a Chinese delegation to the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm. This 
has been widely seen as an important turning point in environmental protection in the 
PRC (Economy, 2004a: 93). Yet at the time, the majority of Chinese officials did not 
share the concern that Zhou Enlai showed in relation to environmental issues. Qu Geping, 
who headed China’s environmental protection bureaucracy throughout the 1980s, later 
claimed that, without Zhou’s efforts, the start of environmental protection in the PRC 
could have been delayed by another 10 years (Lili Wang, 2005: 202-3).  
 
                                                   
23 After the Sino-Soviet split that started in the late 1950s, the PRC had been relatively isolated 
internationally. In the early 1970s, however, the PRC resumed relations with the US and President Nixon 
made an official trip to Beijing in February 1972. In addition, the PRC was recognised by the UN in 1971 
as the sole legitimate government of China. 
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In August 1973, one year after the UNCHE, another significant step was taken when 
China convened the First National Conference on Environmental Protection (NCEP) in 
Beijing.24 This has been seen as the point at which China’s environmental protection 
effort was officially launched (Yang, 2007). The First NCEP set the overall direction for 
environmental protection in China. It also introduced the concept of environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) (Wang et al, 2003). One year previously, China’s first 
environmental management tool, the so-called ‘three synchronisations policy’25 (san 
tongshi zhengce), had been introduced (Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection 
Bureau, 1994). According to this policy, enterprises carrying out construction projects 
must design, install, and operate pollution control facilities at the same time that the 
construction project is designed, constructed, and goes into operation. 
 
Following on closely from these developments, the first stage in the formation of China’s 
environmental protection bureaucracy was achieved in 1974 with the establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Office (EPO). The EPO came under the direct jurisdiction of 
the State Council, and was granted a staff of 20 people (World Bank, 2001: 101). Its 
purpose was to develop procedures and guidelines concerning environmental protection 
that would then be implemented by local level EPOs that had been established at the 
provincial, county and city levels (Wang et al, 2003: 545). In addition, the central level 
EPO was charged with drafting China’s first environmental protection law (Ibid.: 545-6). 
 
China’s Environmental State in the Reform Period 
Since 1978, China’s environmental challenge has become more complex and severe. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, China’s economic reforms have contributed to 
worsening industrial pollution. In addition, rising living standards have led to a surge in 
demand for consumer durables, which has placed additional strain on China’s ecological 
system. As Vaclav Smil (2004: 143) put it, since the start of the reform era ‘new 
destructive forces of blind consumerism have filled the void left by the old destructive 
forces of the retreating rigid ideology’. 
                                                   
24 Subsequent NCEPs have been held in 1983, 1989, 1996, 2002, and 2006. According to Vermeer (1998: 
962), these conferences mark new long-term policies and influence subsequent government measures. 
25 Sometimes referred to as the ‘three simultaneous’. 
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The onset of the reform period saw a significant change in China’s industrial structure. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated industrial production in the centrally planned 
economy before the reforms. However, in the 1980s town and village enterprises (TVEs) 
proliferated. Due in part to their poor environmental management capacity, their 
inefficiencies partly associated with their small size, and the difficulties faced by EPBs in 
terms of monitoring them due to their being widely dispersed across rural areas, TVEs 
contributed to growing pollution.26  
 
Another important change that affected environmental protection was decentralisation 
(Mol & Carter, 2006). As others have noted, this has led to a greater variation in 
environmental quality between different localities (Ibid.; Beach, 2001). For example, 
evidence suggests that richer eastern seaboard provinces have invested many more 
resources in environmental protection than those in poorer inland regions (Economy, 
2004a). It has also been claimed that decentralisation has been problematic for the 
environment due to a relative lack of independent oversight with regards local officials 
(Beach, 2001; Beyer, 2006). In addition, decentralisation has made economic growth at 
the local level even more important, as local governments are now compelled to fund a 
greater number of public goods from their own revenue sources (Whiting, 2001). 
 
1978-1987: The Environmental State in the Early Reform Period 
The construction of China’s environmental state accelerated with the onset of the 
economic reforms. This was triggered by worsening environmental problems, as well as 
Deng Xiaoping’s realisation of the importance of resource efficiency (Jahiel, 1997). In 
1978 the Constitution was amended to include the principle of state responsibility for 
environmental protection,27 and China’s Constitution still provides the underlying basis 
for the country’s environmental laws and regulations (Ma & Ortolano, 2000).  
 
                                                   
26 According to the World Bank (2001: 2), between 1990 and 1995 combined TVE emissions grew by 120 
per cent. In the same period, SOE emissions fell by 99 per cent. 
27 Article 11 of the 1978 Constitution states that, ‘the state protects the environment and natural resources, 
and prevents and eliminates pollution and other hazards to the public’ (as cited by Palmer, 1998: 791). 
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An important milestone in the creation of China’s environmental state was the 
promulgation of the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(For Trial Implementation) in 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the 1979 EPL).28 It 
emerged out of a debate between those who argued that China should ‘pollute first and 
clean up later’, and those who saw the need for steps to be taken in order to safeguard the 
environment (Edmonds, 1999: 641). This perhaps explains its somewhat tentative ‘trial’ 
status. The 1979 EPL focused on pollution prevention and introduced the concept that 
polluters should take responsibility and pay for their pollution (Ferris Jr. & Zhang, 2005). 
It also provided a formal legal foundation for the three synchronisations policy, EIA 
process, and the pollution discharge fee system. In addition, it established national and 
local level EPBs (Ma & Ortolano, 2000: 16). 
 
Following the enactment of the 1979 EPL, a series of sector-specific environmental laws 
were promulgated during the 1980s, covering every major environmental sector (Mol & 
Carter, 2006: 152). These included the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law 
(1984), the Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution (1987), the 
Marine Environmental Protection Pollution Law (1982), the Grassland Law (1985) and 
the Forestry Law (1986) (Palmer, 1998: 799). Another important development during this 
period was the raising of environmental protection to the status of ‘basic state policy’ 
(jiben guoce) at the Second NCEP convened in December 1983. This conference also 
reaffirmed the policies of ‘prevention first’, ‘polluter pays’, and the need to ‘strengthen 
environmental protection management’. 
 
Also during this period, important institutional developments in environmental protection 
were enacted. The establishment of China’s environmental protection bureaucracy 
accelerated, although not all developments were viewed positively. For example, in 
administrative reforms carried out in 1982 the EPO’s staff was increased to 60 people, 
and it was promoted to bureau status (Jahiel, 1998, 768). However, in the same year the 
                                                   
28 The 1979 EPL was one of seven codes promulgated by the National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee following the breakdown in the legal system during the Cultural Revolution. The promulgation 
of an environmental protection law at this stage shows the seriousness with which environmental issues 
were viewed (Beyer, 2006: 192). 
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EPO ceased to report directly the State Council. Rather, it became a department in the 
newly established Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental 
Protection (MURCEP). By virtue of losing its independent status, the EPO emerged from 
this round of administrative reforms weaker than before (Ibid.). In addition, this 
administrative reshuffling negatively impacted on local level Environmental Protection 
Bureaus (EPBs). Some areas that had established independent environmental protection 
bureaus now placed them under the jurisdiction of local level MURCEP bureaus and cut 
back their staff allocations (Ibid.). 
 
At the Second NCEP, various environmental officials and scholars expressed their 
concern about the 1982 administrative reforms. As a result, in 1984 the environmental 
protection department under MURCEP was promoted and renamed the National 
Environmental Protection Bureau (NEPB) (Jahiel, 1998). At the same time, its personnel 
allocation was doubled to 120 people. Another positive development in the strengthening 
of China’s environmental state was the establishment in 1984 of the State Environmental 
Protection Commission (SEPC). The function of the SEPC was to coordinate 
environmental protection across ministries and to set broad guidelines on environmental 
policy in view of other national priorities, including economic growth (Wang & Liu, 
1998: 376). The position of many EPBs also improved following the 1984 central level 
reforms, although the negative impact of the 1982 reorganisation was felt by many 
county level EPBs well into the 1990s (Jahiel, 1998: 768).  
 
1988-1995: New Policies are Introduced and China Officially Subscribes to ‘Sustainable 
Development’ 
In the period between 1988 and 1995, the Chinese government introduced new 
environmental protection mechanisms, and continued to strengthen the legislative 
framework for environmental protection. In 1989, the Environmental Protection Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the 1989 EPL) was 
promulgated. It built on the 1979 EPL and, significantly, was no longer for trial 
implementation. Under the 1989 EPL, the ‘three old systems’ denoting the three 
synchronisations, EIA, and pollution discharge fee, were improved. In addition, the so-
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called ‘five new systems’, which comprised a discharge permit system, an environmental 
responsibility system, annual assessment of the urban environment, limited time 
treatment, and centralised pollution control, were introduced.29 Taken together, these 
eight policy instruments form the backbone of China’s predominantly top-down system 
of direct regulation that emerged during the first decade of the reform era. 
 
As well as providing a solid legislative base for China’s environmental protection 
framework, the 1989 EPL gave local governments explicit environmental protection 
responsibilities for the first time (Ma & Ortolano, 2000: 16). Before this, many officials 
believed that responsibility for environmental issues was the sole domain of the 
environmental protection bureaucracy (Ibid.). This move reflected decentralisation 
dynamics that had started in the early 1980s. As a result of decentralisation, local officials 
were given greater responsibility for the provision of services and public goods, including 
environmental protection (Beach, 2001).  
 
In the early 1990s, there was an important shift in the government’s development 
strategy. Up until 1992, the Chinese government officially pursued a policy of ‘co-
ordinated development’ (xietiao fazhan).30 Under this policy, economic development was 
officially prioritised over environmental protection, and no emphasis was placed on the 
environmental rights of future generations (Palmer, 1998: 791-2). However, this changed 
in 1992 when China participated in the Rio Earth Summit. Following the summit, China 
officially adopted the policy of sustainable development, largely supplanting the previous 
policy of co-ordinated development (Ibid.: 792). 
 
As others have already noted, China started to diversify its approach to environmental 
protection during this period (Mol & Carter, 2006). The 1989 EPL included provisions 
for environmental information disclosure (see Chapter 5). Policies such as the Urban 
Environmental Quantitative Evaluation System (UEQES) represented a move away from 
a purely regulatory approach to environmental management (see Chapter 3). In addition, 
                                                   
29 For a detailed description of these, as well as the ‘three old systems’, see Beijing Municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureau (1994) and Ma & Ortolano (2000). 
30 Official commitment to co-ordinated development was re-affirmed at the third NCEP in May 1989.  
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as noted below, permission was granted to establish China’s first ‘grassroots’ NGOs from 
1994, and other non-state actors begun to influence environmental protection. 
 
Another important policy change emerged in the early 1990s, when the emphasis on 
pollution control started to shift away from ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions to a more 
comprehensive approach. During a speech given in 1993, head of NEPA Xie Zhenhua 
outlined a three-point strategy to this end. First, it involved introducing concentration and 
mass-based systems for pollutant discharge, where previously a purely concentration-
based approach had been employed. Second, Xie advocated a more centralised approach 
to waste treatment in order to try and move away from individual enterprises treating 
their own waste. And finally, Xie stated that China should move towards cleaner 
production and pollution prevention (Ma & Ortolano, 2000: 28). Cleaner production was 
introduced in China in 1993 (World Bank, 2001: 105), whereas the other two points of 
Xie’s strategy were incorporated in the 1996 Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act 
(Ma & Ortolano, 2000: 28). 
 
A further reflection of the increasing official concern for environmental issues came in 
1988, when the NEPB was given the rank of agency to become the National 
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA). Significantly, it also achieved independence 
from MURCEP and once again reported directly to the State Council. In addition, staff 
numbers rose to 321 people (Jahiel, 1998: 769). In 1993, the EPNRCC of the National 
People’s Congress was established. It was responsible for revising and drafting new 
environmental laws and ensuring their swift promulgation (Ibid.: 770). According to 
Abigail Jahiel (Ibid.), this development significantly strengthened the position of EPB 
officials, as well as lightening their workload. However, in a bid to streamline 
government at the county level, the 1993-4 administrative reforms placed a limit on the 
number of first-tier administrative units that could exist at each local government level. 
As a result, many county level EPBs were downgraded to second-tier status, representing 
a setback for China’s environmental protection bureaucracy at this level (Ibid.).  
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1996-2000: Greater Leadership Concern for Environmental Issues 
By the mid-1990s, signs were emerging that greater official emphasis was being placed 
on environmental protection. In July of that year, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li 
Peng attended the Fourth NCEP. This was the first time that the country’s two most 
senior officials had attended one of these conferences (Jahiel, 1998: 773). Following this 
conference the ‘State Council Decision Regarding Certain Environmental Protection 
Problems’ (hereinafter the 1996 Decision) was released. It paved the way for stricter 
legislation and enforcement (Van Rooij, 2006b: 87). The 1996 Decision stated that 
jurisdictions should move to ‘basically control’ the worsening pollution situation. 
Significantly, the 1996 Decision also called for greater media reporting of environmental 
issues in order to ‘expose’ and ‘criticise’ pollution and environmental degradation (see 
Chapter 5 for more details) (State Council, 1996). This was another important step 
towards diversifying China’s environmental governance approach. 
 
The 1996 Decision also stated that the environmental management of TVEs should be 
improved (Ibid.). The proportion of industrial output accounted for by TVEs, which 
frequently employ outdated and inefficient production methods grew significantly in the 
first two decades of the reform period. Many TVEs are located in relatively remote or 
inaccessible rural areas. As a result, they are not only often highly polluting but also 
difficult to regulate,31 especially considering that China’s environmental protection 
framework was designed principally with the regulation of SOEs in mind (Shi & Zhang, 
2006: 277). After the 1996 Decision was released, the so-called ‘15 smalls’ (shiwu xiao) 
campaign was initiated. During this campaign, approximately 65,000 small, heavily 
polluting TVEs in 15 industrial sub-sectors were closed down (World Bank, 2001: 2).32 
Although the 15 smalls campaign was in part considered a success, it was also socially 
disruptive and not a viable long-term solution (World Bank, 2001: 2, 5). 
 
                                                   
31 TVEs are currently responsible for about one third of China’s sulphur dioxide emissions and more than 
half of all soot and dust emissions (Ho & Vermeer, 2006: 257). 
32 According to the World Bank (2001: 2), 20-30 per cent of these TVEs subsequently resumed operations, 
either illegally or having rectified their environmental management procedures. 
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The 9th Five-Year Plan (FYP) for the 1996-2001 period also signified increased central 
government concern for the environmental impact of China’s rapid economic growth.33 It 
was China’s first FYP to include explicit environmental performance objectives that 
could be monitored. In addition, it introduced China’s first pollution investment 
programme (World Bank, 2002: 40). Also of significance was the 9th FYP’s inclusion of 
the ‘33211’ campaign, which aimed to target priority areas, namely three lakes (Tai, 
Chao, and Dianchi), three rivers (Huai, Hai, and Liao, two control zones (two regions 
with severe sulphur dioxide emissions and high levels of acid rain), one sea (Bohai), and 
one municipality (Beijing) (World Bank, 2001). These areas had suffered severe 
pollution. However, as Elizabeth Economy (2004a) found in relation to the campaign to 
clean up the Huai River, these initiatives have not always been successful. 
 
In 1998, amid another round of administrative reform, NEPA was promoted to ministerial 
status and was renamed the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). 
Despite this promotion, SEPA was only made a second-tier, non-cabinet level ministry 
with inferior ranking to powerful economic development-oriented ministries (Ma & 
Ortolano, 2000: 80; OECD, 2007). This was problematic because, at the same time, the 
SEPC was disbanded. SEPA assumed the responsibility of co-ordinating environmental 
protection across central government departments, yet struggled to fulfil this role due to 
its relative lack of bureaucratic clout (OECD, 2007). Accordeing to the OECD’s Deputy-
Secretary General Kiyotaka Akasaka, ‘environmental protection involves many 
ministries, unless SEPA has an equivalent rank, it can't discuss with the other ministries’ 
(China Daily, 11 November 2006). In addition, SEPA’s promotion did not immunise it 
from the staff cuts arising from bureaucratic downsizing that were carried out across the 
central government. As a result, its workforce was reduced from 321 to about 200.34 
Nevertheless, SEPA emerged from the administrative reforms as the government body 
with overall responsibility for the environment (Jahiel, 1998). 
 
                                                   
33 For a detailed discussion of the 9th FYP’s environmental goals, see Vermeer (1998). 
34 However, as Jahiel (1998) notes, although NEPA was given a staff allocation of 321 people in 1988, it 
only employed around 200 staff. 
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In an attempt to overcome the problem of lax enforcement of environmental legislation, 
in the late 1990s a requirement was introduced whereby all EPB head appointments had 
to be endorsed by the next level up in the environmental protection bureaucracy (World 
Bank, 2001: 99). This was the second attempt to resolve the horizontal/vertical issue after 
the introduction of the environmental responsibility system (Ibid.: 122). However, as 
already noted in this thesis, compliance with environmental standards remains a 
significant problem in China.  
 
2001 onwards: Moving Towards a New Environmental Protection Paradigm? 
Since coming to power in 2002, the PRC’s fourth generation of leaders, headed by Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao, have declared their intention to steer the course of the country’s 
development away from the blind pursuit of increased GDP that was seen by some to be 
the case under Deng and Jiang and onto a more balanced development path that pays 
more attention to issues such as growing inequalities and environmental degradation. As 
Chapter 3 argues, this represents a ‘paradigm shift’ in how the central leadership views 
China’s development. This approach, which can be seen as representative of an emerging 
body of ‘Hu Jintao thought’ (Fewsmith, 2004), is articulated through concepts such as 
‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui) and ‘the scientific development concept’ (kexue 
fazhan guan).35 
 
The significance of this paradigm shift for environmental protection was outlined in the 
2005 ‘State Council Decision Regarding Implementing the Scientific Development 
Concept and Strengthening Environmental Protection’ (hereinafter the 2005 Decision) 
(State Council, 2005). It acknowledged that China’s environmental situation is still 
‘extremely serious’, and called on environmental protection to be placed in a more 
strategic position in the country’s development. It also called for a fundamental 
transformation in China’s economic growth model. 
 
                                                   
35 This new development path is examined in detail in the next chapter. 
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China’s Sixth NPEC was convened in 2006.36 It echoed the call in the 2005 Decision to 
place environmental protection in a more strategic position. At the conference, Wen 
Jiabao enunciated the so-called ‘three transformations’ (san ge zhuanbian) strategy. 
These were as follows:  
1. Change from prioritising economic growth whilst neglecting environmental 
protection to giving equal attention to economic growth and environmental 
protection. Develop whilst protecting the environment. 
2. Transform the situation whereby environmental protection lags behind economic 
development to one where the two are promoted at the same pace. Don’t create 
new environmental debts, and repay old environmental debts. Change the 
situation of polluting first, cleaning up later, and treating pollution whilst 
degrading the environment. 
3. Transform from relying primarily on administrative methods to protect the 
environment to the synthesised use of legal, economic, technological, and 
necessary administrative measures in order to resolve the environmental problem. 
Conscientiously follow economic laws and natural laws, increase the level of 
environmental protection work. 
 
As MEP official Tian Weiyong explained in an interview, the third element of this 
transition includes the creation of policies conducive to information disclosure, 
democratisation of the decision-making process, encouragement of public interest 
litigation, and the strengthening of relations with environmental NGOs (China 
Government Online, 2007). Some of these issues are discussed in detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
Following the Sixth NPEC, in an attempt to improve enforcement of environmental 
legislation, in July 2006 the MEP established 11 Law Enforcement Supervision 
Departments that would report directly to the MEP and be independent of local 
governments (SEPA, 2006a). Of these, five are ‘environmental protection supervision 
                                                   
36 Information in this paragraph is based on a Renmin Ribao editorial (Renmin Ribao, 19 April 2006). 
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centres’, situated in Nanjing, Guangzhou, Xi’an, Chengdu, and Shenyang.37 These five 
centres’ duties include monitoring local environmental law and policy enforcement, 
investigating and dealing with ‘major incidents’, and mediating over cross-jurisdictional 
disagreements. The other six are labelled ‘nuclear and radiation safety supervision 
stations’ (Ibid.). Originally, 15 vice-directors were appointed to these 11 departments, but 
in October 2006 the MEP announced that this number would double (South China 
Morning Post, 23 June 2006). 
 
In 2008, SEPA was upgraded to full ministerial status and renamed the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP). Following this promotion, the MEP’s official staff 
allocation increased to 311 (State Council, 2008). Some responsibilities, such as 
approving and issuing water pollution permits, were devolved to EPBs (Ibid.). The 
creation of the MEP had been repeatedly advocated by Chinese scholars, 
environmentalists, and international organisations such as the World Bank (2001) and 
OECD (2007), and was broadly welcomed by observers due to the increased influence of 
the environmental protection agency. One environmental protection official said that, 
‘SEPA was subordinate to the State Council, but the MEP is a department of the State 
Council and can play a bigger part in the country’s synthesised decision making. In 
addition, incorporating the environmental problem into the State Council’s overall 
decision making process is more convenient, and adds weight [to environmental issues]’ 
(Xin Jing Bao (The Beijing News), 12 March 2008). The MEP has the authority to 
independently draft and implement environmental protection plans, policies and 
standards (Xin Jing Bao, 13 March 2008). SEPA also did this, but powerful economic 
ministries such as the NDRC had to agree to them before they could be implemented 
(Ibid.). However, the promotion of SEPA to full ministerial status will not solve China’s 
environmental problems in an instant. Qu Geping, who headed the EPO, NEPB and 
NEPA from 1982 to 1993, argued that only a fundamental change in the country’s 
                                                   
37 The Nanjing station was responsible for supervising responsible for supervising Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong; the Guangzhou station was responsible for supervising 
Hu’nan, Guandong, Guangxi, Hainan; the Xi’an station had responsibility for supervising Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang; the Chengdu station was responsible for supervising Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet; and the Shenyang station had responsibility for supervising Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang. 
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economic growth model can resolve China’s environmental problems. He said, ‘it is 
impossible for the severe environmental problem to be solved through a single 
institutional promotion, and it is impossible to rely on the MEP, which is a single 
department, to resolve [the environmental problem]’ (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China 
Youth Daily), 16 April 2008). 
 
At the local level, some governments have responded to the establishment of the MEP by 
upgrading EPBs from bureau status to become a department (ting) of the local 
government. The first EPB to be upgraded was the Jiangsu provincial EPB (Xin Jing Bao, 
12 March 2008). The Heilongjiang EPB was also promoted. However, some observers 
stated that the latest administrative reforms still do not address the weak position of 
EPBs. MEP Vice-Minister Wu Xiaoqing confirmed that the MEP would not exercise 
direct supervision over EPBs in the short term (Xin Jing Bao, 13 March 2008). Rather, 
the issue would be resolved ‘based on the actual situation’ (Ibid.). 
 
Environmental Civil Society 
The following section outlines the main developments in relation to Chinese civil society, 
which this thesis defines to include NGOs, citizen activists, and the media. Due to the 
significant amount of scholarly interest in Chinese environmental NGOs, these 
organisations are discussed in more detail than other elements of civil society that have 
been relatively neglected in the secondary literature. 
  
Environmental NGOs 
China’s environmental NGO sector has developed fairly rapidly in a short space of time. 
According to a survey carried out by the All-China Environmental Federation (2006: 3), 
which is a government-organised NGO (GONGO) established by the MEP, by the end of 
2005, China had a total of 2,768 environmental NGOs. These included 1,382 GONGOs, 
202 grassroots NGOs, 1,116 student groups, and 68 international NGOs (see below for an 
explanation about different types of Chinese environmental NGOs).  
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China’s first ‘grassroots’ NGO, Friends of Nature, was established in Beijing in 1994. 
Two years previously at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the Chinese delegation was 
reportedly embarrassed by its lack of grassroots NGO representation in comparison with 
other countries (Economy, 2004a: 162). This appears to have contributed to a paving of 
the way for the emergence of environmental NGOs in China. As a result, China was able 
to include an NGO presence at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development only 
10 years later (Ibid.). 
 
The emergence of environmental NGOs in China also reflects wider shifts in state-society 
relations during the reform era. In this time, the Chinese state has withdrawn from many 
aspects of social life and has started to adopt a more relaxed stance towards associational 
activities. The Maoist policy of ‘strong state, weak society’ has given way to the concept 
of ‘small government, big society’ (xiao zhengfu, da shehui) (Turner, 2004). As a result, 
social organisations have been allowed to contribute more to society and, in many cases, 
take over or supplement the role of the state. In 1998 Luo Gan, the then Secretary 
General of the State Council, admitted that, ‘government has taken up the management of 
many affairs which it should not have managed, is not in a position to manage, or actually 
cannot manage well’ (as cited by Saich, 2000: 128). This view was reinforced by Premier 
Wen Jiabao in his government report to the 2004 NPC, which stressed the need to speed 
up the transfer of ‘matters that should not be undertaken by the government’ to the non-
government sector, including NGOs (Wen, 2004).  
 
Before this chapter outlines the impact of Chinese environmental NGOs on 
environmental governance, it is necessary to discuss several important conceptual points 
related to the relationship between these organisations and the state, and the different 
types of organisation that currently exist. 
 
State-society relations 
The Chinese government’s attitude to NGOs has been somewhat ambivalent (Ho, 2001; 
Wong, 2005: 53). According to Qiusha Ma (2007: 47), two contradictory factors have 
shaped the way in which the Party-state views these organisations. On the one hand, as 
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noted above, the government recognises the positive role that NGOs can play in reform-
era China. This is especially the case with regards environmental NGOs, which are 
among the most active and vibrant groups (Turner, 2004). In particular, the MEP has 
welcomed the involvement of green NGOs as partners in raising environmental 
awareness and improving the implementation of environmental legislation.  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese Party-state has also sought to limit and closely regulate 
NGOs. In 1996, Jiang Zemin called for greater control to be exerted over NGOs (Ma, 
2007: 87). As a result, in 1998 the government passed the ‘Regulations for the 
Registration and Management of Social Organisations’ (hereinafter the 1998 
Regulations), which specified strict requirements for any group wishing to register as a 
social organisation. In an attempt to bind NGOs more closely to the Party-state, the 1998 
Regulations attached strict conditions to the registration of NGOs (Saich, 2000: 129). 
According to the legislation, any organisation wishing to operate as an NGO must first 
find a sponsoring unit in the form of a government bureau, often referred to as a ‘mother-
in-law’ (guakao/popo) unit.38 Once a sponsor has been found, the NGO is then obliged to 
register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA). The purpose of implementing a two-
tier or ‘dual’ registration process is to prevent the NGOs increasing at too rapid a pace 
(Ma, 2007: 65). In addition, it is designed to foster communication between NGOs and 
the government (Ibid.).   
 
Even if the NGO can find a sponsoring unit, which is difficult considering that there is 
arguably little incentive for a government bureau to become a sponsor, it must meet other 
stringent conditions. For example, article 10(5) of the 1998 Regulations states that 
national-level social organisations wishing to register must have funds of at least 100,000 
Renminbi (about US$12,500), whilst local-level organisations need a minimum of 30,000 
Renminbi (about US$3,500). These sums represent significant amounts to Chinese 
NGOs, the vast majority of which struggle for funds. And, in order to further limit the 
power of NGOs, they are not allowed to establish branch organisations across the country 
                                                   
38 Mother-in-law units may withdraw their support at any time (Ma, 2007: 65). 
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(State Council, 1998). According to Guobin Yang (2005: 54), the 1998 Regulations have 
exerted a restrictive influence on the development of civil society. 
 
In reality, however, state-NGO relations are more fluid than the 1998 Regulations might 
suggest. Ma (2007: 74) argues that the Chinese government does not hold a unified 
official position regarding NGOs. Rather, regions and government departments deal with 
NGO-related issues in a way that suits their own interests. In spite of, or perhaps because 
of, the strictness of the 1998 Regulations, many NGOs register as ‘for-profit’ businesses 
whilst operating on a non-profit basis. Many others do not register at all (Ho, 2001; 
Howell, 2004c). As long as they do not challenge the Party-state, these organisations are 
generally tolerated. According to Ma (2007: 105), MOCA officials believe that non-
registered organisations actually outnumber those that are formally registered. Xiaoguang 
Kang and Heng Han (2008) have argued that the Party-state exerts control over NGOs by 
operating a ‘system of graduated controls’, ranging from suppression to a laissez-faire 
approach. Politically antagonistic organisations, such as the Falungong, are prohibited, 
and are dealt with harshly. Grassroots NGOs that provide public goods and which 
practice self-censorship, on the other hand, are generally not interfered with.39 
 
Types of Chinese environmental NGOs 
There are various types of environmental NGO currently active in China. They vary 
significantly from each other in terms of size, funding, and level of autonomy from the 
state. In fact, some organisations could not be accurately described as being ‘non-
governmental’. In order to seek clarity, various commentators have drawn up taxonomies 
of Chinese NGOs (see Schwartz, 2004: 37; Cooper, 2006: 122; Yang, 2005: 50). Table 1, 
is taken from Yang (2005: 50), and presents a taxonomy of the main types of domestic 
NGO operating in China.  
 
                                                   
39 There are disadvantages for NGOs that are not registered, including difficulties with fundraising and 
attracting staff (Ho, 2001: 905). 
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Organisational Type     Registration Status Examples 
GONGOs Social organisations established 
by the government 
China Environmental 
Science Association 
University research 
centres/institutes 
 
Affiliated with institutions of 
higher learning but operate as 
NGOs 
Centre for Legal 
Assistance to Pollution 
Victims 
Registered NGOs 
 
Registered as an NGO 
 
Friends of Nature 
 
Non-profit enterprises 
 
 
Registered as businesses, but 
operate on a non-profit basis 
 
Global Village of Beijing 
 
 
Unregistered 
voluntary groups 
 
Unregistered groups that operate 
as NGOs 
 
Green Earth Volunteers 
 
 
Web-based groups 
 
 
Unregistered groups that operate 
mainly through the internet 
 
Greener Beijing 
 
 
Student environmental 
associations 
 
 
Affiliated with institutions of 
higher learning, but operate as 
NGOs 
 
 
Sichuan University 
Environmental Volunteer 
Association  
 
Table 1: Typology of Chinese NGOs (based on Yang, 2005). 
 
Table 1 highlights the different types of domestic environmental NGO operating in 
China. In order to aid conceptual clarity, this thesis condenses these into two main 
categories of organisations operating in China. These are government-organised NGOs 
(GONGOs), and ‘grassroots’ NGOs, which incorporate all of the organisational types 
listed in Table 1 apart from GONGOs. 
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GONGOs  
Government-organised NGOs (ban guanfang zuzhi), often referred to as GONGOs,40 
form part of what has been described as a ‘parastatal non-profit sector’ (Young, 2001). 
There are currently several GONGOs operating beneath the MEP, including the China 
Environmental Science Association (CESA), China Environment Protection Industry 
Association, the China Environment Fund, and the All-China Environment Federation 
(ACEF). GONGOs can be distinguished from other, more autonomous NGOs by virtue 
of having been set up by a government agency or institution, and often function as centres 
of research and consultancy for the government (Wu, 2002: 48). Aside from the provision 
of these services, part of the rationale for setting up GONGOs has been to attract funding 
from overseas governments and organisations that wish to support China’s efforts in 
areas such as environmental protection, but which do not want to give money directly to 
the Chinese government. Another important function served by GONGOs has been to 
create jobs for some of the government officials made redundant as a result of 
bureaucratic downsizing.  
 
As Wu Fengshi (2002: 45) notes in a rare study that focuses exclusively on GONGOs, 
these organisations have often been seen as little more than extensions of the government, 
lacking in any real autonomy. However, although some GONGOs continue to be virtual 
extensions of the government, it has been argued that some are becoming increasingly 
independent of the government (Young, 2001; Economy, 2004a: 135). Wu (2002) has 
argued that this greater autonomy stems partly from improved capacity on the part of 
GONGOs, which enables them to implement projects more independently, and partly 
from the influence of international NGOs, which are increasingly seeking to work with 
more autonomous organisations in China.  
 
Wu (2002: 53-4) argues that, unless they can become more independent themselves, 
GONGOs may be in danger of foregoing overseas funding. In recent years, government 
funding for some GONGOs has been reduced or stopped altogether (Ma, 2007: 96). 
According to the All-China Environment Federation (2006: 6), only 32.9 per cent of 
                                                   
40 Nick Young (2001) refers to these organisations as State-owned NGOs, or SONGOs. 
  
67 
67 
GONGOs have a fixed source of income. The same report also stated that GONGOs’ 
level of independence from the government was still ‘insufficient’, and that many sub-
provincial GONGOs rarely carry out activities (Ibid.: 11). 
 
NGOs 
For the purposes of this thesis, NGOs are distinguished from GONGOs in that they are 
not established by the government. The decision to set up an NGO is taken by an 
individual, or group of individuals who have a personal interest in the area of activism. In 
other words, they are organised from the bottom-up.41 As shall be discussed below, many 
of these organisations work fairly closely with the government, and some have close 
personal links to the authorities. For example Liang Congjie, the founder of China’s 
Friends of Nature, is also a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC). At the same time, however, Chinese NGOs do not rely on the 
government for funding, and they do set their own organisational priorities, albeit in a 
restrictive environment (Howell, 2004c: 156-8). Only 20 per cent of these groups have a 
fixed source of income (All-China Environment Federation, 2006: 6). 
 
Table 1 includes five different sub-types of NGO, ranging from registered NGOs to 
student environmental associations. Indeed, one of the main ways of distinguishing these 
groups from each other is whether or not they have registered with the authorities. 
Whereas some groups, such as Friends of Nature, have registered with the government, 
many have not due to the stringency of the registration conditions. Of those that have 
registered, some have done so as NGOs, while others have registered as businesses, 
although operate as non-profit enterprises. In addition, there are also about 184 student 
environmental associations throughout the country, which are registered with universities 
(Turner, 2004).  
 
                                                   
41 In Chinese, these are referred to as bottom-up, or ‘zi xia er shang’, whereas GONGOs are seen as top-
down (zi shang er xia) organisations. 
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Development of environmental NGOs 
This thesis focuses on grassroots NGOs as opposed to GONGOs. This chapter now 
examines the emergence of these organisations and the impact they have had. Based on 
discussions with Chinese environmental activists, this is divided into two sections: 1994-
2000, and 2000 onwards. 
 
1994-2000 
As mentioned above, China’s first ‘grassroots’ NGO Friends of Nature was established in 
1994. Shortly thereafter, various other organisations were established. Both Beijing and 
Yunnan are ‘hotspot’ areas of environmental NGO activity. Many NGOs locate in the 
former in order to be geographically close to central government officials, while the latter 
is an area of incredible ecological wealth and biodiversity. In addition, organisations have 
been established in many other parts of China. 
 
Initially, NGOs focused primarily on environmental education and awareness raising. 
Indeed, these activities still represent a major part of NGO activism at time of writing. 
Environmental education is considered a ‘safe’ area for activists, and virtually every 
Chinese NGO has been involved in environmental education or awareness raising at 
some point or other (Wang, 2006: 251-2). For example, the Tianjin NGO Friends of 
Green has been running a ‘beautiful environment’ education project that, by 2006, had 
been participated in by 50,000 students across various schools and universities (Interview 
1, 2006). In 2000, Friends of Nature unveiled an environmental education van that it has 
so far used to visit over 200 schools across the country and spread the message of 
environmental protection to more than 20,000 primary and middle school pupils (All-
China Environment Federation, 2006: 12). In addition, in 1996 the NGO Global Village 
Beijing began producing a weekly television series broadcast on national TV entitled 
‘Environmental Protection Hour’ (Ho, 2001: 910). 
 
Quite early on in the development of China’s environmental NGO sector, two high-
profile campaigns to protect endangered wildlife highlighted the important role that 
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NGOs could play in environmental protection beyond education and awareness raising.42 
The first campaign was centred on Deqin County in Yunnan Province. In 1995, illegal 
logging sanctioned by the local government threatened the survival of the endangered 
Snub-nose monkey. The logging was exposed by local photographer Xi Zhinong who, 
with the help of Friends of Nature activists and the media, brought the logging to the 
attention of the central government. As a result, the State Council ordered the illegal 
logging to stop, although it has been suggested that the logging is continuing in some 
areas.  
 
The second campaign involved an effort to protect the Tibetan antelope, which has 
become endangered due to poaching. Starting in 1998, Friends of Nature has played an 
important role in raising public awareness of this issue. They also raised money to buy 
two jeeps for the Wild Yak Brigade, which defends the animal from poachers in the 
sparsely populated northwest region of China. In addition, Liang Congjie lobbied NEPA 
and the Ministry of Forestry, calling for more resources to deal with the problem. 
According to Economy (2004a: 149), ‘these campaigns not only energised the 
environmental activists but also helped catalyse a nationwide environmental movement 
and establish a foundation for future campaigns’. 
 
2000-present 
Environmental NGOs have continued to develop and emerge to the extent that some 
commentators view them as important actors in environmental governance in China 
(Economy, 2004a, b; Lu, 2007). There are signs that certain NGOs are becoming more 
specialised. One example is the Centre of Legal Assistance for Pollution Victims 
(CLAPV), which offers free legal assistance to victims of pollution that wish to pursue 
legal action. By 2006, CLAPV had won 31 of the 74 cases it had accepted (Xu & Wang, 
2006). The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), examined in Chapter 5, is 
an organisation established in 2006 whose main task is to collect and disseminate data on 
air and water pollution via an interactive, online map. In addition, other organisations 
such as the Shaanxi Mothers’ Environmental Protection Volunteers Association and the 
                                                   
42 Information in the next two paragraphs is taken from Economy (2004a: 149-56). 
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Pesticide Eco-Alternatives Centre (PEAC) have focused on single issues. Since 1999, the 
former has constructed 1,144 biogas generation units in 26 Chinese villages (Friends of 
the Earth, n.d.). PEAC, meanwhile, provides information on pesticides and carries out 
pesticide risk monitoring and assessment. 
 
The Chinese NGO community has also become increasingly adept at networking. NGO 
activists are increasingly forging links with academics and other specialists in order to 
add legitimacy to their positions (for example, see Chapter 4). Furthermore, NGOs have 
continued to cultivate close, mutually beneficial relationships with environmental 
protection officials, as well as journalists. Regarding the latter, the Beijing-based NGO 
Green Earth Volunteers holds regular ‘green journalist salons’. Journalists attending these 
seminar-like events are briefed in detail on certain environmental protection issues by 
various experts. The salons are designed to increase environmental awareness and 
knowledge among green journalists.  
 
More recently, NGOs have cooperated with each other in order to raise environmental 
awareness and advocate changes in government policy in relation to specific issues. A 
successful example of this was the ’26 degree air-conditioning’ campaign, which began 
in 2004. Six NGOs took part in the campaign, which urged people to set their air-
conditioners at no lower than 26 degrees in the summer in order to save energy. As a 
result of the campaign, the government released a regulation in June 2005 that forbid 
government buildings from lowering their temperatures below 26 degrees in the summer 
(Qiao & Wang, 2006). According to Liao Xiaoyi, who is the founder of the NGO Global 
Village Beijing, this was the first time that Chinese NGOs had come together in pursuit 
of a specific goal (Jingji Ribao (The Economic Daily), 3 December 2004). 
 
Arguably more than any other event, the Nu River campaign highlights how the influence 
of NGOs has grown. In April 2004 it was reported in the media that Premier Wen Jiabao 
had stepped in to temporarily halt a proposal to build a set of 13 dams on Yunnan’s Nu 
River (Nujiang). Although the existence of a ‘high level of social concern’ was cited as 
the reason for the project’s suspension, there were also disagreements within the central 
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government and pressure emanating from downstream countries such as Thailand and 
Myanmar (Litzinger, 2007). The decision to halt the project was seen as a major victory 
for the coalition of public interest campaigners, including both Chinese and international 
NGOs, elements of the media, and academics, that had mobilised against the project. This 
opposition centred on the Nujiang’s immense ecological value. Nujiang is part of the 
Three Parallel Rivers that in 2003 was designated a World Heritage Site by UNESCO, 
and is one of only two rivers in China that have not been dammed. The NGO campaign 
against dam building on the Nu River included the mobilisation of 15,000 students in 
Chongqing municipality who signed a petition against the project (Yang & Calhoun, 
2006). In addition, a study tour of the Nu River region was organised whereby activists 
invited journalists to see the area’s ecological importance for themselves. Upon returning 
to Beijing, a photographic exhibition of the Nu River and its people was organised. This 
attracted significant media attention in the issue. 
 
In his study of the Nu River campaign, Michael Büsgen (2006) has argued that, although 
protecting the Nu River’s ecology was the initial drive behind the NGO campaign, NGOs 
subsequently began linking hydropower development to issues such as environmental 
justice and rule of law. One NGO organised a group of villagers from the Nu River area 
to visit another group of villagers from a different region that had been relocated due to a 
dam project. However, this tactic was considered overly provocative by the local 
authorities, and the NGO in question came under significant pressure. Andrew Mertha 
(2008) has analysed NGO involvement in the Nu River campaign, and concluded that 
these organisations, in some cases, act as ‘policy entrepreneurs’. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, there are limits to what NGOs have been able to achieve in this 
case, and it seems likely that dams will be constructed on the Nu River in the near future. 
 
However, even though they have become relatively well established, Chinese NGOs are 
not immune to periodical government interference. Following a series of ‘colour 
revolutions’ in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, environmental NGOs in China 
were subjected to increased state control (Ho, 2007: 197). In order to prevent any similar 
movement in China, in late 2005 authorities conducted ‘intrusive’ audits of green NGOs, 
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particularly those in receipt of overseas funding (San Francisco Chronicle, 25 June 
2006). In addition, NGOs had to reregister, and communication links such as the Internet 
were subject to greater control (Ho & Edmonds, 2007: 335). In addition, the China 
Development Brief publication, which regularly conducted research on Chinese civil 
society, was shut down in 2007 (Young, 2007). Although this was apparently unrelated to 
the government concern generated by the colour revolutions, it does show that NGOs are 
still subject to the vagaries of the Chinese political environment. In other words, the 
development of NGOs should not be viewed merely as a linear process, even if many 
organisations have made much progress since their inceptions. 
 
The Media and Citizen Activism 
There are relatively few studies in existence that examine the role of the media and 
citizen activism in Chinese environmental governance. Nevertheless, it has been 
suggested that the Chinese media has enjoyed greater freedom to report on environmental 
issues since the early 1990s (Wen, 1998). In part, the government has encouraged 
journalists to expose environmentally harmful behaviour in order to hold culprits to 
account. At the same time, the media industry has changed in some important ways. 
Since the reforms, some newspapers have become increasingly reliant on sales and 
advertising, as opposed to funding from the government. As a result, there is an 
imperative to publish interesting and newsworthy stories, which often include articles 
related to environmental issues. 
 
In addition, many green journalists have close links with NGO activists. Many important 
NGO figures such as head of Green Earth Volunteers Wang Yongchen are from a 
journalistic background. The media has played a vital role in some of the successful NGO 
campaigns noted above. Guobin Yang and Craig Calhoun (2006) have argued that a 
‘green public sphere’ is emerging in China, whereby debates in the public sphere can 
facilitate pluralism and influence government policies. They claim that the media has 
contributed to this by producing and circulating a newly created environmental discourse 
(Ibid.). 
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Initial studies have suggested that citizen activists are also playing a greater role in 
environmental governance, for example via the complaints process (Brettell, 2008). It has 
been suggested that citizen complaints can influence government officials to improve 
their enforcement efforts (Dasgupta & Wheeler, 1996). In addition, citizens have sued 
local governments and polluting enterprises, and have petitioned local and national 
government departments (Van Rooij, 2008). Although there are substantial obstacles to 
taking legal action against polluters (Ibid.), this tactic can be successful. In one notable 
case in 2005, which was taken on by CLAPV, over 1,700 plaintiffs from Fujian Province 
won a class action suit against China’s largest chlorate manufacturing plant (Eugene 
Weekly, 2 January 2006). 
 
Finally, as noted in Chapter 1, citizens have carried out environmental protests. 
According to state media, in 2005 there were 50,000 pollution disputes in China (China 
Daily, 4 May 2006). Furthermore, these disputes are increasing in number by about 30 
per cent a year (Ibid.). Some environmental protests are large-scale. For example, in April 
2005 approximately 20,000 protestors, whose grievance was related to pollution from a 
nearby industrial park, clashed with police. As a result, the polluting factories were 
closed, although the protest’s organisers were jailed (Lum, 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
Since the early 1970s, China has established a nationwide environmental protection 
bureaucracy that has periodically been strengthened by the country’s leadership due to a 
growing environmental problem. In addition, China has promulgated a comprehensive 
body of environmental legislation. However, there is still a discrepancy between China’s 
western-style laws and its capacity to effectively implement them (Ho & Vermeer, 2006). 
Despite the strengthening of China’s environmental state, it has been argued that 
improvements have not been fast enough to ensure sustainable development (Ho, 2006). 
Since the start of the reform era, increasing demands have been placed on China’s 
environmental protection bureaucracy to the extent that there has been a widening in the 
gap between its resources and what it is mandated to do (World Bank, 2001: 100). In 
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short, the process of strengthening China’s environmental state has not proceeded quickly 
enough in order to keep up with growing environmental degradation. 
 
As others have argued (Mol & Carter, 2006), and as this chapter has illustrated, from the 
1990s China’s system of environmental governance has diversified, although the state 
maintains a dominant role. China has taken steps towards addressing pollution problems 
‘further up the pipe’ through initiatives such as cleaner production and increased referral 
to total pollutant loads when monitoring enterprises. The development of an 
environmental civil society is another example of this diversification. Since the mid-
1990s not only have China’s first environmental NGOs emerged, but the media has been 
allowed much greater freedom in its reporting of environmental issues. Moreover, 
individual citizens are increasingly taking action in relation to environmental issues, 
albeit in relation to isolated incidents. However, civil society still occupies a relatively 
precarious position. Despite notable successes, for example with regards the Nu River 
campaign, the need to self-censor remains imperative. 
 
As this chapter has argued, the position of environmental protection in China’s overall 
development strategy has changed markedly since environmental issues emerged on the 
country’s political agenda in the early 1970s. However, China’s environmental challenge 
remains serious. Furthermore, high-level concern for environmental issues does not 
necessarily translate into better outcomes at the local level. The next chapter examines in 
more detail the ‘paradigm shift’ towards a more environmentally friendly and resource 
efficient development path that the current leadership has tried to promote since 2002. 
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Chapter 3: Reforming the Environmental State – Green 
GDP and Environmental Storms 
 
As Chapter 2 noted, environmental issues have risen up the political agenda in reform-era 
China due to the significant environmental degradation that has accompanied the 
country’s rapid economic growth since 1978. One result of this has been the progressive 
strengthening of China’s environmental state since the start of the reform period and the 
emergence of environmental civil society in the mid-1990s. 
 
This chapter continues to investigate the growing concern among China’s central 
leadership for environmental issues and its impact on the environmental state. It has been 
argued that since the 1980s many advanced industrialised nations have moved away from 
‘economic rationality’, whereby economic interests are established as a society’s 
dominant organising principle. As a result of becoming more reflexive about the side 
effects of economic growth, environmental concerns have become an increasingly 
important consideration in these countries’ development blueprints (Beck, 1994; Mol, 
2006). One consequence is that environmental issues are no longer confined to a single 
dedicated environmental protection agency in the government bureaucracy. Rather, they 
have become a central part of the work of government as a whole (Weale, 1992). As 
discussed in more detail below, some scholars have claimed that similar processes are 
occurring in China as it becomes more reflexive about the environmental impact of its 
rapid economic growth (Rock, 2002a, b; Economy, 2006; Lo & Tang, 2006; Mol, 2006; 
Carter & Mol, 2006).  
 
This chapter analyses the role that environmental and resource issues have been given in 
the current ‘fourth generation’ leadership’s development strategy.43 Since assuming 
formal control in 2002, the (President) Hu Jintao and (Premier) Wen Jiabao leadership 
has repeatedly emphasised the need to protect the environment and conserve energy 
                                                   
43 Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin are seen as the ‘core’ of the PRC’s first, second, and third 
generation leadership, respectively. 
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resources whilst pursuing economic growth. This trend is encapsulated in the current 
leadership’s promotion of a ‘Scientific Development Concept’ (SDC), which represents 
in part an attempt to reorient China’s development strategy towards a more 
environmentally sustainable direction.44 This policy is consistent with the advice of 
international agencies such as the World Bank (2001: 135), who argue that only through 
changing its growth strategy can China successfully address its environmental challenges. 
This chapter argues that the Chinese leadership is undergoing an important ‘paradigm 
shift’ in terms of how it views the country’s development. With this paradigm shift, 
environmental issues are increasingly moving beyond the domain of China’s 
environmental protection agency to become an important part of the country’s overall 
development strategy.  
 
This chapter contributes to understandings of how official accountability for 
environmental issues is being promoted. Specifically, it examines how officials are held 
to account to higher levels of government. Although strong central government rhetoric 
in favour of a more balanced development approach arguably augurs well for China’s 
environmental situation, there is clearly a challenge in terms of translating this rhetoric 
into better environmental outcomes. This chapter argues that, if the central leadership’s 
paradigm shift regarding China’s development trajectory is to make a meaningful 
difference to environmental outcomes, changing local officials’ behaviour by making 
them more accountable to higher levels of government for environmental issues is vital. 
Improving local official accountability is a key aspect of any strategy to reduce the 
environmental protection implementation deficit and ensure that development is more 
environmentally sustainable. 
 
In examining the likely impact of the central leadership’s paradigm shift on China’s 
ability to improve environmental compliance and move towards a more sustainable 
development model, this chapter focuses on two recent Ministry of Environmental 
                                                   
44 Also referred to as the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’. 
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Protection (MEP)45 initiatives designed to make local Party-state officials pay greater 
attention to environmental protection. Both schemes were made possible by the SDC, and 
both possess goals that are consistent with it. Additionally, the two initiatives have been 
strongly linked to the SDC by MEP officials. The first initiative involved an attempt, in 
conjunction with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), to establish a system of 
measuring green GDP. The aim of green GDP is to incorporate the cost of environmental 
degradation and resource depletion into traditional GDP calculations. As GDP is a key 
performance indicator for local officials, the purpose of the green GDP project was to 
provide an incentive for local officials to accord higher priority to environmental and 
resource efficiency issues. The second initiative examined in this chapter involved the 
MEP launching several high-profile crackdowns on various large-scale projects in breach 
of environmental regulations in what the Chinese media has dubbed a series of 
‘environmental storms’.46 These environmental storms, which were crucially backed up 
by the central leadership, were seen primarily as an attempt to improve the enforcement 
of environmental legislation and therefore promote the rule of law. In addition, both 
initiatives were designed to improve local officials’ accountability with regards 
environmental issues. 
 
Although Elizabeth Economy (2006) has briefly examined China’s green GDP project in 
the context of an ‘emerging economic dimension’ in the country’s environmental 
governance, this chapter introduces new empirical material that takes advantage of the 
lapse in time since Economy’s study in order to show how the project ultimately stalled 
due in part to local level resistance. Environmental storms, meanwhile, have not been 
examined in the scholarly literature, despite their prominence in the Chinese and, to a 
lesser extent, overseas media. Through presenting detailed studies of these two important 
initiatives, this chapter aims to address these gaps in the literature. 
 
                                                   
45 Before 2008, the MEP was referred to as the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). For 
clarity, this chapter uses the term ‘MEP’ when referring to the central level environmental protection 
agency both before and after this bureaucratic reorganisation. 
46 The term ‘environmental storm’ is adopted in this chapter reflecting its widespread use in the Chinese 
media and environmental protection circles. It should not be interpreted as a negative term, rather it is used 
to connote the sudden and aggressive sweeping away of bad environmental practice by the central 
authorities. 
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This chapter has two main focal points. First, it considers the extent to which the MEP 
has been able to benefit from aligning its own goals with those of the fourth generation 
leadership’s new approach to development. As John Kingdon has argued (2003: 16-17), 
issues can be pushed up the policy agenda by events such as crises, a change in indicators 
(for example worsening pollution), or a change in administration. Such events may lead 
to the opening of ‘policy windows’ that, albeit sometimes fleetingly, present an 
opportunity for government officials, or ‘policy entrepreneurs’, who are ‘advocates 
willing to invest their resources … into a problem in order to gain benefit’ (Ibid.: 179). 
Action is most likely to be taken on a policy when the need for such a policy is 
recognised, a policy exists in order to address the issue, and political support is present. 
This chapter argues that the way in which the green GDP and ‘environmental storm’ 
initiatives have been closely associated with the SDC suggests that the MEP has 
benefited from a policy window created by the new leadership and its new development 
approach. This policy window has been skilfully exploited by MEP vice-minister Pan 
Yue, particularly in his use of the media. However, this chapter also argues that the 
outcomes of these initiatives show that this benefit has been mainly confined to a raising 
of environmental protection agency’s profile, as well as that of environmental issues 
through the media, rather than ensuring the implementation of environmental legislation 
by local officials. 
 
Second, this chapter aims to assess the main obstacles to overcoming local official 
resistance to a more balanced development path, as evidenced through the green GDP 
and environmental storm initiatives. In both cases, local officials displayed strong 
opposition to what they perceived as attempts to impinge on their ‘bottom line’ of 
economic growth. In the case of green GDP, this ultimately led to a significant watering-
down of this policy. Whereas the first green GDP findings were published openly amid 
much media interest, local cadre opposition ensured that subsequent green GDP data 
would not be published, but would instead be confined to internal use only. In the case of 
environmental storms, high-level support played an important role in supporting the MEP 
in the face of local level opposition, demonstrating a heightened commitment to 
environmental and resource issues in the central leadership. However, this initiative is 
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much less ambitious than green GDP, and is unlikely to have any lasting effect beyond 
highlighting the scale of China’s enforcement challenge due to its ‘campaign’ nature.  
 
This chapter concludes that the central leadership’s paradigm shift towards a more 
balanced development path has enabled the MEP to pursue policies that would not be 
possible without support from leadership elites. Additionally, it demonstrates how 
environmental issues are increasingly moving beyond the sole domain of the 
‘environmental state’ and are becoming a growing priority for the central leadership. 
These should be seen as positive developments. However, this chapter also argues that, to 
date, the growing central leadership concern for environmental issues has not been 
effectively translated into more effective environmental governance at the local level, at 
least not in the case of the two initiatives examined in this chapter. The green GDP and 
environmental storm initiatives are best understood as a skilful attempt by the MEP to 
strengthen its position through positioning itself at the forefront of the SDC, as well as 
showing its value in terms of implementing the government’s macroeconomic policies, 
rather than improving local officials’ environmental accountability to higher levels of 
government. Local officials will continue to resist initiatives that threaten GDP growth as 
long as this remains the main criterion by which they are judged. As a result, it appears 
that attempts to incorporate ecological rationalities into China’s development strategy 
will fail as long as officials are simultaneously encouraged to prioritise economic growth. 
 
Background 
The Problem of ‘Careless and Unrestrained’ Development 
Chapter 2 noted that poor enforcement of environmental legislation has been identified in 
the literature as a major shortcoming with regards environmental governance in China. 
Both scholars and officials within the Chinese central government frequently blame local 
officials for prioritising economic interests ahead of environmental issues, to the extent 
that they fail to abide by environmental regulations (see, for example, Liu, 2007a).  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, one commonly cited problem is the fact that Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs), which represent the MEP at the local level, are heavily reliant 
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on the local government in overall charge of their jurisdiction for resources and career 
advancement (Jahiel, 1998). In order to understand how local government officials 
approach environmental protection, it is important to appreciate the factors that ultimately 
guide their behaviour. Since the early reform period, local government officials have 
been strongly influenced by the various quantitative goals set for them by officials above 
them in the bureaucracy (Whiting, 2001; Edin, 2003).  
 
As Susan Whiting (2001: 72) has argued, the most powerful factors shaping the 
behaviour of local officials since the mid-1980s have been the revenue-sharing fiscal 
system and the cadre evaluation system. Fiscal reforms enabled township governments to 
keep a share of revenue collected on top of their mandatory contribution to higher 
administrative levels (Ibid.: 78). In addition, local governments became increasingly 
responsible for funding public goods that were previously financed centrally (Wong, 
1991). The early 1980s also saw a move towards imposing quantifiable, specific 
performance indicators on local officials under the cadre evaluation system (Whiting, 
2001: 102). In many cases, officials’ salaries and career advancement became directly 
linked with economic performance. Both of these changes provided strong incentives for 
cadres to maximise economic growth through promoting the rapid development of local 
industry (Whiting, 2001). Elsewhere, Maria Edin (2003) has also found that officials 
have been strongly encouraged to pursue economic growth by the cadre evaluation 
system.47 In addition, due to the often blurred line between officialdom and business, 
local officials often have a direct personal stake in local industry. As a result, local 
officials tend to have strong vested career and personal financial interests in maximising 
GDP growth, which can contribute to the poor enforcement of environmental legislation 
(Lieberthal, 1997).  
 
The pursuit of GDP growth that fiscal reform and cadre evaluation methods have 
encouraged has been blamed for encouraging ‘careless and unrestrained’ (cufang) 
                                                   
47 According to Edin (2003), there are three types of target for cadres: ‘soft’, ‘hard’, and ‘priority’. She 
found that economic performance was classed as a ‘hard’ target. In her fieldwork, Edin identified two 
‘priority’ targets which, if not met, would mean that all other achievements would be negated. The 
‘priority’ targets were the maintenance of social stability and family planning. These two indicators must 
therefore be achieved at all costs.   
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development at the local level. According to one report, the quest for GDP growth has 
played a significant part in contributing to a reversal of the trend away from heavily 
polluting and energy-intensive heavy industry towards light industry as officials at the 
provincial, county and city level compete with each other to grow GDP (Rosen & 
Houser, 2007). Since the late 1990s, heavy industry has become more profitable and this 
sector has grown markedly as a result. Whereas in 2002 heavy industry accounted for 39 
per cent of China’s total energy consumption, in 2007 it accounted for 54 per cent (Ibid.: 
14). This GDP-centric approach to development pursued by many local governments 
often leads to careless and unrestrained development. The latter phenomenon was neatly 
encapsulated by MEP Minister Zhou Shengxian when he said that, ‘the thing that is 
burned away is resources, the thing that is left behind is pollution, the thing that is 
produced is GDP’ (Hu, 2007).  
 
The trend towards energy and resource intensive heavy industry has negative 
consequences for China’s energy intensity. Figures indicate that China’s energy intensity 
per unit of GDP, which fell almost threefold from 1978-2002, actually rose in the period 
between 2002-2005 as total energy consumption increased by 70 per cent in the five 
years between 2000 and 2005 (The World Bank and SEPA, 2007: xi, 7-8). All of this has 
serious implications for the central government’s target to quadruple GDP by 2020 
compared with 2000. According to one estimate, China will have to double its primary 
energy supply in the same period in order to meet this goal (OECD, 2007: 20). This is 
clearly an issue that is of concern to the country’s leadership. In a speech delivered in 
April 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao said, ‘if we do not speed up [economic] restructuring 
and transform the growth model, resources will not hold out, the environment’s carrying 
capacity will be exceeded, society will not be able to endure the cost, and it will be 
difficult for economic development to continue’ (Xinhua Tongxun She (Xinhua News 
Agency), 7 May 2007). As well as contributing to pollution and social unrest therefore, 
the development trajectories pursued by local governments are increasingly impinging on 
the central government’s ability to sustain economic growth. 
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Attempts to Change Local Officials’ Behaviour 
Poor enforcement of environmental legislation in China highlights the problems 
associated with pursuing a ‘command-and-control’ approach to environmental protection 
in developing countries where economic growth is viewed as the main priority (Adeel & 
Nakamoto, 2003; Desai, 1998). As some scholars have noted, however, China’s central 
government has taken steps in an attempt to reassert control over local officials and 
encourage them to take environmental issues more seriously. One strategy has been to 
provide incentives for local officials. Based on an examination of China’s Urban 
Environmental Quantitative Evaluation System (UEQES), Michael Rock (2002a, b) has 
questioned the dominant view in the literature that Chinese local officials’ pursuit of 
economic growth necessarily leads them to neglect environmental issues. Under this 
initiative, major cities are ranked based on their environmental performance, and this 
information is published in environmental yearbooks and sometimes in the media. Rock 
(2002a, b) argues that the UEQES is changing industrial policy making in some Chinese 
cities. Following the introduction of UEQES, he found that EPBs were taken more 
seriously by other government departments, and city mayors have taken a much greater 
interest in their jurisdiction’s environment (Ibid.). Arthur Mol (2006: 41) has argued that, 
in making local governments accountable to higher levels, UEQES is an example of how 
environmental rationalities can be introduced in China, in spite of the prioritisation of 
economic growth. 
 
Elizabeth Economy (2006) has examined the National Environmental Model City 
(NEMC) initiative, which builds on the UEQES. Under the initiative, cities can apply for 
NEMC status, the awarding of which is based upon the city in question meeting various 
environmental protection criteria. There are three basic requirements and 25 specific 
criteria that must be met in order for NEMC status to be conferred. By October 2006, 63 
cities and 5 city districts had been awarded NEMC status (Zhongguo Huanjing Bao 
(China Environment News), 26 October 2006).48 City mayors see the attainment of 
                                                   
48 In response to the increased importance attributed to environmental issues by central government 
documents such as the 2005 ‘State Council Decision Regarding Implementing the Scientific Development 
Concept and Strengthening Environmental Protection’ and the 11th Five-Year Guidelines, the indicators 
determining whether or not a city can be given NEMC status were made stricter in 2006 (SEPA, 2006). 
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NEMC status as beneficial in attracting foreign investment as well as hosting 
international events, and some have actively sought out NEMC status as a result 
(Economy, 2006: 178). For example, in 2006 the Wuhan city government announced that 
it would invest over 34 billion RMB on environmental protection during the 11th Five-
Year Plan period in a bid to obtain NEMC status during this period (Hubei Ribao (Hubei 
Daily), 23 May 2006). According to Economy (2006: 179), NEMC has stimulated 
‘dramatic’ change in certain cities.  
 
The central authorities have also attempted to reform the ways in which cadres are 
assessed by linking environmental performance to the evaluation of cadres via the 
environmental quality administrative leadership responsibility system (Lo & Tang, 
2006).49 Under this system, the leaders of local jurisdictions agree to environmental 
targets. At the end of the year, their performance in relation to these targets is assessed. If 
targets are missed for three consecutive years, the officials in question are not eligible for 
promotion for the next five years. This system has been credited with making local 
leaders in Guangdong province more concerned about environmental issues. 
 
Another way in which the central level Party-state has also tried to exert control over 
local officials has been through organising environmental enforcement political 
campaigns. In a rare study examining such campaigns, Benjamin Van Rooij (2006a) has 
suggested that they can be effective in achieving short term goals, although they have 
failed to resolve the underlying problems that cause weak compliance with environmental 
protection legislation. 
 
Can attempts to change local officials’ behaviour significantly improve the way in which 
they pursue development? Most scholars examining attempts to encourage or compel 
local officials to prioritise environmental issues highlight the positives of such an 
approach. This is partly because most studies have focused on relatively wealthy parts of 
China. For example, Rock (2002b) acknowledges that his findings in relation to UEQES 
are based on research done in wealthy, coastal cities, and do not necessarily apply to 
                                                   
49 This paragraph is based on Lo and Tang (2006). 
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poorer areas inland. This is also the case with Economy’s (2006) work in relation to the 
NEMC. Cities must reach a certain level of wealth before they can be considered for 
NEMC status, which in turn prevents many cities from taking part. Hence, although 
scholars have been cautiously positive about schemes such as UEQES and NEMC, these 
conclusions appear to only apply to richer cities on China’s eastern seaboard. Although 
incentives can be attractive to wealthy cities with mayors willing to invest more resources 
in environmental protection, this approach might not be effective in other locations.  
 
This chapter finds evidence to suggest that there are serious obstacles to changing local 
official behaviour with regards the environment. This is particularly so in poorer, inland 
areas. Although incentives and enforcement campaigns can lead to positive results in 
some cases, such schemes need to be backed up by deeper reform in how local cadres are 
assessed.  
 
Towards a New Development Paradigm 
In view of the worsening environmental and resource crisis that is increasingly impinging 
on the fundamental CCP goals of economic growth and social stability (see Chapter 1), 
since coming to power in 2002 China’s current ‘fourth generation’ leadership has 
emphasised the need to follow a more balanced path to development that affords greater 
priority to environmental protection and resource efficiency. In terms of official rhetoric, 
it marks a significant break from the primacy given to economic growth during the Jiang 
Zemin era (Lam, 2005). At the centre of this new development path is the ‘Scientific 
Development Concept’ (SDC), which was formally written into the CCP Constitution at 
the 17th Party Congress in October 2007. According to China’s president Hu Jintao, with 
whom the SDC is closely associated (Fewsmith, 2004a), the SDC aims to ‘[combine] the 
development of the economy with the protection of resources and the environment’ as 
well as ‘[striving] to take a civilised development path characterised by the development 
of production, a well-off life, and a good ecological environment’ (Ibid). According to an 
official definition of the SDC, it aims to create dialectical unity between people and 
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nature.50 In this sense, it represents the coming of full-circle since Mao’s ‘war on nature’ 
(see Chapter 2).  
 
It has been argued that, due to their content and manner in which they were drafted, the 
current 2006-11 Five-Year Guidelines51 should be seen as representing the current 
leadership’s economic programme (Naughton, 2005). As well as incorporating a goal to 
double the nation’s GDP in 2000 by 2010, the guidelines also include the goal of 
reducing energy intensity per unit of GDP by 20 per cent by 2011. Another aim stated in 
the guidelines is to reduce major pollutants, including sulphur dioxide and Chemical 
Oxygen Demand (COD) by 10 per cent, also by 2011. In the words of Barry Naughton 
(Ibid.), ‘the Plan contains a strong call for environmental protection: it is the first time 
that the national government has been so strongly committed to the environment’.  
 
The setting of ambitious environmental goals in China is not a new phenomenon. The 
10th Five-Year Plan included environmental goals such as reducing industrial pollution 
nationwide by an average of 10 per cent (Murray & Cook, 2002: 5). And yet these goals 
were not realised in practice. Speaking in 2006, Wen Jiabao said that, ‘if we talk about 
the 10th Five-Year Plan, most of our targets were basically achieved. However, I can 
frankly tell everyone that environmental targets were not met’ (Zhongguo Wang (China 
Online), 14 March 2006). Worryingly in terms of whether or not China’s leaders can 
direct the country towards a more sustainable development path, it was reported that in 
the first year of the 11th Five-Year Guidelines period, sulphur dioxide and COD levels 
had both risen, by 1.8 per cent and 1.2 per cent, respectively (China Daily, 13 February 
2007). In addition, although energy intensity per unit of GDP fell by 1.23 per cent in 
2006, this was far from the 4 per cent required in order to meet the 20 per cent energy 
intensity reduction target (Xinhua Tongxun She, 4 March 2007). It appears that translating 
the rhetoric and ambitious goals in support of a new development trajectory into practice 
will be a formidable task. 
                                                   
50 This definition (in Chinese) is taken from the Shanghai Keji Weiyuanhui (Shanghai Science and 
Technology Commission) website. Available at 
http://www.stcsm.gov.cn/learning/lesson/guanli/20040628/lesson.asp. 
51 These ‘guidelines’ contain very few quantitative targets, unlike previous five-year ‘plans’, hence the 
terminology (see Naughton, 2005). 
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The new development paradigm as promoted by the Hu-Wen leadership might ultimately 
lead to a change in how local officials pursue economic growth. There appears to have 
been a change in emphasis by some local officials. For example, Party Secretary of 
Jiangsu Province Li Yuanchao was quoted as saying that, in relation to efforts aimed at 
cleaning up the Tai Lake, ‘the measures [to clean-up the lake] must be strictly 
implemented, even if they cause a 15 per cent downturn in the province’s gross domestic 
product’ (The Financial Times, 9 July 2007). However, it should also be noted that these 
comments came after a severe outbreak of algae on the Tai Lake led to the temporary 
suspension of drinking water for nearby residents. This incident attracted a large amount 
of media coverage and criticism both in China and overseas, which in turn put pressure 
on the authorities to be seen to be taking action to cleanse the lake. 
 
In spite of the difficulties associated with directing China onto a more balanced 
development path, it is clear that the central government has recognised the need to 
pursue a more sustainable development trajectory. Overcoming careless and unrestrained 
development is arguably of fundamental importance in this regard. In order to be 
successful in terms of its environmental and resource elements, therefore, the SDC must 
alter how local officials approach development. This chapter now examines in detail two 
schemes, namely green GDP and environmental storms, which have been framed as 
attempts to do just that. 
 
Green GDP 
Research into green accounting in China started relatively early, in the 1980s (Pan, 
2004a). However, steps to put it into practice in earnest were not taken until March 2004 
when the MEP joined forces with the NBS in order to conduct research into establishing 
an initial framework ‘based on China’s national conditions’ for calculating green GDP 
within three to six years (Ibid.). Green GDP involves calculating and then subtracting the 
financial cost of environmental degradation and resource consumption from conventional 
GDP, finally producing a figure that reflects the environmental and resource cost of 
economic growth.  
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The timing of the green GDP project is related to the central leadership’s desire to 
promote ‘scientific’ development. The initiative has been endorsed by Hu Jintao (Pan, 
2004a; South China Morning Post, 26 May 2006). Green GDP has been portrayed as 
being consistent with the SDC because it can be used as a tool to promote a more 
balanced development path amongst local officials. According to the MEP, the ultimate 
goal of green GDP would be to use it as a quantifiable measure of cadre performance that 
could provide a strong incentive for local officials to pursue a more resource efficient and 
environmentally friendly development path.52 As MEP Vice-Minister Pan Yue stated, 
‘green GDP means a deep conceptual transformation, it means a completely new concept 
of development and cadre assessment’ (Pan, 2004b). 
 
In 2005 it was announced that green GDP would be piloted in 10 municipalities and 
provinces.53 These regions were charged with developing green GDP models that took 
into account local conditions, as well as contributing to improving the national model of 
green GDP calculation (Zheng & Chen, 2006). In September 2006 the MEP and NBS 
published their first annual green GDP report.54 The ‘Research Report into the 
Calculation of Green GDP in China, 2004 (Public Version)’ was somewhat tentative and 
incomplete, reflecting the significant technical difficulties associated with the calculation 
(SEPA & NBS, 2006). According to the MEP, a complete green GDP calculation should 
include at least five indices relating to natural resource depletion, namely the depletion of 
land, mineral, forest, water, and fishery resources. In addition, it should account for the 
cost of pollution and ecological degradation. However, the report only accounted for 
losses caused by pollution, and even this calculation was incomplete as it only considered 
10 out of more than 20 items that should be accounted for (SEPA, 2006). According to 
one commentator, the report represented only ‘the tip of China’s environmental iceberg’ 
(Green, 2006). Despite the report’s obvious limitations, it claimed that in 2004 the 
financial cost of the 10 items of pollution under consideration had been 511.8 billion 
                                                   
52 MEP officials have, however, stressed that incorporating green GDP into the cadre assessment process is 
a long-term goal that cannot be achieved in the short-term (Xinhua Tongxun She, 8 September 2006). 
53 These were Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, Anhui, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Liaoning, Sichuan, and 
Zhejiang. 
54 A ‘public version’ of the report was made available to the general public. 
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Yuan,55 equal to 3.05% of GDP, a figure described as ‘shocking’ by one MEP official 
(Reuters, 23 July 2007). 
 
After the 2004 report was published the green GDP project was expanded nationwide. 
However, opposition to the project from various sectors has grown. Reports of friction 
between NBS and the MEP have spilled over into the media, with the former accusing the 
latter of failing to appreciate fully the technical difficulties associated with the project. At 
the same time, conflicting signals have emerged from the two departments. For example, 
one NBS official was quoted in the media as saying that the whole project was being 
stopped due to its difficulty (Financial Times, 9 May 2006), whilst MEP officials have 
maintained that work on green GDP will continue (Xinhua Tongxun She, 13 January 
2007). Overall, NBS arguably has much less to gain from green GDP, whereas the MEP 
has been able to generate high levels of publicity that serve to raise its profile as well as 
keeping environmental issues high up the political agenda.  
 
Although green GDP is notoriously difficult to calculate due to the problems associated 
with assigning market values to non-market goods such as clean air and water, conflict 
between the NBS and the MEP has not been purely based on this factor.56 Green GDP 
has faced the problem of opposition from provincial and municipal governments who fear 
that their GDP figures could be reduced significantly, and damage their cadre assessment 
credentials. As a result, dissent has been prominent. Opposition to the project reached a 
head just before the 2005 green GDP report was scheduled to be released around March 
2007. Some local officials criticised the 2004 report in public, and some municipalities 
and provinces have reportedly tried to withdraw from the project (21 Shiji Jingji Baodao 
(21st Century Business Herald), 22 March 2007). In addition, some municipalities and 
provinces put pressure on the MEP and NBS by writing to them requesting that results 
not be made public (Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 15 October 2008).57 A major 
                                                   
55 US$1 = 7.5 Yuan approximately.  
56 For a discussion on some of the problems associated with assigning monetary values to phenomena such 
as environmental degradation, see Smil (2004: 178-181). 
57 Provinces enjoy the same ranking as central cabinet level ministries, which puts them slightly above 
SEPA and the NBS in the hierarchy. This made higher level support vital for the green GDP initiative, 
particularly because SEPA had yet to be promoted to full ministerial status. 
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cause of contention appears to have been diverging opinions regarding whether or not the 
provinces and municipalities included in the report should be ranked according to 
performance. Although ranking was not used in the 2004 report, the MEP was in favour 
of including ranking in the 2005 report because it would place added pressure on the 
poorly performing regions to modify their development paths (Jingji Guancha Wang 
(The Economic Observer Online), 27 March 2007). In contrast, NBS, apparently loathe to 
cause trouble with provincial and municipal governments, opposed this idea. According 
to one official involved in the green GDP project, the ranking of provinces and 
municipalities in this way is particularly unpopular among those situated in China’s 
western region (Ansfield, 2007), where economic growth has lagged behind that of the 
eastern seaboard and where a lower proportion of government expenditure is invested in 
environmental protection (Economy, 2004a: 117-8). That poorer provinces have more to 
lose from green GDP is supported by media reports claiming that the as yet unpublished 
2005 report reveals that not only are the three worst-performing jurisdictions all situated 
in the western region (Jingji Guancha Wang, 27 March 2007), but that the calculations 
would reduce the GDP of western region provinces and municipalities by an average of 
3.16 per cent, compared with a reduction of just over 1 per cent for the eastern seaboard 
(21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, 22 March 2007). As a result, many provincial governments have 
mobilised against the project. 
 
Apart from the bureaucratic wrangling between the MEP and NBS, as well as between 
the centre and localities, opponents have also been aided by other factors. First, the then 
pending 17th Party Congress reportedly strengthened the bargaining position of provincial 
governments on this issue vis à vis Hu Jintao, who required the backing of provincial 
officials in order to carry out his desired reshuffle (South China Morning Post, 24 July 
2007). Second, Vice-President and Jiang Zemin protégé Zeng Qinghong has maintained 
that per capita GDP is the best way of measuring China’s development (Fewsmith, 
2004a), suggesting that the leadership is not completely united in support for green GDP, 
or at best is still somewhat tentative. According to Lieberthal (1992: 17), in China top-
level disagreement is likely to reduce the likelihood of lower-level compliance. Finally, 
the CCP is still sensitive about releasing data that casts it in a negative light. This was 
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highlighted in 2007 by the way in which Chinese authorities censored a World Bank 
report that attributed a large number of deaths to air pollution (The Financial Times, 2 
July 2007). Leaders were reportedly embarrassed by the data included in the 2005 report 
(South China Morning Post, 24 July 2007). Ultimately, NBS sent the 2005 report and the 
final decision about whether or not to publish it directly to the State Council (21 Shiji 
Jingji Baodao, 22 March 2007). To date, the report has still not been forthcoming. 
 
Despite the difficulties, officials have claimed that work on calculating green GDP will 
continue. However, as one State Council official revealed, green GDP results will be used 
for ‘internal reference’ within the bureaucracy rather than being released to the public 
(Interview 2, 2008). MEP official Wang Jinnan noted that the likelihood of the 
government making public another green GDP report in the future was ‘very small’ 
(Nanfang Zhoumo, 15 October 2008). He also stated that it would not be used as a cadre 
assessment indicator at present because the conditions are not in place (Ibid.). 
 
Environmental Storms 
In between January 2005 and January 2007, the MEP launched three so-called 
‘environmental storms’. These amounted to a series of high-profile interventions by the 
MEP in order to suspend projects that had been allowed to go ahead in violation of 
environmental regulations. The environmental storms, superficially at least, represented 
an attempt by the MEP to alter how cadres pursue economic growth through taking a 
tougher stance regarding the enforcement of environmental legislation.  
 
On 18 January 2005, the MEP announced that it had suspended 30 major projects across 
13 provinces and municipalities for failing to comply with the 2003 Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) Law. Although the halting of construction projects by the MEP 
is not unusual, the size of the projects with a combined investment in excess of 118 
billion Yuan made this an ‘extraordinary and unprecedented move’ (Adams, 2005) that 
was dubbed an ‘environmental storm’ (huanjing fengbao) by the media.58 The MEP 
repeated this tactic at the start of 2006 when it targeted a series of chemical and 
                                                   
58 This first ‘environmental storm’ was also referred to as an ‘EIA storm’ (huanping fengbao). 
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petrochemical plants situated on the banks of rivers. This was seen as a response to the 
Songhua River disaster that occurred in November 2005 when an explosion at a chemical 
factory caused pollutants to be discharged into the river, necessitating the temporary 
suspension of water supplies to the downstream city of Harbin. Then, in January 2007, a 
third environmental storm was launched, in which the MEP imposed the strictest 
administrative penalties yet on polluting companies and districts by imposing four 
regional and industrial bans. This meant that no new projects under the jurisdiction of the 
four regional governments or the four large companies targeted by the storm would be 
approved until rectifying measures had been taken. Although the three storms were all 
spearheaded by the MEP, it became clear that it had received high-level support from 
other parts of the central government that enabled it to take on powerful economic 
interests. One explanation for this support is that a central feature of the storms, similar to 
the green GDP project, was to send out a powerful signal to local governments against 
careless and unrestrained development. 
 
The 2005 environmental storm was ostensibly carried out in order to enforce the 2003 
EIA Law. Large-scale projects frequently submit an EIA report after construction has 
been completed, in a practice that the MEP refers to as ‘boarding the bus before buying a 
ticket’ (xian shang che, hou mai piao) (Xiong, 2006). Many projects do not carry out an 
EIA at all.59 In the month prior to the launching of this initiative, the MEP began to take 
steps to strengthen the EIA process and ensure that the process was carried out as 
intended. In December 2004, the MEP released a notice calling for stricter EIA 
procedures in order to prevent haphazard construction of power stations, and also took 
action against 68 work units with the authority to conduct EIA for failing to properly 
carry out their duties (Ibid.).  
 
However, the 2005 environmental storm should also be interpreted as a macroeconomic 
measure designed to cool down the economy, as well as an attempt by the MEP to align 
itself with the SDC. 26 out of the 30 projects targeted for failing to complete an EIA were 
                                                   
59 According to the MEP, only 30-40 per cent of projects at county level and below in the central and 
western region carry out an EIA (Xiong, 2006).  
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in the power sector, which has been developed in an unsystematic fashion as local 
governments rush to fill the energy shortfall and boost local GDP figures. As one official 
from the China Academy of Social Sciences stated, ‘one aspect of local governments 
conniving to introduce electric power projects on a large scale is to soften the problem of 
electricity shortage; another aspect is to increase GDP and increase [cadres’] political 
achievements’ (21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, 13 January 2007).  
 
Three of the halted projects were undertaken by the influential and powerful Three 
Gorges Corporation (TGC) which is the largest hydroelectric company in China and 
which ranks above the MEP in the bureaucracy. In a move that highlighted the MEP’s 
hitherto lack of bureaucratic power, the TGC initially resisted the MEP’s halting order, 
which led to a standoff between the two. This standoff was revealing, as it soon became 
apparent that important actors were mobilising behind the scenes in support of the MEP. 
Premier Wen Jiabao was reported to have supported the storm and subsequently praised 
the MEP at a meeting of central officials (Time, 7 February 2005).  
 
Similar to green GDP project, the 2005 environmental storm also encountered opposition 
from local officials. However, according to the former head of the Hunan provincial EPB, 
when some officials strongly opposed the first environmental storm and called for Pan 
Yue, who had been the most vocal supporter of the initiative, to be disciplined, the central 
government again showed its support for the MEP by intervening and calming the debate 
(Nanfang Zhoumo, 22 March 2007). In addition, during the standoff with the TGC, the 
powerful central ministry National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
jointly issued a notice with the MEP concerning the need to pay attention to 
environmental protection during the construction of hydropower plants (Renmin Wang 
(People’s Daily Online), 2 February 2005). This support for the MEP represented a 
significant shift in central government policy. As the head of the Energy Foundation 
Yang Fuqiang noted, ‘in the past, the NDRC would have backed up the power 
companies… its support is a sign that [China’s] leaders want to back SEPA up’ (Time, 7 
February 2005). This high-level support proved decisive; the TGC backed down and 
received a maximum fine of 200,000 Yuan for each of the three projects. 
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Shortly after the Songhua River disaster, the MEP launched what was described as the 
second environmental storm (Nanfang Zhoumo, 9 February 2006a). The agency 
suspended the licences of 11 enterprises in nine provinces that were located on the banks 
of rivers and which posed an environmental threat. It also conducted risk assessments on 
127 chemical and petrochemical plants with a combined investment of approximately 
450 billion Yuan, and examined 10 illegal projects with a combined investment of 29 
billion Yuan (Ibid.).  
 
The third environmental storm, launched in January 2007, represented a new phase in this 
tactic. The MEP identified and halted 82 projects with a combined investment of over 
112 billion Yuan for failing comply with environmental regulations. However, in contrast 
to the first two storms that targeted individual projects, the MEP placed ‘regional permit 
restrictions’ on four cities60 and ‘trade permit restrictions’ on four of China’s five biggest 
power corporations.61 These permit restrictions meant that none of the cities or 
corporations in question would have any new projects approved62 until they had complied 
with environmental regulations. This move represented the toughest administrative 
penalty ever adopted by the MEP (Yang Lei, 2007). Regional permit restrictions are 
significant in that they target local governments as opposed to individual enterprises, and 
are therefore a far stiffer penalty (21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, 13 January 2007). As Pan Yue 
noted, ‘this is a first step for thte MEP, which has never before taken such resolute steps 
in its entire 30 year history’ (Nanfang Zhoumo, 23 January 2007).  
 
In the same vein as the 2005 storm, the objectives of the 2007 storm were closely linked 
to macro-control policy and the SDC. According to Pan, ‘environmental protection is 
strongly connected with the scientific concept of development and can be seen as an 
instrument through which to implement macroeconomic policies’ (Nanfang Zhoumo, 23 
January 2007). In addition, the 2007 storm followed closely on the news that China had 
                                                   
60 The cities were Tanghan in Hebei province, Luliang in Shanxi province, Liupanshui in Guizhou 
province, and Laiwu in Shandong province. 
61 The corporations were Datang International, Huaneng, Huadian, and Guodian. 
62 With the exception of projects related to the ‘circular economy’. 
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failed to meet its goal in 2006 regarding the reduction of energy consumption per unit of 
GDP as set out in the 11th Five-year Guidelines. It was reported that certain elements of 
the leadership had ‘lost their tempers’ over this, which could explain support for the strict 
measures undertaken (21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, 13 January 2007). The third environmental 
storm may have been partly motivated by the desire of the central government to signify 
that this would not be tolerated. 
  
The environmental storms suggest that the MEP has managed to successfully solicit high-
level support by aligning this campaign closely with central government goals consistent 
with the new development direction. However, there are limits to what it has been able to 
achieve. First, although the MEP claimed victory in the standoff with the TGC, it could 
only impose a maximum fine of 200,000 Yuan per project, a paltry amount in comparison 
with the amount of money invested. This shows the extent to which the MEP remains 
limited in terms of the punishments it can hand out. In addition, it was reported that soon 
after the 30 projects in the 2005 environmental storm were halted, they were allowed to 
resume again after completing a ‘make-up’ EIA. This reveals deeper systematic 
shortcomings related to China’s EIA process, as conducting an EIA after a project has 
begun undermines the main premise of an EIA, which is to identify potential 
environmental impact before it occurs in order that mitigating steps might be taken. 
Furthermore, although the environmental storm approach has been successful in 
generating headlines, and Pan Yue has been christened ‘Whirlwind Pan’ (Pan Xuanfeng) 
by the media, they are by their very nature one-off campaigns. After the storms die down 
the situation usually reverts to normal (Tang, 2007). Pan Yue has acknowledged the 
limitations associated with the environmental storm approach, and has argued that a more 
wide-ranging reform of the system is needed (Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 6 February 
2007). However, he views measures such as the environmental storms as necessary steps 
towards this direction, explaining that, ‘to move the system forward, we’re playing a kind 
of game: we enforce a new environmental law – and the other side retreats a bit, and we 
advance a bit’ (Nanfang Zhoumo, 23 January 2007). 
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Wider Political Motives and the Role of Civil Society 
In what ways has the central leadership’s increasing concern for environment and 
resource issues affected environmental governance in China? The two initiatives 
examined above show how the MEP has taken advantage of the paradigm shift at the 
central level in order to pursue policies that it would not have been able to pursue in the 
absence of significant support from the leadership. On the face of it, both green GDP and 
environmental storms were designed to encourage, or compel, local officials to change 
how they pursue economic growth. In this sense, they were very much consistent with the 
goals of the SDC, which advocates a more balanced development path. However, a closer 
examination of the two schemes suggests that they were also attempts to improve the 
MEP’s bureaucratic standing by positioning it at the forefront of the central leadership’s 
new development trajectory and attempts to use macro-control as a means of regulating 
the economy. Both schemes were also designed to bring attention to the severity of 
China’s environmental situation. Even though the MEP could claim a victory in relation 
to the environmental storms, weaknesses in the EIA Law meant that this was a 
bureaucratic victory rather than something that could significantly improve the 
environment. The highly ambitious green GDP initiative, meanwhile, was perhaps 
unsurprisingly largely unsuccessful due to bureaucratic opposition in a political 
environment where economic growth is still prioritised. 
 
A major feature of the two initiatives was the way in which MEP officials, and Pan Yue 
in particular, used the media in order to overcome institutional constraints. Pan, a former 
journalist, skilfully engaged with the media in order to promote both green GDP and the 
environmental storms. The green GDP and environmental storm initiatives both 
generated a large amount of media interest. This media attention was arguably the most 
fruitful aspect of the two schemes from the MEP’s viewpoint. In addition, the MEP’s 
interactions with the media added a layer of transparency to the two initiatives. For 
example, Pan announced details of the first environmental storm in person to journalists 
at a press conference. In all three storms, the MEP revealed the names and details of the 
companies and local governments involved, effectively ‘naming and shaming’ them in 
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the media.63 Moreover, MEP officials such as Pan and Wang Jinnan, who worked on the 
green GDP project, also fielded numerous interviews in relation to the two initiatives.64 
These interviews enabled them to justify the MEP’s position, appeal to public support, 
and also keep the two schemes, and environmental issues more generally, on the public 
agenda. The MEP also raised the profile of green GDP through its televised ‘Green China 
Champions’ award show, during which one of the statisticians working on the project 
received an award (Newsweek International, 15 Janury 2007). However, after the NBS 
sent the 2005 green GDP report to the State Council, Pan was reportedly forced into 
keeping a low profile, and was therefore unable to offer a public explanation as to why 
the report was not to be published. Partly as a result of this, media reports on green GDP 
reduced significantly and the decision making process in relation to the future green GDP 
was conducted behind closed doors. 
 
The two initiatives as a plea for more resources 
There is evidence to suggest that Pan Yue and the MEP used the two initiatives in order 
to make a case for increasing the agency’s resources. This was also done in several ways. 
For example, although ostensibly an attempt to promote environmental indicators in the 
cadre assessment process, the green GDP initiative was also used to highlight the lack of 
investment in environmental protection. A news bulletin issued by the MEP highlighted 
the 2004 report’s finding that a one-off investment of 108 billion Yuan, equivalent to 6.8 
per cent of GDP, was needed in order to treat point source pollution. In addition, annual 
investment equivalent to 1.8 per cent of GDP was needed in order to maintain a clean 
environment. However, the bulletin pointed out that, under the 10th Five-Year Plan 
annual investment in pollution control was only equivalent to 1.18 per cent of GDP 
(SEPA, 2006b). In media interviews, Pan Yue also used the report’s findings to point out 
the need to increase investment in environmental protection (Renmin Ribao, 11 
September 2006). As a result, it could be argued that the MEP, in drawing attention to 
                                                   
63 Chapter 5 examines the tactic of ‘naming and shaming’ in more detail. 
64 For an English translation of one such interview, see Nanfang Zhoumo (23 January 2007). In the past, 
Pan has also been interviewed by overseas publications, in which he has emphasised China’s environmental 
plight. See, for example, Spiegel (7 March 2005).  
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both the scale and the clean-up cost of China’s environmental degradation, used green 
GDP partly in order to make the case for more funds.  
 
Likewise, the environmental storms could be seen as a useful way of highlighting the 
scale of the problem of lax enforcement of environmental legislation, and the MEP’s 
weak position in the bureaucracy. The paltry nature of the fines that the MEP levied on 
companies in the first environmental storm, as well as the indifference to the agency’s 
regulations displayed by many project coordinators showed how little authority the MEP 
had in relation to powerful enterprises. The MEP’s motives for launching the initiative 
were also questioned by an environmental expert who works with the agency. Speaking 
in relation to the first environmental storm, he said, ‘[the MEP] is just putting on a show 
to convince the public that it is doing its job… it is diverting attention from the fact that it 
has failed to clean up the environment’ (South China Morning Post, 21 March 2005). 
 
NGO involvement 
As well as utilising media support in its pursuit of the two initiatives, the MEP was also 
supported by Chinese environmental NGOs. For example, after it was announced that 
publication of the 2005 green GDP report was being postponed indefinitely, Friends of 
Nature issued a statement in support of green GDP (Friends of Nature, 2007a). In 
addition, 56 NGOs signed a letter of support for the environmental storms (Friends of 
Nature et al 2007). Although NGOs appeared to have a negligible effect in both cases, the 
support given by activists demonstrates the linkages that are developing between the 
MEP and China’s NGO community. Pan’s successful courting of the media, and NGO 
support, facilitated the claim that green GDP and environmental storms were important 
because they successfully won the attention and support of the media and the public (see, 
for example, Xiong, 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on efforts to hold local officials to a greater degree of 
accountability to higher levels of government with regards environmental issues. A high 
level of central leadership concern for environmental issues represents a paradigm shift in 
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how development is perceived. The SDC shows that environmental issues are more and 
more forming a central part of China’s development strategy and are decreasingly 
confined to the domain of the environmental protection agency. This in itself is an 
important development. And yet this chapter has also shown that translating the 
environmental protection aspects of the SDC into better environmental outcomes is likely 
to be a long and difficult task. 
 
The green GDP and environmental storm initiatives show how the MEP has been 
relatively successful in positioning itself at the forefront of a policy window created by 
the current leadership’s new development direction that is, to a greater extent than before, 
underpinned by environmental and resource concerns. The MEP has also shown that it 
can be an important actor in the government’s macro-control policy. Heightened central 
leadership support for environmental and resource issues has enabled the MEP to 
introduce policies that are unprecedented in the PRC, both in terms of the scale of the 
‘carrot’ of green GDP which offers incentives to officials to move away from GDP-
centric development, and the ‘stick’ of the environmental storms whereby the MEP 
showed a previously lacking determination, backed up by central government support, in 
taking on illegal projects. Aided by the communication skills of Pan Yue in the role of 
‘policy entrepreneur’ (Kingdon, 2003), these initiatives have facilitated the raising of thte 
MEP’s profile, and the profile of environmental issues overall. Ensuring that 
environmental issues maintain a high profile is important for China’s long-term 
environmental prospects, even considering that public opinion does not have the same 
influence in China as it does in liberal democracies. Likewise, any strengthening of the 
environmental agency’s position should be welcomed. 
 
However, the two case studies also demonstrate the difficulties that the central 
government encounters as it attempts to affect more balanced development in the face of 
powerful vested interests in a highly fragmented political system. Although it has been 
argued that initiatives such as UEQES and NEMC have had some success in changing the 
behaviour of local officials (Rock, 2002a, b; Economy, 2006), this chapter has found that 
the green GDP project has so far largely failed to change incentives. Due to local 
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government opposition, the MEP was forced to back down from its original position that 
green GDP data, accompanied by a performance league table, should be made public. 
Admittedly, the green GDP project as envisioned by the MEP amounts to a far more 
ambitious scheme than previous attempts to provide incentives for environmental 
protection. Whereas UEQES and NEMC appeal to local officials because they believe 
that it might ultimately lead to tangible benefits such as greater inward investment, the 
green GDP initiative would, if properly implemented, significantly alter the way in which 
officials pursue growth. Local officials would not be able to sign up for green GDP on a 
voluntary basis if it did become a performance indicator. Striking the right balance 
between providing incentives on the one hand, and significantly altering how local 
officials develop their economies on the other, may prove difficult. 
 
Apart from their short-term impact, the environmental storms merely highlight deeper 
shortcomings in China’s environmental governance regime. Resorting to campaigns to 
improve officials’ behaviour highlights the difficulties involved in promoting greater 
accountability within a non-democratic political system. The way in which central leaders 
offered unprecedented support to the MEP in launching the three storms is consistent 
with policies such as the SDC that suggest something of a paradigm change in terms of 
the amount of attention paid to environmental issues. And yet, whilst it might be 
relatively easy for central leaders to lend their support to one-off campaigns in order to 
send a signal to local cadres, it may be much harder for the leadership to take the tougher 
steps required in order to effect lasting change, even if they are willing to do so. As noted 
earlier in relation to green GDP, significantly altering the balance between economic 
growth and environmental protection appears to still be an area of contention even among 
the central leadership. Although steps have been taken to increase the emphasis placed on 
environment and resource issues in the cadre evaluation system, economic growth 
remains the dominant goal. The prospects for any significant realignment in the 
relationship between economic growth and environmental and resource issues in China 
appear unlikely in the short term at least, particularly when in its authoritarian political 
system largely unaccountable political elites are able to resist such steps. 
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As this chapter has argued, improving environmental accountability for local officials 
from within the bureaucracy is a difficult undertaking. However, officials can be 
encouraged to change as a result of public pressure. Although public participation in 
environmental protection in the PRC has been limited, some officials are recognising the 
important role that citizens can play in holding officials to account. The next chapter 
explores the impact that government policy and civil society activism has had in 
promoting environmental public participation in China. 
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Chapter 4: Creating a Legislative Framework for 
Environmental Public Participation 
 
The previous chapter examined attempts by the central government to improve the 
enforcement of environmental legislation by holding local officials more accountable for 
environmental issues. It showed how the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), 
backed up by central leadership support, has attempted to change the behaviour of local 
officials through its green GDP and environmental storm initiatives.65 However, as 
Chapter 3 argued, there is strong opposition from many local officials to schemes 
designed to improve their performance in environmental protection. As a result, this 
chapter suggested that the MEP should also try to enable the public to play a greater role 
in environmental protection through improving access to public participation. 
 
This chapter contributes to understandings of how public participation in environmental 
governance is being promoted in China. Participation has been identified as an important 
element of ‘good governance’ (Asian Development Bank, 1995; Nanda, 2006). It can 
improve the design and implementation of projects, including in relation to their 
environmental impact. Furthermore, through participating in decisions, members of the 
public can promote official accountability. In this sense, public participation can be 
advanced in two main ways. First, by participating in environmental governance, the 
public can ensure that local officials obey policies from higher up levels of government. 
Second, the public can pressurise officials to respond to citizens’ own wishes. This 
chapter examines ways in which the Chinese Party-state has promoted environmental 
public participation. It also considers the extent to which public participation in China 
can effectively hold officials to account and improve environmental decision-making. It 
does so through an examination of key policy documents and public participation 
legislation. This chapter also examines two case studies that have implications in terms of 
                                                   
65 Before 2008, the central level environmental protection agency was referred to as the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). This chapter uses ‘MEP’, which SEPA became known 
as in 2008, throughout. 
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whether environmental public participation in China can promote greater official 
accountability. 
 
Low levels of public participation have been cited as a major shortcoming in China’s 
approach to environmental protection (Lotspeich & Chen, 1997; Tang & Lo, 2006; 
Martens, 2006). As Chapter 2 noted, the Chinese government has historically favoured 
solutions to environmental problems that are firmly rooted within the state. And yet, 
confronted by a significant environmental challenge and serious environmental protection 
implementation deficit, MEP officials have increasingly acknowledged the importance of 
the public’s role in environmental protection. In the early 1990s, the MEP started to 
pursue an agenda of promoting public participation. Initially, this was centred on 
measures such as improving environmental awareness, allowing the emergence of 
environmental NGOs, and establishing an environmental complaints system. Since 2003, 
the policy of promoting public participation has deepened. The government has strongly 
advocated environmental public participation and has introduced formal channels 
whereby the public can play a more proactive role in the planning stage of new projects.  
 
One of the most significant developments in relation to the deepening of Chinese 
environmental public participation since 2003 centres on the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) process. As a result, public participation related to the EIA process is a 
central consideration of this chapter. The EIA Law, promulgated in 2003, contains 
clauses that facilitate the incorporation of public opinion into the EIA process. In theory, 
this enables citizens to present their opinions on large-scale projects before they are 
approved. As the previous chapter discussed, many construction projects fail to take the 
EIA Law seriously, and implementation of this law has been problematic. The insertion 
of channels for public participation in this process might render it more effective from a 
planning perspective through incorporating the concerns and suggestions of local 
stakeholders. In addition, it might ensure that local officials are held accountable for 
projects by members of the public who demand to have their say in the EIA process.  
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Although several scholars have noted China’s attempts to incorporate public opinion into 
China’s EIA process (Zhang et al, 2007; Carter & Mol, 2006; Martens, 2006), very little 
empirical analysis has been done (Tang et al, 2005; Moore & Warren, 2006). To date, 
some scholars have expressed cautious optimism regarding public participation in the 
EIA process. It has been suggested that incorporating public opinion into the EIA process 
through mechanisms such as public hearings may contribute to a diversification of 
China’s environmental governance approach (Zhang et al, 2007: 664; Carter & Mol, 
2006: 336; Martens, 2006). Others argue that, despite these policies, public participation 
is likely to remain constrained by the Party-state (Tang et al, 2005). In addition, although 
the impact of public participation legislation on Chinese environmental civil society has 
been mentioned as an issue in the literature (Lu, 2007; Tang & Zhan, 2008), no detailed 
studies exist that examine the linkages between the Party-state’s public participation 
agenda and civil society in China. In order to address these gaps in the literature, this 
chapter introduces original empirical material that helps improve understanding regarding 
the kind of public participation that is being promoted in China’s one-party political 
system. In addition, this chapter also focuses on how the government’s public 
participation agenda influences civil society, and vice versa. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. It begins by examining the evolution of the Chinese 
government’s policy regarding environmental public participation. Referring to policy 
documents and official statements, it argues that official promotion of public participation 
has gathered pace since 2003. As part of this process, public participation is increasingly 
being framed in legal terms that emphasise the public’s ‘right to participate’ (canyuquan), 
and ‘right to know’ (zhiqingquan). The Party-state’s policy on public participation, 
however, is not designed to give members of the public unlimited involvement in 
environmental issues. Rather, the aim is to create a ‘public supervision mechanism’ 
(shehui jiandu jizhi), whereby members of the public can improve the implementation of 
environmental legislation.66 This mechanism aims to promote an orderly and easily 
controlled form of environmental public participation that does not provide a platform 
                                                   
66 The term ‘public supervision mechanism’ was used in the 2005 ‘State Council Decision Regarding 
Implementing the Scientific Development Concept and Strengthening Environmental Protection’ (State 
Council, 2005). 
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from which members of the public might challenge the central authorities. At the same 
time, a central aim of this public supervision mechanism is to defuse growing social 
unrest associated with environmental issues. 
 
As well as focusing on legislative and policy developments relating to public 
participation emanating from the environmental state, this chapter is concerned with the 
response of civil society. In particular, it focuses on the involvement of NGOs in two 
high profile campaigns. First, this chapter examines in detail China’s first national level 
environmental public hearing, which took place in April 2005 at Yuanmingyuan (the Old 
Summer Palace) in Beijing. This hearing was convened after the park authorities failed to 
carry out an EIA on a controversial project to line the park’s lake beds with plastic 
sheeting in order to conserve water. Although this hearing has been analysed from a 
legislative viewpoint (Moore & Warren, 2006), no studies document the role of civil 
society. This chapter focuses on the role that NGOs played before, during, and after this 
hearing, and what this incident reveals in terms of the wider implications regarding the 
role of civil society in environmental governance.  
 
Second, this chapter introduces further original empirical materials in order to consider 
the ways in which NGOs have attempted to make use of public participation legislation in 
their campaign against hydropower development in Yunnan Province. During the Nu 
River campaign, activists cited the government’s own policies concerning public 
participation in order to push, unsuccessfully, for a more consultative decision making 
process. However, in a separate hydropower project at Ahai in Yunnan, activists were 
invited to comment on the EIA report and take part in formal meetings with officials. 
This was the first time that activists had been allowed to formally participate in decisions 
related to hydropower development in China.  
 
This chapter concludes that public participation mechanisms such as public hearings are 
still a long way from becoming an institutionalised part of environmental protection in 
China. Rather than representing the beginning of a more inclusive decision making 
process as some have tentatively suggested (Zhang et al, 2007: 664; Shi & Zhang, 2006; 
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Carter & Mol, 2006: 336), public participation mechanisms have failed to promote 
meaningful public input. The extent to which officials can be held to account via these 
mechanisms is very limited. Rather than making use of institutional channels to affect 
government policy, NGOs have been primarily concerned with pioneering these new 
public participation mechanisms. In doing so, they support the MEP and push for gradual 
governance reform within the current political system rather than actively engaging with 
and mobilising the grassroots to make use of their ‘right to participate’. Due to the 
arbitrary way in which public participation requirements are discharged by officials, and 
because of lingering suspicion of non-state involvement in decision-making processes, it 
is likely that public participation will continue to be more effective when pursued 
reactively in relation to environmental grievances, rather than proactively through the 
MEP’s emerging legislative framework. 
 
The Evolution of Environmental Public Participation Policy in China 
Public participation can be defined as ‘any of several “mechanisms” intentionally 
instituted to involve the lay public or their representatives in administrative 
decisionmaking’ (Beierle & Cayford, 2002: 6). Various scholars have argued that a lack 
of public participation in environmental protection is a significant impediment to better 
environmental outcomes in China (Lo & Tang, 2006), and in authoritarian systems more 
broadly (Lotspeich & Chen, 1997; Payne, 1995). For example, it has been suggested that 
in China low levels of public participation contribute to the poor enforcement of 
environmental legislation (Alford & Shen, 1997; Beyer, 2006), which was identified in 
Chapter 2 as a major failing in China’s environmental protection efforts to date. As a 
result, commentators have stressed the value that greater citizen involvement in 
environmental protection could potentially have for China (Martens, 2006; Economy, 
2007). Moore and Warren (2006: 4) have argued that public participation could be the 
best chance for China to improve its system of environmental governance, whilst 
prominent Chinese environmentalist Ma Jun cites a lack of public participation as 
China’s greatest failing in its environmental and resource management efforts (Ma, 
2007a).  
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MEP officials agree that low public participation levels are seriously impeding China’s 
environmental protection efforts. Officials have cited a lack of channels for public 
participation as one factor behind low rates of public involvement. As MEP Vice-
Minister Pan Yue noted, ‘insufficient legal mechanisms for public participation are an 
important reason why China’s environmental protection has laws that are not enforced, as 
well as having laws that are enforced in a lax manner’ (Zhongguo Huanjing Zaixian, 1 
June 2004). The role of the public in enforcing environmental regulations and exposing 
egregious examples of official neglect or incompetence is potentially a vital one in terms 
of increasing the efficacy of the MEP’s policies and therefore promoting rule of law and 
official accountability. Public participation can be a cheap yet highly effective means of 
promoting environmental protection and overcoming China’s environmental protection 
implementation deficit.  
 
Another factor behind the government’s recent enthusiasm towards public participation is 
that, as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, social unrest triggered by environmental problems has 
risen sharply in the past few years. This is a cause of great concern for the authorities. It 
has been claimed that much unrest materialises because the public is often unable to seek 
redress for environmental problems through official channels (Lü Ye, 2006a: 16). Unrest 
can also occur when the public is not consulted in the planning stage of projects that have 
a negative environmental impact. Officials have recognised that incorporating the views 
of citizens into decision-making processes can reduce discord between officials and the 
public. Speaking in favour of greater environmental public participation, Pan Yue stated 
that, ‘we would rather have an argumentative policy making process and a harmonious 
result, as opposed to a ‘unanimous’ policy making process and a chaotic result’ (Xin Jing 
Bao, 27 April 2007).  
 
The Beginnings of Environmental Public Participation in China 
Since the early 1990s, the central government has slowly started to put in place some of 
the necessary conditions and channels in order to encourage public participation in 
environmental protection. As Chapter 2 noted, the creation of a limited space for 
environmental NGOs to operate in was an important step. Not long after the country’s 
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first environmental NGO Friends of Nature (FON) was established in 1994, NGOs and 
members of the public demonstrated the role they could play as environmental 
‘watchdogs’ and ‘whistleblowers’ (see Chapter 2).  
 
Around the same time that FON and other organisations began appearing, the central 
government articulated its support for public participation in environmental protection 
through the 1996 ‘State Council Decision Regarding Certain Environmental Protection 
Problems’ (hereinafter the 1996 Decision). This has been described as a turning point as 
far as the encouragement of public participation in environmental protection in China is 
concerned (OECD, 2006: 44). The 1996 Decision called on government officials to 
encourage public participation and to give NGOs a more prominent role. It also urged 
citizens and the media to expose illegal activities that are harmful to the environment 
(State Council, 1996). As Chapter 5 discusses in detail, this contributed to the growth in 
environmental information made available to the public by the media and, to a lesser 
extent, by government officials, throughout the 1990s.  
 
The 1996 Decision failed to specifically set out how greater public participation should 
be achieved (Ibid.). One important policy to increase public participation did, however, 
emerge during the 1990s, namely establishment of a system for collecting environmental 
complaints. It has been suggested that this policy has achieved some success, with 
regulators tending to respond positively to complaints (Dasgupta & Wheeler, 1996). 
Anna Brettell (2008) has found that the number of recorded environmental complaints 
has risen significantly, with 5.59 people per 1000 lodging a complaint in 2004 compared 
with 1.23 people per 1000 in 1990. Meanwhile, Shi and Zhang (2006: 288) quote official 
statistics that show an almost tenfold increase in written complaints to EPBs between 
1996 and 2004. This increase can be explained in part by worsening pollution as well as 
increased environmental awareness by members of the public. It is also indicative of an 
improving institutional system for managing environmental complaints (Brettell, 2008). 
By the end of 2005, almost 70 per cent of administrative divisions had established a 
pollution hotline through which members of the public can register complaints (Ibid.). In 
addition, citizens also have the opportunity to seek redress through the ‘letters and visits’ 
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(xinfang) system, and are also allowed, at least in theory, to take their complaints to the 
next administrative level (shangfang). However, as Mol and Carter (2006: 161) argue, 
reactive complaints represent a ‘poor’ form of participation. 
 
With the 2003 promulgation of the EIA Law, the central government has stepped up its 
efforts to encourage environmental public participation to the extent that some analysts 
claim they have officially ‘embraced’ the concept (Moore & Warren, 2006: 3). Rather 
than promoting a ‘free for all’, however, the MEP would like to ensure that public 
involvement is limited to ‘reasonable’ (heli) and ‘legal’ (hefa) officially created channels 
such as commenting on draft legislation and through the EIA process. By pursuing these 
policies, the MEP is continuing to try and extend governance to non-state actors through 
tightly controlled, systematic channels that form part of a ‘public supervision 
mechanism’.67 Another aspect of this framework, information disclosure, is examined in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Since the EIA Law was promulgated, there has been greater emphasis on channels for 
incorporating public opinion into projects and policies at the planning stage. The 2005 
‘State Council Decision Regarding Implementing the Scientific Development Concept 
and Strengthening Environmental Protection’ (hereinafter the 2005 Decision) called on 
officials to convene public hearings (tingzheng hui) and listen to the public’s suggestions 
about development plans and construction projects that affect public interest (State 
Council, 2005). This represents a continuation in the departure from limiting public 
participation to reactive action, and mirrors a wider trend whereby public participation is 
seen as enhancing the legitimacy and enforceability of legislation in the PRC in general 
(Paler, 2005). In the environmental sphere, Ferris Jr. and Zhang (2005) have noted that 
there are increasing opportunities for people to comment on draft legislation, although 
there is a lack of manpower dedicated to analysing these opinions (see also Alford & 
Liebman, 2001). In addition, the government solicited and received a large number of 
public comments at the drafting stage of the 11th Five-Year Guidelines. Members of the 
                                                   
67 The need to ‘systemise’ (zhiduhua) environmental public participation is frequently put forward by 
officials and the official media (see, for example, State Council, 2005). 
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public have also been invited to submit comments in relation to draft legislation, 
including the revised Water Law.68 
 
Public participation in EIA 
As noted above, the policy of extending governance to non-state actors through official 
mechanisms has been most prominent in the field of Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA). As a result, this forms the main focus of this chapter. The history of EIA in the 
PRC dates back to as early as 1973 when it was introduced at the First National 
Conference on Environmental Protection (Wang et al, 2003: 545). It then formed an 
important part of the 1979 Environmental Protection Law (For Trial Implementation) and 
the 1989 Environmental Protection Law. Unlike the EIA process in western countries 
which encourages and facilitates public participation, EIA in China was designed as a 
top-down instrument through which to control pollution (Ibid.: 563). However the 1998 
‘Regulation on the Environmental Protection Management of Construction Projects’ did 
included national-level provisions for public participation in the EIA process (Tang et al, 
2005: 12). And before this, the Shanghai and Guangzhou municipal governments had 
adopted measures, in 1994 and 1995 respectively, that required projects to consider 
public opinion during the EIA process (Ibid.). However, overall public participation in 
China’s EIA process was very limited, representing a significant weakness in this process 
(Ibid.: 8, 14). 
 
In October 2002 a new, stand-alone EIA law was promulgated, coming into effect in 
2003 (see People’s Republic of China Executive Order No. 77, 2002). The EIA Law 
makes provisions for public involvement in the EIA process and also makes local 
government plans and programmes subject to strategic environmental assessments.69 In 
general terms, Article 5 of the law states that the government ‘encourages’ (guli) relevant 
units, experts and the public to participate in EIAs. According to Article 11, local 
                                                   
68 According to an article from the People’s Daily, the soliciting of public opinion regarding the Water Law 
was the first example of ‘genuine’ public input into an environmental law (Renmin Ribao, 3 September 
2007). 
69 Early drafts of the law included provisions that would have made government policies subject to EIA 
procedures. However, these provisions were excluded from the final version after objections from 
government departments. See Wang et al (2003: 550). 
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government planning departments overseeing plans and programmes that could create 
unfavourable environmental impact directly affecting the public interest should solicit 
public opinions through discussion meetings (lunzheng hui), hearings (tingzheng hui), or 
‘other channels’. Furthermore, local governments should include an attachment with the 
EIA report stating the reasons why these opinions have either been accepted or rejected. 
Article 21 makes similar provisions for private sector construction projects (Ibid.). 
 
In order to clarify the role that the public should play in the EIA process, in 2004 the 
MEP promulgated the ‘Temporary Measures for Environmental Protection 
Administrative Licensing Hearings’ (hereinafter ‘ALL Measures’), pursuant to the 
Administrative Licensing and EIA laws (SEPA, 2004). The ALL Measures made 
provisions for public hearings in relation to EIAs for the environmental administrative 
licensing of projects and plans (Moore & Warren, 2006: 6).70 In 2006, the MEP followed 
this up by promulgating the ‘Temporary Measures on Public Participation in 
Environmental Impact Assessment’ (hereinafter ‘EIA Measures’), which was pursuant to 
the EIA Law. The EIA Measures identify five different ways in which the public can 
participate in the EIA process, namely opinion surveys, consultations, seminars, debates, 
and hearings (SEPA, 2006c).  
 
This emerging body of legislation underscores the MEP’s apparent growing commitment 
to public participation based on legal rights and responsibilities (Moore & Warren, 2006). 
Officials have spoken at length about the need to promote public participation based on 
citizens’ rights, which is a relatively novel concept in the PRC. In an essay written in 
2004 entitled ‘The Environment Needs Public Participation’ Pan Yue argued that, ‘we 
must understand clearly that public participation is the right and interest of the people 
endowed by law. The government has the obligation to respond to and protect this right’ 
(Pan, 2006[2004c]). 
                                                   
70 Two types of projects and 10 types of plans are referred to in the legislation. Projects include those large 
and medium scale projects that are likely to have a large environmental impact, and small scale projects 
likely to cause pollution to the detriment of local people’s quality of life. Plans include those related to 
industry, agriculture, herding, energy, water resources, transport, forestry, urban construction, tourism, and 
development of natural resources, which are likely to have a negative environmental impact on people’s 
lives (SEPA, 2004). 
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The changing legislative environment is potentially significant for China’s green NGOs. 
As well as suffering from difficult registration procedures and a lack of human and 
financial resources, NGOs have also been limited by a lack of channels through which to 
participate. NGOs have watched these legislative developments with interest. Indeed, 
some organisations contributed to the drafting of the EIA Measures, and a meeting of 
over 40 NGO representatives to discuss the significance of the EIA Measures was 
convened two days after they were promulgated (Lü Ye, 2006b: 21; Buckley, 2006). 
However, ensuring that this legislation is enforced throughout the country will be a 
significant challenge. There are also problems with specific aspects of the legislation. For 
example, the EIA Law and the EIA Measures both grant exemption to projects deemed 
‘state secrets’. This could be used as an excuse by the authorities to block public 
participation (Lü Ye, 2006b: 21). Furthermore, it has been argued that the EIA Measures 
do not go far enough regarding information disclosure, and that participation takes place 
too late in the decision making process (Wang & Li, 2005: 2).  
 
Public Participation Limitations 
Despite the enthusiasm with which public participation is being pursued by the MEP and 
others in the central government, there are various obstacles that need to be overcome 
before public involvement in environmental protection becomes the norm rather than the 
exception. The trend towards legislating for environmental public participation in China 
is not necessarily a linear process. There is opposition within the parts of the bureaucracy 
to public participation. A case in point is the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment 
(SEIA) Law that in 2008 was in the process of being drafted. When a draft version of this 
law was made available for public comments, it was criticised for not containing enough 
channels for public participation (Renmin Wang Huanbao Pindao (People’s Daily Online 
Environment Channel), 3 September 2008; Fazhi Ribao, 24 April 2008). According to 
Wang Jin, a professor from Peking University who had been involved in the drafting 
process, MEP officials significantly watered down public participation requirements 
contained in the original draft in order to appease other government departments that 
opposed public involvement. As a result, one journalist claimed that officials had used 
  
112 
112 
public participation as a ‘bargaining chip’ (Meiri Jingji Xinwen (National Business 
Daily), 21 April 2008). It was suggested that, by conceding ground in relation to public 
participation, the MEP won concessions in other areas of this draft law (Ibid.). 
 
A lack of governmental capacity is another factor holding back public participation 
through official mechanisms. One interviewee noted that, although the government has 
strongly advocated public participation, there is a huge gap between rhetoric and actually 
implementing this policy around the country (Interview 3, 2006). A lack of knowledge on 
behalf of EPBs regarding how to facilitate public participation is considered a major 
limiting factor (Ibid.).  
 
Overcoming scepticism and/or sheer resistance from local officials trying to safeguard 
economic growth is another barrier to effective public participation. According to MEP 
official Mu Guangsheng, ‘many local officials and enterprises still think public attention 
may hamper economic development’ (South China Morning Post, 3 February 2005). In 
addition, many officials still regard public participation with a degree of trepidation and 
worry that it might lead to the opening of a Pandora’s box of grievances and unrest. Even 
though, as already noted, public participation has the potential to contribute to social 
stability and improve environmental outcomes, this is balanced by the desire of the CCP 
to maintain a monopoly on political power. Ironically, there is a fear that too much 
participation could also be destabilising if it resulted in higher levels of unemployment 
due to enterprises being shut down for failing to reach environmental standards.  
 
All of these factors impact on how the concept of public participation is defined and 
played out in the Chinese context. First, the central authorities have tended to emphasise 
the role of the public in enforcing decisions that have already been made, as opposed to 
trying to generate serious debate regarding the direction in which environmental policy 
should take (Kim & Jones, 2006: 99). To the extent that public participation is carried out 
at all in China, it is often viewed as a mere formality.  
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Another factor limiting public intervention relates to the weak rule of law in China. 
Public participation can frequently represent a risky undertaking, especially where such 
intervention threatens to damage the image or goals of local officials. In a widely 
reported case, environmentalist Wu Lihong was jailed in 2007, on what many claimed 
were trumped-up charges, as a result of his campaign to raise awareness about pollution 
on Wuxi’s Tai Lake. Wu had attempted to raise awareness of the plight of the heavily 
polluted Tai Lake by sending reports to central government officials (South China 
Morning Post, 4 June 2007) whilst simultaneously criticising local officials for inaction. 
Despite the fact that Wu’s actions apparently fit well with the MEP’s rhetoric in support 
of increased public participation, and despite the fact that central officials were made 
aware of this case, Wu’s conviction has been allowed to stand.  
 
Partly as a result of these factors, public participation in environmental issues remains 
limited. For example, in 2006, the GONGO China Environmental Culture Promotion 
Association published a detailed statistical report on public participation in China entitled 
the ‘National Environmental Protection People’s Livelihood Index’ (China 
Environmental Culture Promotion Association, 2006). This report defined public 
participation very broadly, including activities such as water conservation by individual 
households. And yet it still came to the conclusion that, although large numbers of 
Chinese are aware of and concerned about environmental problems, public participation 
was weak. The report noted that many Chinese do not know how to participate or do not 
know which form of participation is the most appropriate or indeed legal. This can 
partially be explained by a lack of mechanisms, as well as a lack of knowledge about 
existing mechanisms. For example, the report found that only 16 per cent of respondents 
were aware of the “12369” free telephone hotline that can be used by citizens to report 
environmental problems. Clearly the raising of public awareness is an important issue. 
Cultural factors can also be a barrier. Many Chinese view tasks such as environmental 
protection as solely belonging to the government’s domain. In addition, one of the most 
serious limiting factors has been the lack of information upon which the public can act. 
Finally, a lack of channels for public participation has been identified as a major factor 
limiting public involvement in environmental protection (Lü Ye, 2006a: 16). 
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Public participation in the EIA process: The Yuanmingyuan Public Hearing 
In order to examine how public participation through the MEP’s emerging legislative 
framework plays out in practice, this section draws on documentary evidence to examine 
the case of China’s first ever national level public hearing, held in 2005 at 
Yuanmingyuan in Beijing. 
 
Background 
Yuanmingyuan, situated in a northern suburb of Beijing, was built in 1709 as an imperial 
retreat consisting of a series of gardens, palaces and lakes. It was infamously burned 
down in 1860 by French and British soldiers and was destroyed a second time in 1900 by 
the allied army of eight foreign countries. As a result, as well as being a popular tourist 
attraction, the park is highly evocative of China’s humiliation at the hands of western 
countries during the 19th Century.  
 
Plans to renovate Yuanmingyuan were drawn up by park authorities and some local 
government agencies in 2003. Officially, this renovation work included repairing lake 
and river banks, protecting the Yuanmingyuan ruins, and cleaning the lakes. Officials 
also cited the need to conserve water, a lack of which meant the park’s water features ran 
dry for seven months every year (Xinhua Tongxun She, 28 July 2005). However, 
renovation was also unofficially motivated by the desire of park officials to introduce 
commercial activities, such as boating, to the site. The renovation project started in 
October 2003, having been authorised by the Yuanmingyuan Management Department, 
the Water Resources Research Institute of the Beijing municipal government, and the 
Water Resources Bureau of the Haidian district government (Zhou et al (eds.), 2005: 29). 
Yuanmingyuan authorities claimed that the ‘Regulations on the Sustainable Usage of 
Yuanmingyuan’s Water Resources’, drafted by the three departments, officially 
mandated the renovation work (Ibid.).  
 
Controversy regarding the project surfaced on 22 March 2005 when a professor of life 
science from Lanzhou University, Zhang Zhengchun, visited the site whilst in Beijing on 
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business. Zhang was shocked when he discovered dozens of workers who were in the 
process of laying white plastic sheeting on the site’s lake and river beds in a bid to 
prevent water from seeping away into the ground. Zhang immediately realised the 
potential damage that such a project could cause to the park’s ecosystem and, by 
extension, to the authenticity of one of the country’s most prized and evocative historical 
relics. In order to raise public awareness, he brought news of this ‘leak prevention 
project’ (fangshen gongcheng), carried out as part of the wider renovation work, to the 
attention of both local and national media. This set in motion a chain of events 
culminating in the PRC’s first ever national level public hearing on an environmental 
issue.  
 
The media played a key role in bringing the story to the attention of the public, and the 
issue generated a large amount of public interest. After receiving a telephone call from 
Zhang on 24 March, the People’s Daily investigated and ran the story on 28 March 
(Zhao, 2006). Other parts of the national press, including major newspapers such as 
Southern Weekend and China Youth Daily carried the story the next day. Some reports 
were very critical of the project and the way in which the park authorities had conducted 
themselves. The leak prevention part of the project, costing about 30 million RMB, had 
started in September 2004, and by the time that Zhang helped expose it to the authorities 
and wider public, it was almost complete.   
 
One of the main points of contention in the debates that followed centred on what the 
purpose of the park should be. Opponents charged that the leak prevention work was 
being carried out for financial and commercial reasons, and that Yuanmingyuan should 
be treated as a cultural and historical relic rather than an amusement park. In contrast, the 
Yuanmingyuan management maintained that the project was required due to severe water 
shortages (Xin Jing Bao, 4 April 2005). However, public suspicion of the authorities’ 
motives heightened when it later emerged in May that plans were afoot to rent out one of 
Yuanmingyuan’s islands to private tenants. And, several days later, it was reported in the 
media that plans existed to build villas within the site. After these plans were exposed, 
the park authorities backed down under pressure and cancelled these projects. 
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The official response followed soon after the story came out in the media. The Beijing 
EPB visited the Old Summer Palace to carry out its own investigation on 29 March (Zhou 
et al (eds.), 2005). Then, on 31 March, the MEP stepped in and issued an order for the 
leak prevention work to be halted. The justification for this stemmed from the fact that no 
EIA had been carried out for the work in question. Based on this, the MEP invoked 
article 31 of the 2003 EIA Law and ordered the park authorities to carry out and submit 
to them a ‘make-up’ (buban) EIA.71 Indeed, as well as violating the EIA law, the 
renovation work was also contrary to the Heritage Law and the Heritage Bureau of the 
Beijing municipal government had apparently not been informed of the work (Ibid.: 30). 
At the same time, the MEP announced that a public hearing, as legislated for in the ALL 
Measures, would be held concerning the Leak Prevention Project on 13 April before the 
submission of the EIA (Ibid: 32). The reason given by the MEP for holding a public 
hearing in this case was ‘based on the project’s environmental sensitivity and because 
there exists a large divergence of opinion’ (SEPA, 2005).  
 
Yuanmingyuan Public Hearing
72
 
In one sense, the Yuanmingyuan hearing was an example of how grassroots pressure, 
combined with public participation mechanisms, can result in a governance process in 
China that involves actors beyond the state. However, the MEP also viewed it as a good 
opportunity to promote its public participation agenda through convening a public 
hearing that attracted much public and media interest.  
 
The hearing was attended by over 70 people who had been selected from over 200 
applicants (Moore & Warren, 2006). They included representatives from eight 
administrative bodies and over 40 news units. Attendees also included approximately 10 
representatives from NGOs FON, Global Village Beijing (GVB), Green Earth Volunteers 
(GEV) and the Earthview Environmental Education Centre (EEEC). High-level MEP 
                                                   
71 Constructors who fail to carry out an EIA are allowed to do a ‘make up’ EIA after construction is 
underway. This is seen as a major weakness in the EIA process, as it effectively undermines the whole 
logic behind the EIA process. 
72 Unless otherwise indicated, information related to the Yuanmingyuan public hearing is based on the 
official hearing transcript (see Renmin Wang, 13 April 2005). 
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officials including Minister Xie Zhenhua and Pan Yue were also present (Zhao, 2006). 
This demonstrated a high-level of agency support given to the hearing, and public 
participation by extension. Among the 29 speakers were three NGO members, namely 
FON General Director Xue Ye, EEEC Chairperson Li Hao, and GVB Chairwoman Liao 
Xiaoyi. The fact that NGO representatives were invited to participate in the hearing also 
represented a first for China. As Liao Xiaoyi subsequently noted, ‘The Yuanmingyuan 
leak prevention public hearing is a beginning, it is the first time that environmental NGOs 
have been invited to participate and put forth our voices. I think this is the start of a new 
era’ (Ma, 2005: 10). 
  
The hearing started with a short statement from Pan Yue. He said that among the reasons 
for holding the hearing were in order to expand and standardise public participation and 
to help push forward a more democratic decision-making process. In a show of openness 
and transparency, the hearing was broadcast live on the websites of Xinhua and the 
People’s Daily. Participants took it in turns to put forward their cases, alternating 
between those against and those in favour. At times, the debate became rather heated, and 
towards the end of the hearing a representative from the Yuanmingyuan Management 
Bureau stormed out after the participant summing up for the project’s opponents called 
for those responsible for the project to be held to account. One MEP official stated after 
the hearing that participants had not used enough statistics to back up their positions and 
had not reasoned enough (Yi, 2005). Nevertheless, the hearing took place and featured a 
plurality of opinions, even if the final decision firmly rested with the government. 
 
After the hearing, the next task was for the EIA report to be drafted. Initially, it proved 
difficult to find a willing agency to take on the responsibility in such a highly publicised 
case. However, Qinghua University finally agreed to undertake the task, and the report 
was published on 5 July. In another show of openness, it was available on the MEP’s 
website. Within 10 hours of appearing online, it had received 17,000 hits, causing the 
website to crash for three hours (Nanfang Zhoumo, 22 July 2005). The EIA report 
concluded that the project was illegal, had resulted in a negative impact on the ecological 
environment, and should be remedied (Zhao, 2006: 73). However, this was only a hollow 
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victory for those opposed to the project. The approximately 90 per cent of the project that 
had already been completed by the time that the MEP issued its halting order was not 
dismantled and remained largely untouched, leading to speculation that the MEP had 
made a political decision (Moore & Warren, 2006: 17). The hearing was also criticised 
because the MEP did not strictly adhere to procedure as set out in the legislation. It was 
pointed out that in China hearings should take place after the EIA report is completed. 
However, in this case the hearing took place before the public had had a chance to view 
the EIA report (Ibid.). 
 
NGO Involvement in the Yuanmingyuan Incident 
How does the government’s promotion of public participation through official 
mechanisms affect Chinese civil society? The role that NGOs played in the 
Yuanmingyuan incident reveals something about how civil society is affected by the 
government’s policy of promoting public participation. Beijing-based NGOs, and FON in 
particular, had taken an interest in Yuanmingyuan well before the leak prevention project 
was exposed. FON had a bird watching group that had been meeting and conducting 
ecological surveys at the park since 2002. Around that time, the group discovered that 
some projects being carried out at the park were threatening its biodiversity, and in 
February 2003 sent a report to the Beijing Municipal Government. The ‘Protect 
Yuanmingyuan’s Wild Biodiversity Report’ was passed on to the Yuanmingyuan 
Management Bureau by Beijing Vice-Mayor Liu Jingmin. Finally, in August 2003 the 
Yuanmingyuan Management Bureau responded, assuring FON that they took the 
problem seriously and would take steps to protect the park’s ecology (Yi, 2005). 
However, as FON’s Xue Ye subsequently noted, ‘the pity was that [the] Yuanmingyuan 
[management] went back on its own word’ (Xin Jing Bao, 14 April 2005). In 2004 the 
bird watching group also witnessed the park’s experiments that preceded the leak 
prevention project, but apparently did not realise the significance of this and failed to 
report it to the authorities (Ibid.). It is interesting to note that FON activist and member of 
the 12th Beijing Municipal National People’s Congress Li Xiaoxi said that after 
witnessing some of the early renovation work, ‘we resolutely opposed [the renovation 
project], we even invited the MEP minister to come over, but we were unable to stop 
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them’.73 Opposition to what was going on in the park was ineffective and the work 
continued. 
 
There are arguably two key factors behind the attention that the lead prevention project 
attracted in 2005. First, the involvement of the national media brought the issue into the 
open, creating pressure for the issue to be resolved amenably. Second, the Yuanmingyuan 
incident presented the MEP with an opportunity to hold a public hearing and showcase its 
emerging public participation agenda. 
 
Once the Yuanmingyuan issue had been widely publicised by the media, several Chinese 
environmental NGOs decided to become involved. Only a few days after the story was 
broken by the press, FON teamed up with Internet blog site ‘China Blog’ (Boke 
Zhongguo) and hurriedly convened a ‘people’s hearing’ (minjian tingzheng hui) on 1 
April (Yi, 2005).74 Over 50 people, including academics, environmental activists and 
members of the public, attended. Government officials from the MEP, the Haidian 
District Government, and the Yuanmingyuan Management Bureau also participated in 
the meeting, as did over 20 members of the mainstream media, including the People’s 
Daily and Xinhua.  
 
The people’s hearing performed several functions. First, the strong media presence 
ensured that journalists continued to cover the Yuanmingyuan incident, therefore 
maintaining public interest. Exposure was boosted further by virtue of the event being 
broadcast live on the Internet. Second, this ‘people’s’ hearing was ostensibly an attempt 
by NGOs to reach out to ordinary members of the public. This added to the sense that 
NGOs were in a position to represent wider public opinion in the official public hearing. 
Third, the people’s hearing was useful in providing technical information to NGOs about 
the impact of the renovation work (Yi, 2005). Academics played an important role in this 
regard in providing meeting participants with information about aspects of the case that 
they were unclear about, such as whether or not plastic sheeting was damaging for the 
                                                   
73 See Sina.com, 2005.  
74 Unless otherwise indicated, information related to the NGOs’ ‘people’s hearing’ is based on the official 
hearing transcript (see Sina.com, 2005). 
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environment. Academics also provided written reports to bolster the NGOs’ position (see, 
for example, Liu, 2005). This type of information enabled NGOs to pursue the issue on a 
stronger footing.  
 
From the outset, Xue Ye made it clear that those NGOs involved were supportive of the 
central government and that their motivation for wanting to take action over 
Yuanmingyuan came from a desire to ensure that the EIA law was effectively 
implemented. This support also manifested itself in other ways. For example, on the day 
of the people’s hearing, several NGOs including FON, GVB, and GEV produced a 
document they had jointly authored entitled ‘Announcement in Support of the 
Government Convening a Public Hearing with Regards the Laying of Leak Prevention 
Material at Yuanmingyuan Incident’ (hereinafter ‘The Announcement’) (Friends of 
Nature, 2005a). The Announcement pointed out that the authorities in charge of the 
project had broken national law by failing to carry out any EIA procedures. It also called 
for a public hearing to be held.75 At the same time, NGOs expressed the wish to take part 
in the hearing should one be convened. The Announcement was sent to the Beijing 
Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) and the Haidian District Government, as well as 
being copied to the MEP, the Beijing bureaus concerned with forestry, heritage and water 
resources, and to the Yuanmingyuan Management Bureau. 
 
In the run-up to the public hearing, NGOs continued to be active. On the day before the 
official public hearing, a group of seven NGOs, again including FON and GVB, issued 
their ‘Five Suggestions to Push Forward Resolution of the Yuanmingyuan Problem’ 
(Friends of Nature, 2005b). These suggestions were that the plastic sheeting be removed; 
the Yuanmingyuan renovation plan should be rewritten and that Yuanmingyuan should 
be defined as a heritage park; if the Yuanmingyuan management can not afford to 
purchase extra water, they should receive support from local government and/or raise the 
price of entry tickets; and finally, those responsible should be held to account. It was also 
suggested that the management of Yuanmingyuan should henceforth be entrusted to a 
                                                   
75 According to interviews with environmental activists, the NGOs were already aware of the MEP’s 
decision to hold a public hearing at this stage. Calling for a public hearing to be held was therefore an 
attempt to indicate solidarity with the government (Interview 5, 2007). 
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body made up of a variety of government departments as well as relevant experts, 
citizens, and NGOs. 
 
During the public hearing itself, NGOs were seen as representing public opinion (Zhao, 
2006: 77), and the NGO presence added legitimacy to the process. Moore and Warren 
(2006: 9) argued that ‘in part due to national NGO participation, the Yuanmingyuan 
hearing involved greater attention to the public’s procedural participation rights and 
implementation through hearing rules, as well as greater national publicity, and increased 
attention to the [EIA] report’s conclusions’. At the hearing, NGO activists were given a 
chance to contribute their views. FON’s Xue Ye presented a report based on the findings 
of the bird-watching group, as well as showing photographs. This factual evidence was 
praised by some sections of the media, although FON also had to contend with claims 
that their photos were fake (Yi, 2005). After the hearing, FON continued to pursue the 
issue through the media. Two days later, it gave the Shanghai Morning Post newspaper 
more details about the damage to the park that their bird watching group had discovered, 
arguing that the area of the park subject to experiments with plastic sheeting had 
experienced a decrease in plant and bird life (Xinwen Chenbao (Shanghai Morning Post), 
16 April 2005). 
 
On 14 July 2005, three months after the public hearing took place and a week after the 
publication of the EIA report, GEV, FON and Blog King convened a second meeting, to 
follow on from the people’s hearing and official public hearing, in order to review and 
take stock of the events surrounding the Yuanmingyuan incident. Participants at this, the 
‘Second Yuanmingyuan Ecology and Heritage Protection Meeting’ (hereinafter ‘second 
people’s hearing’) seemed united in the view that, although the hearing was a one-off and 
there was still a long way to go before such a process became institutionalised, it 
nonetheless represented an important step forward in terms of promoting environmental 
public participation through official channels (‘2005 Nian 7 Yue 14 Ri “Yuanmingyuan 
Shengtai Yu Yizhi Baohu Di Er Ci Huiyi” Fayan Jilu’, 2005). 
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The impact of NGOs on the actual outcome of this case appears to have been negligible. 
The NGOs’ five suggestions were not taken up, and the plastic sheeting was allowed to 
remain. Nevertheless, NGO involvement in the Yuanmingyuan incident suggests that 
activists can play an important role in promoting new, more participatory, governance 
mechanisms. Cases such as the Yuanmingyuan public hearing are important in raising 
awareness about new governance mechanisms and ultimately ensuring a more 
participatory and transparent style of governance. Arguably the main feature of NGO 
activity in this case was the way in which they supported the government in its effort to 
promote the public hearing process in China. By cooperating with the media, activists 
helped ensure that the issue remained in the public eye. In addition, NGO involvement 
lent legitimacy to the public hearing itself.  
 
Hydropower development in Yunnan 
The case of hydropower development in Yunnan also highlights how legislative 
developments have altered the approach of NGOs. This case also suggests that, whilst the 
government officially supports public participation, it wishes to introduce this policy on 
its own terms. 
 
The Nu River Campaign 
In April 2004 it was reported in the media that Premier Wen Jiabao had stepped in to 
temporarily halt a proposal to build a set of 13 dams on Yunnan’s Nu River. Although the 
existence of a ‘high level of social concern’ was cited as the reason for the project’s 
suspension, there were also disagreements within the central government and pressure 
emanating from downstream countries such as Thailand and Myanmar (Litzinger, 2007). 
The decision to halt the project was seen as a major victory for the coalition of public 
interest campaigners, including both Chinese and international NGOs, elements of the 
media, academics, and some environmental protection officials, that had mobilised 
against the project.  
 
This opposition centred on the Nu River’s immense ecological value. Nu River is part of 
the Three Parallel Rivers that in 2003 was designated a World Heritage Site by 
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UNESCO, and is one of only two rivers in China that have not been dammed. Although 
the decision by the central leadership to suspend the Nu River project was seen as a 
significant victory for campaigners, it did not mark the end of the issue. Relevant 
departments had been ordered to carry out and resubmit an EIA as part of Premier Wen’s 
request that careful research be carried out and that the decision-making process be 
conducted in a rational manner based on science. Much has been written about the Nu 
River campaign (see, for example, Büsgen, 2006; Litzinger, 2007; Mertha, 2008) and this 
chapter does not seek to cover the whole campaign in detail. Rather, the purpose of this 
section is to focus on one aspect of the campaign, namely the way in which, following the 
suspension of the project, NGOs have encouraged central government officials to bring 
the decision-making process out into the open through calling on the government to 
enforce its own laws relating to public participation.  
 
Although the activists’ campaign started off by focusing on environmental issues, some 
participants also started to take an interest in the impact on local people (Büsgen, 2006). 
In doing so, some activists decided to empower local residents from the Nu River area, 
who are due to be resettled if and when the dams are constructed, in order that they might 
have a say in the decision-making process. This approach proved controversial and risky. 
The Yunnan NGO Green Watershed, which views the establishment of good governance 
mechanisms as key to overcoming poverty and water crises (Hu & Yu, 2005: 138), took 
14 villagers from Nu River County to visit the nearby Manwan Dam in May 2004 in 
order to see firsthand how its construction had affected the lives of local people (Li, 
2004). The poverty in which the latter were living apparently shocked the villagers. 
Green Watershed also facilitated the participation of Nu River village representatives in 
the 2004 UN Dam and Development Symposium in Beijing (Hu & Yu, 2005). These 
tactics fell foul of local officials, who tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to close down the NGO 
for engaging in activities that went beyond its charter (China Development Brief, 2005). 
In addition, Green Watershed founder Yu Xiaogang was subsequently prevented from 
travelling overseas.  
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Given the risks involved with directly mobilising ordinary people, activists opposed to 
hydropower development have placed greater emphasis on promoting public participation 
according to law. Beginning in 2005, as well as continuing to raise public awareness of 
the issue, activists started to pay more attention to the formal decision-making process. 
They attempted to compel the government to hold a public hearing on the project as 
mandated by the EIA Law and the EIA Measures. As Wang Yongchen, founder of the 
NGO GEV and a prominent figure in the campaign stated,  
We are not blindly opposed to dams… We want to let the public know the 
environmental pros and cons of such projects. What green organisations 
demand is a fair decision-making process. Has the environmental 
assessment been done? Will there be a public hearing? How will the 
interests of those affected be protected? (South China Morning Post, 21 
January 2006) 
Through this approach, activists have essentially adopted procedural correctness as their 
bottom line; if dams are to be built, at least the process should conform to law. By doing 
so, NGO activists are using their voices to attempt to push forward new governance 
processes that have been made possible by developments in the environmental state.  
 
After the Nu River project was halted, the way in which central government departments 
handled the issue remained perhaps deliberately opaque, with discussions taking place 
behind the scenes and without any input from members of the public. For example, in 
November 2004 it was reported in the media, after the event, that a meeting of experts 
had already been convened in Beijing in order to discuss the new EIA. Apparently, 
participants had only been given the relevant materials just before the meeting, and were 
prevented from taking these documents with them when the meeting ended. In response, 
various NGOs and other activists argued that, by conducting the decision-making process 
in a closed manner, officials were going against provisions contained in environmental 
legislation that were designed to facilitate public participation. 
 
In a bid to put pressure on the government to make the whole process more transparent, 
in August 2005 a group of over 90 NGOs, academics, and over 450 individuals signed an 
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open letter to the central government entitled ‘Request for the Nu River Hydropower EIA 
Report to be Made Public in Accordance with Law’ (2005). It noted that the EIA had not 
been made public, and there had been no public hearing to enable those directly affected 
to voice their opinions. As one activist was quoted as saying, ‘this is the case to set a 
precedent… for the first time, there is a legal basis for public participation. If it happens, 
it would be a major step forward’ (New York Times, 26 December 2005). However, no 
official response from the government was forthcoming, although government 
sympathisers claimed that the EIA report would not be released due to it being considered 
a ‘state secret’.76 
 
In early 2008, reports suggested that construction on the first dam to be built on Nu River 
was either imminent or already underway (Zhong An Zaixian (Anhui News), 15 January 
2008). This development prompted the same group of NGOs to re-state their request for a 
transparent decision-making process, in this case through a second open letter. It stated 
that, ‘we once again request that information relevant to the Nu River strategic EIA 
report is made public, and to allow members of the public under the precondition of full 
knowledge of the situation to go through open comment through a mechanism such as a 
public hearing’. However, once again these calls went unheeded and the public has not 
been given the opportunity to participate in the formal decision-making process. 
 
Dam Construction at Ahai 
In 2007, there were signs that calls for a more open decision-making process were finally 
being considered, albeit not in the case of Nu River. The Jinsha River is, along with the 
Nu River, one of the Three Parallel Rivers. Plans are afoot to construct a series of eight 
hydroelectric dams on the river. One of the eight dams is to be located at a place called 
Ahai, in Yunnan Province.  
 
                                                   
76 Under the EIA Law, projects deemed to be state secrets are not required to accommodate public 
participation. The Nu River is an international river, which may explain why the EIA in this case was 
classed a state secret. However, given the absence of a definition in the EIA Law as to what exactly 
constitutes a state secret, it could be easily exploited as a loophole. 
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The Ahai case is significant because officials and constructors presiding over the dam-
building project complied with participatory requirements related to the EIA Law. In 
October 2007, an abridged version of the project’s EIA report was released for public 
comment.77 This was the first time that such a report had been made public for a dam 
project. Although they criticised the abridged EIA for omitting the opinions of experts 
who opposed the project, and for being too short,78 environmental activists including 
Wang Yongchen and Ma Jun welcomed the opportunity to work within the system. As 
Ma said, 
We had been planning to draft an open letter calling for water resource 
development projects on the Yangtze River to strictly adhere to relevant 
laws and regulations… However, the subsequent release of the Ahai EIA 
report made us feel gratified and also changed our direction of work. We 
are willing to carry out our responsibilities as citizens within the 
framework (Zhongguo Jingji Shibao, 29 November 2007). 
Ma and Wang convened a group of 18 individuals, including academics, officials from 
the National Forestry Bureau, and environmental activists, which submitted written 
comments on the EIA in November 2007.  
 
Environmental activists were given another chance to take part in the formal decision-
making process at the end of 2008. NGO representatives were invited to take part in the 
‘Technical Assessment Meeting for the Jinsha River Middle-reaches Ahai Hydroelectric 
Plant Environmental Impact Assessment Report’ that was convened from 29-30 
December (Di Yi Caijing Ribao (First Financial Daily), 6 January 2009). This was the 
first time that NGOs had been invited to take part in such a meeting, which consisted of a 
discussion regarding the technical basis of the Ahai project. Activists Yang Yong and Ma 
Jun attended the meeting, and expressed their views about the project. In addition, they 
submitted written comments, which were later included in the official meeting minutes 
(Zhongguo Jingji Shibao, 1 January 2009).  
                                                   
77 According to Article 11 of the ‘Measures on Public Participation in EIA’, only an abridged version 
(jianben) of the EIA report need be released to the public. 
78 There are no limits in the ‘Measures on Public Participation in EIA’ governing to what extent the public 
version of the EIA is to be shortened. 
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According to newspaper reports, most environmental activists were generally satisfied 
with the procedural element in relation to the Ahai project (Ibid.). There were problems, 
however. Environmental activist Wang Yongchen expressed disappointment regarding 
the fact that hundreds of millions of Yuan had already been spent on the initial stages of 
the Ahai project before the technical assessment meeting took place. Hence, it is unlikely 
that any opponents of the project would be successful in preventing it from going ahead, 
or even modifying it significantly by going through official public participation channels.  
 
It is unclear whether or not the Ahai case is in any way related to calls for the EIA Law to 
be upheld in the Nu River case, although activists have suggested that the two are linked 
(personal correspondence on file with author; see also Sanxia Tansuo (Three Gorges 
Probe), 31 December 2008). At the same time, following NGO participation in the 
technical assessment meeting, MEP officials claimed that they had played a key role in 
enabling activists to participate in this event. One official was quoted as saying,  
The participation of NGO representatives in the [Ahai] hydroelectric plant 
EIA report technical assessment meeting was the result of the combined 
efforts of the MEP and hydropower departments… the disclosure of EIA 
information for a large scale project and promotion of public participation 
is very important for the decision-making process’s scientific basis and 
degree of transparency (Di Yi Caijing Ribao, 6 January 2009). 
In any case, it remains to be seen whether or not the Ahai case represents a one-off or the 
beginning of a more inclusive decision-making process for hydropower projects, to the 
extent that current legislation with its various shortcomings allows for diverse voices to 
be heard. What does appear clear however is that, whilst the institutionalisation of 
meaningful public participation in hydropower projects appears a very long way away in 
China, environmental activists do aim to make use of every opportunity to engage with 
the decision-making process in the hope that this will ultimately lead to a more 
participatory style of governance. By pioneering new governance policies through calling 
on them to be upheld and participating through formal decision-making channels, even if 
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participation is tokenistic, activists are attempting to promote governance reform from 
within the system. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine how public participation is being promoted 
in Chinese environmental governance. It has also examined the extent to which increased 
support for participation can improve official accountability and decrease China’s 
environmental protection implementation deficit. This chapter has shown that since 2003 
the central government has deepened its policy of promoting environmental public 
participation. It has taken steps to create a ‘public supervision mechanism’ that provides 
channels for formal public participation mandated by legislation. In theory, members of 
the public can draw on their ‘right to participate’ in order to take part in decisions and 
subject local officials to a greater level of accountability. However, despite these 
developments within the environmental state, this chapter has found that the extent to 
which the public can meaningfully participate and hold local officials to account through 
official channels is very limited. 
 
One issue relates to the fact that the development of public participation mechanisms 
such as public hearings is clearly still at an early, experimental stage in China. Referring 
to the Yuanmingyuan public hearing, Pan Yue said that,  
In reality, we just want to do an exploration. The government establishes 
an open platform and allows all kinds of opinions to collect and be 
exchanged. Through a kind of transparent and open form, [we can] open 
up to society all of the relevant links in the government’s decision-
making, publicise decision-making content towards society in a timely 
manner, and make the government’s administrative behaviour subject to 
public opinion and supervision. This is consistent with an administrative 
method of democratic decision-making, scientific decision-making, and 
is beneficial towards the building of a harmonious society (Xinhua 
Tongxun She, 18 July 2005, emphasis added). 
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Pan’s statement also suggests that the Yuanmingyuan public hearing was regarded as an 
example of democratic, and transparent decision-making, at least by Chinese standards. 
The hearing itself was carried out in a transparent manner. And yet at the same time, the 
Yuanmingyuan case also highlighted significant shortcomings in formal public 
participation. On the one hand, members of the public were given a chance to express 
their dissatisfaction with park officials over their handling of the incident. In this sense, 
the former was presented with an opportunity to hold the latter to account. At the same 
time, however, park officials ultimately escaped without official sanction, and the plastic 
sheeting that had already been laid was allowed to remain. Furthermore, the final 
decision reached by the MEP appears to have been based on political considerations, 
suggesting that public involvement was only tokenistic. As a result, the Yuanmingyuan 
public hearing did not submit officials to meaningful public supervision. 
 
Another shortcoming related to formal public participation in China is that the decision to 
involve the public in a decision-making process is often an arbitrary one. In the absence 
of strong rule of law, officials can decide whether or not to open up channels for public 
participation. The same officials who are often strong supporters of development projects 
are also largely responsible for ensuring that public participation legislation is upheld. 
This creates a conflict of interest, which limits the extent to which participation, and 
greater official accountability, can be advanced via this legislation. The case of 
hydropower development in Yunnan highlighted this. The Nu River case demonstrates 
that, in the face of large-scale projects that have significant vested interests, mechanisms 
such as public hearings can be ignored. And yet the huge environmental and societal 
impact that hydropower development on the Nu River will have, as well as the fact that a 
significance divergence of opinions about the project exist, suggests that this is precisely 
the type of project that would benefit from a more inclusive decision-making process.  
 
The lack of formal public participation in the Nu River case also highlights the weak 
position of the MEP. Given the size of the Nu River project and the multitude of vested 
interests, it is likely that, even had the MEP wanted to convene a public hearing in this 
case, more powerful actors within the central government would have overturned its 
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decision. Convening a public hearing at Yuanmingyuan did not bring the MEP into 
conflict with government departments more powerful than itself. Although enabling 
members of the public to hold powerful interests to account might be a positive step for 
environmental protection in China, this is unlikely to happen in the short to mid term. 
 
This chapter did find that authorities in the Ahai case allowed activists to express their 
opinions through commenting on the EIA report and taking part in an experts’ meeting. 
Although activists welcomed this as progress, it still represented an unsatisfactory level 
of participation. The fact that the project was already underway shows that even if the 
public is invited to take part in the decision-making process, it is limited in the extent to 
which it can hold officials to account.  
 
Implications for Civil Society 
This chapter also examined how NGOs have been affected by the government’s public 
participation agenda. Chinese environmentalists generally view the creation of a more 
inclusive decision-making process as a positive development. Despite acknowledging 
various problems associated with public participation legislation, NGO activists have 
broadly welcomed and supported it. One question concerns whether NGOs can turn this 
legislation to their advantage and become more involved in environmental governance. 
As one NGO activist remarked, ‘ten years ago we couldn’t even talk about public 
participation… now we have [public participation legislation], we can take the position 
that ‘now we have a law, where do we go?’’ (Interview 4, 2007).  
 
Despite the shortcomings of the Yuanmingyuan public hearing, it still arguably 
represented significant progress in terms of facilitating a greater role for non-state actors 
in decision-making processes. Only four years previously it was considered a significant 
breakthrough when, in 2001, high-level officials including Beijing’s Vice-Mayor Wang 
Guangtao and officials from the Beijing Water Conservation Bureau agreed to meet with 
representatives from three NGOs. This meeting was convened in order to discuss the 
latter’s opposition to plans to line the bed of a stretch of canal transporting water from the 
Miyun Reservoir to Beijing with cement (China Development Brief, 2001). Yet after the 
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meeting concluded, Wang Guangtao informed the journalists present that their reports 
should be authorised before being published. The media subsequently received a circular 
banning altogether any reporting of the meeting (Ibid.). NGOs had originally hoped to 
convene a hearing regarding the Miyun issue, but were told that only the government 
could do this, and in the end no hearing took place (Friends of Nature, 2006). At the 
second people’s hearing that followed the Yuanmingyuan hearing, some participants 
noted favourably the way in which the Yuanmingyuan incident was handled in 
comparison with the Miyun case, and saw the difference as a sign of progress. Speaking 
at this hearing, Wang Yongchen reminisced about the Miyun case. She said that, ‘at that 
time, [the Miyun project] was a matter that we all very much hoped to participate in, 
however, it was dead on the floor. Only three years later and our participation [in the 
Yuanmingyuan incident] has already reached this level… in our country this is an 
extremely big step forward’ (Ibid.). 
 
However, rather than mark the beginning of regular NGO involvement in official 
channels such as public hearings as some activists might have hoped, this has not 
materialised. Initial optimism amongst NGOs that this type of participation might become 
more common has been tempered somewhat. In 2007 Wang Yongchen commented that, 
‘it has already been three years since the EIA Law formally came into effect in 
September 2003. However, regarding national level public hearings, there has only been 
one, for Yuanmingyuan’ (Yongchen Wang, 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, this chapter has shown how NGOs are increasingly cooperating with the 
MEP in pushing forward its new governance agenda. They have helped pioneer new 
legislation by working with the government in the Yuanmingyuan case, and by 
demanding that this legislation be upheld in relation to hydropower development in 
Yunnan. NGOs worked hard in order to maximise the benefits from the Yuanmingyuan 
public hearing. They attracted media attention and also added legitimacy to the process 
by claiming to represent the grassroots. In calling on officials to discharge their public 
participation duties in the Nu River case, NGOs at least succeeded in drawing attention to 
the fact that the decision-making process was proceeding without public involvement. 
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This strategy appears to have borne fruit in the case of Ahai, which broke new ground in 
China. This suggests that new governance norms might develop slowly based on the 
government’s public participation legislative framework.  
 
One of the prerequisites for public participation is access to information. The next chapter 
examines ways in which the government has taken steps towards improving public access 
to environmental information, and what impact this has on civil society and for 
environmental governance. 
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Chapter 5: Environmental Information Disclosure in 
China 
 
As the previous chapter discussed, the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s (MEP) has 
begun construction of a legislative framework for public participation in environmental 
protection.79 It has promulgated legislation that, in theory, gives members of the public 
the right to participate in certain aspects of environmental protection. This has been most 
notable in relation to the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process. As a result of 
this legislation, NGOs and citizens have been given an opportunity to play a role in 
environmental governance through mechanisms such as public hearings and providing 
comments on draft legislation. Chapter 4 also discussed how NGOs have been active in 
attempting to promote the government’s public participation agenda. At the same time, 
Chapter 4 argued that at present China’s EIA process does not facilitate effective public 
involvement and has been largely insignificant in terms of holding officials to account.  
 
This chapter examines Chinese environmental governance reform by focusing primarily 
on the issue of transparency, which has been identified as one of four pillars of ‘good 
governance’ (World Bank, 1992). A key indicator of transparent governance is the extent 
to which information is accessible to the public via, for example, a free media or through 
government legislation that compels the public disclosure of information (Asian 
Development Bank, 1995: 11). This chapter shows how transparency is increasingly 
being promoted in China’s system of environmental governance. It draws on official 
documents and legislation in order to examine how environmental information disclosure 
policy has evolved in China from the late 1980s until the present. It finds that promotion 
of environmental information disclosure has gathered pace in the past few years. This is 
especially the case since 2008 when new legislation came into effect specifying the 
disclosure responsibilities of firms and local officials.  
                                                   
79 Before 2008, the MEP was referred to as the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). For 
clarity, this chapter uses the term ‘MEP’ when referring to the central level environmental protection 
agency both before and after this bureaucratic reorganisation. 
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This chapter also contributes to understandings of how greater participation and 
accountability are being advanced in Chinese environmental governance. Greater 
transparency can promote public participation. Only if the public has access to 
information can it act in relation to environmental issues. According to an editorial from 
the Xinhua News Agency, it is a lack of environmental information, rather than poor 
environmental awareness, that constitutes the main barrier to public participation in 
environmental protection in China (Xinhua Tongxun She, 3 May 2007). Hence, 
promoting ‘information disclosure’, such as pollutant levels and the names and locations 
of polluting enterprises, is a vital part of the central government’s strategy of increasing 
environmental public participation. By participating in environmental governance, non-
state actors can also subject officials to a higher degree of accountability. This chapter 
considers the extent to which increasing transparency in environmental governance can 
stimulate participation and accountability by examining the response of NGOs. In doing 
so, it examines the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE). Founded in 2006, 
IPE is an NGO that maintains two online interactive pollution databases made up of 
pollution data. This chapter also looks in detail at two NGO campaigns that are largely 
predicated on publicly disclosed information. 
 
This chapter finds that the disclosure of environmental information in China is still 
seriously deficient. And yet the MEP has stepped up its policy of promoting transparency 
in environmental governance in the past few years in order that the public can ‘supervise’ 
(jiandu), or hold to account, polluting enterprises and local governments. There has also 
been a shift in emphasis in the use of environmental information. Throughout the 1990s, 
information disclosure was promoted by requiring cities to reveal information about 
pollution levels. Since the turn of the century however, it has increasingly been used in 
order to ‘name and shame’ enterprises in order to improve compliance and reduce 
China’s implementation deficit. The amount of publicly disclosed environmental 
information, although still low, has increased significantly. 
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This chapter also finds that the strategy of information disclosure has provided new, 
albeit limited, opportunities for NGOs to hold officials and enterprises to account. The 
government’s official policy of promoting information disclosure has enabled NGOs to 
use information in order to hold polluters to account. In other words, government 
promotion of information disclosure has made this a legitimate avenue for NGO activism. 
Furthermore, the increase in the amount of environmental information in the public 
domain has enabled NGO activists to target polluting companies. However, this chapter 
finds that NGOs have been limited in the extent to which they can promote greater 
accountability as a result of having better access to information. The channels that 
activists in liberal democracies can use to take action against polluters, such as litigation, 
protests, and organising consumer boycotts, are often not viable options to Chinese 
NGOs. Instead, the latter must rely on patient, non-confrontational tactics. This in turn 
seriously restricts the extent to which these NGOs can use ‘informational regulation’ to 
hold polluters to account in China. 
 
Environmental Information Disclosure 
Since the late 1980s governments around the world have increasingly turned to 
environmental information disclosure strategies, or ‘informational regulation’. This can 
be defined as ‘regulation which provides to affected stakeholders information on the 
operations of regulated entities, usually with the expectation that such stakeholders will 
then exert pressure on those entities to comply with regulations in a manner which serves 
the interests of stakeholders’ (Kleindorfer & Orts, 1996 cited in Gunningham & Sinclair, 
2002: 122). In other words, environmental information disclosure involves the voluntary 
and/or compulsory release of environmental information by firms or public agencies that 
would otherwise remain outside of the public domain (Stephan, 2002).  
 
According to Tom Tietenberg (1998), environmental information disclosure strategies 
belong to the ‘third phase’ of pollution control after regulation and market-based 
approaches. As well as facilitating improved outcomes compared with these first and 
second wave approaches through adding a ‘mechanism of enforcement’ (Kleindorfer & 
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Orts, 1998: 157), information disclosure can be a useful pollution reduction strategy in its 
own right (García et al, 2007: 740; Tietenberg, 1998: 600; Stephan, 2002: 191). 
 
The initial driving force behind environmental information disclosure was based on the 
principle that the public has a ‘right to know’ about issues such as the discharge of 
pollutants in a certain area, and the content of environmental regulations (Fiorino, 2004; 
Sarokin & Schulkin, 1991). However, it was quickly discovered that disclosure strategies 
could alter the behaviour of enterprises in a way that was beneficial to environmental 
outcomes (Fiorino, 2004). This is largely because, once environmental information is 
released into the public domain, consumers, investors, and pressure groups are in a 
position to punish poor performers whilst simultaneously rewarding those companies 
whose environmental protection records they view more favourably (Kleindorfer & Orts, 
1998). Firms fear the impact of a public backlash on their profits and reputation, and 
therefore take steps to improve their environmental performance (Fiorino, 2004; Stephan, 
2002). Information disclosure is effective therefore because it can open up the traditional 
two-way relationship between regulators and regulated entities (Kleindorfer & Orts, 
1998) through correcting the informational asymmetry that exists between these actors 
and ordinary citizens (García et al, 2007). In so doing, it can fundamentally alter the 
relationship between government, industry, and the public (Sarokin & Schulkin, 1991). 
The government changes from a coercive force to a facilitator (Stephan, 2002; 
Tietenberg, 1998).  
 
There is evidence to suggest that the mere threat of releasing information can compel 
corporations to improve their environmental performance (World Bank, 2000: 65-6). In 
other cases, however, the information must be acted on by citizens or other concerned 
parties.80 Mark Stephan (2002: 191-2) has identified three main ways in which pressure 
can be exerted on polluters. First, non-state actors can negotiate change through using the 
tools of government, such as lawsuits and public policy pressure. Second, the market can 
be used to pressurise polluters through means such as consumer and investor pressure 
                                                   
80 According to Stephan (2002: 192), other political actors such as the media, state officials, and interest 
groups, can act as ‘stand-ins’ for citizens in this regard. 
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and/or boycotts. Finally, civil society pressure including media and political protests can 
be exerted on companies. Civil society also has an important role to play in presenting 
information in an accessible form to citizens, including information that has long been in 
the public domain, in order that they can take action (Ibid.: 195). 
 
There is a range of empirical evidence to suggest that, in many cases, informational 
regulation can have positive results. One of the most successful and notable examples 
was established in 1986, when the United States Congress introduced the Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI). The TRI publishes data on approximately 650 toxic substances 
(http://www.epa.gov/tri). This includes the names, locations, and toxic emissions of 
plants employing at least 10 people and which use at least 10,000 pounds of any 
substance on the list (World Bank, 2000). The TRI has been highly successful, and has 
been credited with reducing total releases of toxic substances into the environment by 
over 44 per cent (Tietenberg, 1998: 593; Fung & O’Rourke, 2000). According to Archon 
Fung and Dara O’Rourke (2000: 116), ‘the TRI has dramatically outperformed all other 
[United States Environmental Protection Agency] regulations over the last ten years in 
terms of toxics reductions and it has done so at a fraction of the cost of those other 
programmes’. 
 
Information disclosure has also been used successfully by developing countries. The most 
prominent example is Indonesia’s Programme for Pollution Control, Evaluation and 
Rating (PROPER). Under a pilot version of this scheme, 187 medium and large-scale 
polluters were given a colour-coded rating based on their compliance with water 
pollution standards.81 Companies that failed to reach these standards were coded black or 
red; companies that met the minimum standards were given a blue rating; and those that 
exceeded standards were awarded a green or gold rating. Initially, those firms that were 
rated green or gold were publicly rewarded. Firms belonging to the other categories were 
told of their ratings and given six months to improve before all ratings were disclosed to 
the public (World Bank, 2000). In this way, PROPER rewarded compliance with 
                                                   
81 PROPER was suspended in 1998 due to the Asian Financial Crisis. However, it has since been revived 
on a larger scale (García et al, 2007). 
  
138 
138 
environmental standards whilst shaming those companies that failed to comply into 
improving their performance (Rock, 2002b: 71). Companies that initially performed 
badly subsequently reduced pollution by an average of 32 per cent (García et al, 2007: 
754). PROPER helped improve compliance with environmental standards, which in turn 
improved the credibility of Indonesia’s environmental protection bureaucracy amongst 
industry, NGOs and citizens, enabling it to better fulfil its functions (World Bank, 2000). 
 
The Evolution of Environmental Information Disclosure in China 
As Chapter 2 discussed, China’s initial approach to environmental governance was based 
almost exclusively on regulatory measures. It has only been very recently that 
information disclosure has been adopted as an environmental policy instrument. 
However, it is poorly understood. Only a very limited number of studies examine 
information disclosure in China. Scholars have identified a trend towards greater 
availability of environmental information in the public domain, albeit with significant 
regional variations (Lo & Leung, 2000; Lo & Fryxell, 2005; Wang et al, 2004; Li et al, 
2008). These studies take a top-down approach. No studies exist on the impact of 
information disclosure on civil society. In addition, important recent legislative 
developments have not been analysed. This chapter attempts to address these gaps 
through charting the development of environmental information disclosure in China up to 
and including the promulgation of ‘Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure 
(Trial Version)’ that were promulgated by the MEP in May 2007. This chapter also 
makes an original contribution by examining the ways in which NGOs have responded to 
the government’s information disclosure policies. 
 
The Beginnings of Environmental Information Disclosure in China 
In China’s authoritarian one-party state, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not 
accountable to the public through the ballot box, and the Chinese government does not 
face the same pressures to release information that governments in liberal democracies 
do. In China, information is often tightly controlled within the Party-state, to the extent 
that even government officials must follow a grading system that determines access to 
information according to criteria such as department and rank (Saich, 2004). Since the 
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establishment of China’s modern environmental protection framework, environmental 
information has also been subject to close censure both within the Party-state and 
between the Party-state and the public. Local officials, worried that environmental ‘bad 
news’ might reflect badly on their own performances, are frequently accused of 
withholding environmental information from higher levels to the extent that the latter 
may be oblivious to the severity of pollution in some areas (US Embassy, 1998). And, 
information on a whole range of criteria relating to environmental protection, including 
basic data on the environment and serious environmental incidents, has often been 
withheld from the public (OECD, 2006).  
 
Since the late 1980s, however, steps have been taken to increase the amount of 
information made available to the public by environmental protection departments. 
Clause 11 of the 1989 Environmental Protection Law (EPL) states that environmental 
protection departments at all levels ‘should publish reports on the state of the 
environment at regular intervals’ (National People’s Congress, 1989). Following on from 
this, the MEP issued the first of its annual ‘State of the Environment’ reports in 1990 
(OECD, 2005). However, due to concerns about social unrest and embarrassment 
regarding levels of environmental degradation, information disclosure as mandated by the 
EPL met with strong opposition from local officials. It was not until 1997 that local 
governments followed the MEP’s lead, when 27 cities started issuing weekly air pollution 
reports (US Embassy, 1998). Also in 1997, it was decided that weekly reports on urban 
ambient air quality in 46 major cities should be published (OECD, 2006), and in 1999 42 
key cities started publishing daily air quality reports (OECD, 2005). In addition, 
provincial and municipal-level governments currently issue their own annual 
environmental reports (Ibid.). At present, daily air pollution reports are released to the 
public in 180 cities, 90 of which also provide forecasts of air quality (Li et al, 2008). 
According to the World Bank (2001: 110), China’s daily air quality reports represent ‘a 
radical change’ that ‘may have been one of the most effective public education exercises 
yet undertaken in the environmental field’. 
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Legislation was also passed in the 1990s requiring enterprises to disclose environmental 
information. For example, the Management Provision on Reporting and Registration on 
Pollutant Emissions (1992) stated that enterprises must report details of pollutants 
including substances, amounts used, density, discharge, and management (Guo, 2005). 
The 1998 Environmental Management Provision for Construction included the 
requirement that, if the design of a construction project changed significantly, enterprises 
must report this fact to the government (Ibid.). However, under these pieces of legislation 
companies were only required to provide information to government officials; there was 
no need to place the information in the public arena.  
 
The media plays an important role in promoting transparency (Asian Development Bank, 
1995: 11). Since the early 1990s, greater freedom has been given to the Chinese media in 
reporting on environmental issues (Wen, 1998). This represents another important 
development in improving public access to environmental information. The 1996 ‘State 
Council Decision Regarding Certain Environmental Protection Problems’ (hereinafter 
‘the 1996 Decision’) stated that the media should report on and praise good practice in 
environmental protection (State Council, 1996). At the same time, reporting of 
environmental ‘bad news’ was also encouraged. The 1996 Decision stated that the media 
should ‘publicly expose and criticise illegal behaviour relating to pollution and 
degradation of the ecological environment’. It went on to note that work should be done 
to, ‘expose work units and individuals that cause severe pollution and damage the 
ecological environment, and bring into play the supervisory function of the news media’. 
The media represents a vital part of China’s social supervision mechanism, especially 
when enforcement of regulations remains poor. It has been suggested that high-level 
officials rely to an extent on media reports in order to gain information on the 
environmental situation, and, according to former NEPA head Qu Geping, the media is 
the main tool in order to encourage local officials to comply with environmental 
legislation (US Embassy, 1998). 
 
In the 1990s, China was also influenced by the successes of information disclosure 
strategies in other East Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines (OECD, 
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2006). In order to promote public participation and improve the flow of environmental 
information to central government officials, between 1999 and 2001 the MEP piloted the 
World Bank’s GreenWatch programme in the city of Zhenjiang in Jiangsu Province, and 
Hohhot in Inner Mongolia (Wang et al, 2004). GreenWatch was developed from 
Indonesia’s PROPER. Under this scheme, enterprises are given a colour-coded grade that 
reflects their impact on the environment. These range from black for the worst polluters 
through to red, yellow, blue, and finally green for the most environmentally friendly 
companies. Under the MEP’s pilot scheme, the environmental performance of 91 firms in 
Zhenjiang representing 65 per cent of economic output, and 56 industrial enterprises in 
Hohhot, was evaluated. Before colour-coded grades were disclosed to the public, these 
enterprises were given about one year in order to improve their ratings. The result was a 
10 per cent increase in compliance in Zhenjiang from an already high compliance rate of 
75 per cent, and a 39 per cent increase in compliance in Hohhot (Ibid.). Although some of 
this improvement could be attributed to other factors, the scheme was judged a success, 
so much so that the MEP announced at the end of 2005 that GreenWatch would be 
extended nationwide by 2010 (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Improving Access to Environmental Information 
In recent years, central government promotion of environmental information disclosure 
has intensified. In its 2005 ‘State Council Decision Regarding Implementing the 
Scientific Development Concept and Strengthening Environmental Protection’, the 
Chinese government made its hitherto strongest statement on environmental information 
disclosure (State Council, 2005). It listed a range of criteria under which provincial 
governments must provide regular information. These included city air quality, city noise 
levels, drinking water source quality, river and coastal water quality, and reports and 
assessments concerning the ecological environment. It also stated that names of cities 
failing to meet environmental quality standards should be made public, and that 
enterprises ‘must disclose environmental information’ (Ibid.). This was all intended to 
‘create the conditions for public participation’ and ‘strengthen social supervision’ (Ibid.). 
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This policy of increasing the amount of environmental information, as well as the way in 
which it is used, is being driven by three main phenomena. First, it can be seen as part of 
a broader campaign by the central government to try and improve official transparency. 
In a bid to improve governance, in 2004 the State Council published its ‘Outline on the 
Comprehensive Promotion of Administration According to Law’ (State Council, 2004). 
This called on all levels of government to improve governance through promoting rule of 
law, transparency, and establishing a ‘public service’ oriented administration approach. It 
also called on officials to respect the public’s ‘right to know’ (zhiqingquan). Then, in 
2007 the State Council promulgated the ‘People’s Republic of China Government 
Information Disclosure Ordinance’ (hereinafter referred to as the State Council’s 
‘Information Disclosure Ordinance’) (State Council, 2007).  This ordinance, which in 
theory grants the public access to a range of governmental information, represents 
another step towards transforming the government into an entity designed to serve the 
public. Efforts to ensure greater official transparency are also reflected in the 
implementation of an official ‘spokesperson scheme’. And, in 1999 the central 
government launched its ‘government online’ project. To date, approximately 80 per cent 
of national and local agencies have established websites (Lollar, 2006: 31).  
 
The MEP has taken its own steps to improve transparency. In 2007, the MEP published 
its ‘Opinions on Strengthening the Work of Open Government Administration in the 
National Environmental Protection System’ (MEP, 2007). This document called for 
increasing public consultation, for example through public hearings, and also listed types 
of information that should be released to the public. Also in 2007, the MEP published the 
Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure (Trial Version), which it 
promulgated one day after the State Council’s Information Disclosure Ordinance was 
passed. The fact that these Measures, which are discussed in more detail below, were the 
first piece of departmental legislation pursuant to the State Council’s Information 
Disclosure Ordinance, suggests that MEP is at the forefront of attempts to improve 
transparency and information disclosure in the Chinese bureaucracy.  
 
  
143 
143 
Second, ensuring that more environmental information is available in the public domain 
is an important part of the MEP’s strategy of shifting accountability mechanisms to the 
public (Shi & Zhang, 2006) and improving environmental governance. According to 
MEP official Yang Chaofei, information disclosure is urgently needed in order to enable 
the public to perform a supervisory function over local officials and enterprises. He said 
that, ‘environmental information disclosure… is beneficial for public supervision, and 
provides beneficial conditions for strengthening the enforcement of environmental 
legislation and overcoming local protectionism’ (Zhongguo Huanjing Bao, 26 April 
2007). He also noted that the government lacks the capacity to enforce environmental 
legislation, and therefore needs the support of the public (Ibid.). In addition, officials 
have also argued that improving access to environmental information can reduce conflict 
and promote social stability. For example, Pan Yue stated that,  
The public obtaining more environmental information will not lead to an 
increase in conflict, in fact it will rapidly alleviate conflict and resolve 
contradictions. The more that information is not disclosed, the greater the 
chances for collusion by special interests, the greater the public’s mistrust 
towards the government, the bigger the marketplace for rumours, and the 
greater the elements of destabilisation (Xin Jing Bao, 27 April 2007).  
Third, there is an increasing demand for better environmental information disclosure 
from the public and market. For example, investors and financial institutions are 
demanding access to information concerning environmental risks (Guo, 2005). The 
percentage of listed companies in China disclosing some form of environmental 
information increased from 34 per cent in 2002 to 37 per cent in 2003 (Ibid.: 23). In 
addition, as is discussed below, NGOs have attempted to pressurise companies into 
releasing environmental information. 
 
The central government’s growing enthusiasm towards the promotion of official 
transparency has been increasingly reflected in environmental protection legislation. 
Information disclosure has been legislated for in the EIA process through the 2003 EIA 
Law and the ‘Temporary Measures on Public Participation in EIA’. The latter lists 
various types of relevant information that should be disclosed to the public, such as the 
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main content of the EIA, as well as how this should be done (SEPA, 2006c). 
Furthermore, other environmental laws such as the Air Pollution Prevention and Control 
Law (2000), Maritime Environment Protection Law (2001), and the Cleaner Production 
Law (2002) also include clauses that require information disclosure. The latter includes a 
clause that enables EPBs to publish the names of polluting companies in the mass media 
(Guo, 2005). This is also a requirement related to information disclosure in the MEP 
(2003) ‘Notice Regarding the Carrying Out of Environmental Protection Checks by 
Companies Applying to be Listed and by Listed Companies Applying for Refinancing’ 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘2003 Notice’). Hence, environmental information 
concerning polluting enterprises is not merely being distributed within the government 
bureaucracy, it is also increasingly being placed in the public domain. 
 
Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure 
In April 2007, the MEP announced that it had formulated and approved the ‘Measures on 
Environmental Information Disclosure (Trial Version)’ (MEID). The MEID, which came 
into effect on 1 May 2008, was promulgated shortly after the State Council’s Information 
Disclosure Ordinance. The MEID was made possible by this piece of legislation, and the 
MEP was the first government department to issue its own measures pursuant to the 
Information Disclosure Ordinance (SEPA, 2007). 
 
Although previous legislation had included information disclosure requirements, the 
MEID should still be seen as a significant piece of legislation. As Pan Yue said, ‘in the 
past, in one sense information disclosure was not standardised enough, and in another 
sense it caused miscomprehension and suspicion in lots of government departments, 
regions, and enterprises’ (Xin Jing Bao, 24 May 2007). The MEID represents an attempt 
to synthesise in a single document the various pieces of legislation pertaining to 
environmental information disclosure in China. The MEID also aims to fill some 
legislative gaps, for example by setting out the types of information that should be 
released and to whom; how information should be released; and what steps can be taken 
in case information is withheld illegally.  
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The MEID is aimed at two types of actor, namely environmental protection government 
officials and polluting enterprises. As a result, it goes beyond the State Council’s 
Information Disclosure Ordinance that only applied to Party-state officials. The MEID 
stipulates that environmental protection departments must release 17 types of 
environmental information. These include environmental protection laws, regulations, 
and plans; environmental quality reports; information pertaining to the issuance of 
pollution permits; fines levied and collected, and reasons for reducing fines; information 
on administrative punishments and lawsuits; and, lists of enterprises that exceed national 
or local pollution standards (SEPA, 2007).  
 
The MEID also targets the worst polluters. According to Clause 20, enterprises that have 
been ‘named and shamed’ on EPB lists ‘should’ (yingdang) release four types of 
information. These are the name, address, and legal representative of the company; the 
names of the main pollutants released, how these are discharged, the concentration and 
overall amount of pollutants that are discharged, and the circumstances surrounding the 
company’s exceeding of pollutant load and concentration standards; information about 
the installation and running of environmental protection equipment; and finally, 
emergency accident action plans. This information must be released to the public through 
the mainstream local media within 30 days of an enterprise being publicly named. In 
addition, polluting enterprises that are not listed by environmental protection departments 
are ‘encouraged’ (guli) to release various types of information to the public.  
 
The MEID also stipulates that members of the public can apply for environmental 
information from the government. Clause 5 states that, ‘citizens, legal persons, and other 
groups can apply to environmental protection departments in order to obtain 
governmental environmental information’ (SEPA 2007). Governments in turn must 
respond to requests within 15 working days. This in itself has been seen as a significant 
development in governmental transparency, although doubts remain regarding the extent 
to which this is enforceable.  
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In targeting government officials and enterprises, the MEID endeavours to improve 
governmental transparency and raise public awareness of polluting companies. According 
to one MEP official, improved access to environmental information should enable 
citizens to exercise their ‘right to know’ (zhiqingquan), ‘right to participate’ (canyuquan), 
and ‘right to supervise’ (jianduquan) (Huang, 2007). In Clause 1, the MEID explicitly 
states that it is designed to promote public participation. As such, the MEID fits well with 
legislation described in the previous chapter, such as the EIA Law and Measure on Public 
Participation in EIA, that forms part of the MEP’s system of public participation.  
 
Obstacles to Information Disclosure 
Proponents of environmental information disclosure face many obstacles. These include 
opposition from some local officials. Although some local governments, most notably in 
Shenyang and Shanghai, have promoted information disclosure, many officials oppose it. 
As Chapter 3 discussed, the decision to publish a list of provinces’ performance on green 
GDP met with such strong opposition that this idea was shelved. There was also 
opposition to public disclosure under the GreenWatch scheme from some local officials 
who were unwilling disclose the environmental performances of some large companies 
that were major sources of fiscal revenue and employment (OECD, 2006: 33). In the 
short time since the State Council’s Information Disclosure Ordinance were released, 
there have already been reports of citizens struggling in vain to make officials discharge 
their duties (Fazhi Ribao, 2 July 2008). For example, in one case, two citizens in Beijing 
appealed to the EPB to release information concerning several EIA reports. When this 
request was refused, they attempted to obtain the information through legal channels. 
However, the court refused to accept the case because the plaintiffs were deemed not to 
have a direct interest at stake (Ibid.).82  
 
The MEID also contains significant loopholes. For example, in April 2008, Greenpeace 
activist Liu Lican applied to the Shanghai municipal government for environmental 
information relating to German multi-national corporation (MNC) BASF. However, in 
May 2008, by which time the MEID had already gone into effect, Liu received a reply 
                                                   
82 At present, public interest litigation is not allowed in China. 
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refusing his request for information on the grounds that it constituted a ‘trade secret’ 
(Beijing Keji Bao (Beijing Science and Technology News), 9 July 2008). Clause 12 of the 
MEID states that local officials are entitled to decline requests for information disclosure 
if they are believed to impinge on trade secrets. The MEID fails to define what 
constitutes a trade secret, thus providing a significant loophole in the legislation 
(Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (China News Weekly), 9 July 2008). 
 
Finally, there are still significant regional variations in the amount of information 
released to the public, and public access to environmental information remains 
predominantly confined to urban areas (Li et al, 2008). In the words of Pan Yue, ‘frankly 
speaking, the public’s right to know is still extremely lacking’ (Xin Jing Bao, 27 April 
2007). Improving government transparency will require a major change in administrative 
culture, and may require stronger political reform initiatives such as improving the 
judicial system in order that citizens can press for officials to release information in 
accordance with transparency legislation. 
 
Information Disclosure and Environmental NGOs 
It has been widely accepted that a lack of access to environmental information has been a 
constraining factor on environmental activism in China (OECD, 2005: 31). As noted 
earlier, access to information is a vital prerequisite to public participation. This section 
examines the extent to which the Chinese government’s recent policy of increasing 
environmental information disclosure is facilitating greater involvement of Chinese 
NGOs in environmental governance. 
 
Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs 
Until very recently, information disclosure remained an untouched area of environmental 
activism in China. This changed in May 2006 when prominent environmental campaigner 
Ma Jun83 founded the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), an NGO 
                                                   
83 Ma Jun is a well-known member of the Chinese environmental protection community. He first rose to 
prominence when he published the book ‘China’s Water Crisis’ in 1999. This book highlighted the perilous 
situation that China was in regarding water pollution and has been hailed as a call to arms in a similar vein 
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dedicated to the dissemination of environmental information in relation to air and water 
pollution. 
 
The main aim of IPE is to take environmental information from the public domain and 
present it in an accessible form on its own website. By doing so, it hopes to facilitate 
public participation.84 In September 2006, IPE launched its ‘water pollution map’. The 
logic behind this map is very simple. The water pollution map is an online, interactive 
map of China that the public can use to access a variety of data on water pollution that is 
input and maintained by IPE staff. In doing so, citizens can learn about, monitor, and 
possibly take action over, the situation with regards water pollution across various 
locations, including the place that they live. Information included on the map includes 
water quality, discharge information, and information regarding sources of pollutants that 
are discharged into river systems. It also features an ‘environmental information 
disclosure index’ that enables users to compare the disclosure levels between different 
local governments. 
 
Since it was founded, IPE has further expanded its operations. In 2007, it launched an ‘air 
pollution map’, based on the same principles as the water pollution map (Zhongguo 
Qingnian Bao, 13 December 2007).85 Initially, the air pollution map only contained data 
from 15 provinces in southern China, although IPE aims to expand it to include 
nationwide data (Ibid.). In addition, according to online NGO directory www.greengo.cn, 
IPE plans to create an interactive biodiversity map of China. 
 
IPE’s water and air pollution maps have been made possible by the government’s policy 
of promoting environmental information disclosure. Although some information 
contained in the water and air pollution maps comes from media reports, IPE staff collect 
the vast majority from government websites (21 Shiji Jingji Baodao, 25 August 2007). In 
that sense, IPE is heavily reliant on officially disclosed pollution statistics and owes its 
                                                                                                                                                       
to Rachel Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’. In 2006, Ma was included in Time Magazine’s list of the 100 most 
influential people in the world. 
84 Information in this paragraph is taken from IPE’s website. See http://www.ipe.org.cn.  
85 See http://air.ipe.com.cn.  
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existence to the greater quantity of environmental data available in the public domain. 
Clearly, if this data were not available, IPE would be unable to function in its current 
form. Furthermore, the central government’s promotion of transparency and information 
disclosure has legitimised IPE and opened up political space for its novel form of 
activism. Without this governmental approval, it is unlikely that an organisation such as 
IPE could function smoothly in China. As Ma Jun said, ‘the only reason we could come 
up with such a database is because the government has made an effort to create the legal 
basis for such action to be taken and have (sic) disclosed more information in recent 
years’ (South China Morning Post, 8 March 2007). The MEP has expressed support for 
IPE’s work. One official said that, 
In the 11th Five-Year Plan, the government expressed the desire to increase 
capacity building in terms of strengthening pollution prevention. Ma Jun’s 
water pollution map is precisely [an example of] cooperation with the 
government… I fully admire it! (Kexue Shibao (Science Times), 27 August 
2007).  
In a further show of official approval, Ma Jun was named as one of China’s ‘green 
heroes’ for the year 2006. This award is administered by the MEP. Speaking in praise of 
Ma Jun, one official stated that, ‘his innovative work in relation to the information 
disclosure system has created a new model for public participation in environmental 
protection’ (Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao (China Bond News), 24 April 2007).  
 
Putting pressure on polluting enterprises 
In addition to maintaining its air and water pollution maps, IPE has attempted to put 
pressure on polluting companies. It has done so individually through its website, and in 
cooperation with other NGOs through the ‘Green Choice’ campaign discussed below. 
Chinese environmental NGOs have supported efforts to target problem companies in the 
past, most notably Indonesian paper giant Asia Pulp and Paper Company Limited’s 
(APP) operations in China.86 Yet, since their inception, Chinese environmental groups 
have tended to focus on environmental education and, particularly since 2003, promoting 
                                                   
86 For details of the NGO campaign against APP, see Chang (2005). 
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public participation. The increased amount of environmental information in the public 
sphere has enabled NGOs to pressurise polluting enterprises and attempt to hold them to 
account. This is a new and potentially important area of NGO activism. 
 
IPE has attempted to pressurise polluting companies through placing on its website the 
names of companies that have been ‘named and shamed’, either by local government 
departments or the media. This data has been made possible by the recent trend of 
disclosing the names of firms that violate environmental protection laws and regulations. 
This disclosure typically takes place either through the media or via the publication of 
‘blacklists’ on local government websites. Typical violations that warrant inclusion on a 
blacklist include failing to conduct an EIA, exceeding pollution standards, and being 
suspended from operating pending investigation (guapai duban). As noted earlier, the 
tactic of naming and shaming polluting enterprises has become more common in recent 
years. For example, in December 2007, six enterprises in Zhejiang province were ordered 
to publish a letter of apology in the local press due to excessive pollution (Xinhua News 
Agency, 27 December 2007). The head of the Zhejiang provincial EPB Dai Beijun 
subsequently announced that this tactic would be implemented across the whole of the 
province (Ibid.). This strategy was also employed in relation to 10 companies in 
Shenzhen (Guangdong Zaixian (Guangdong Online), 4 September 2007). Meanwhile, 
Jiangxi province revealed plans to publish blacklists of administrative areas and polluting 
companies, and also intends to publish environmental performance rankings of cities and 
counties in 11 regions (Xinhua Wang (Xinhua Online), 14 July 2008). In the past few 
years, many other EPBs have started to maintain online lists of companies that have 
failed to adhere to environmental protection legislation.  
 
Although information concerning problem enterprises is already scattered about in the 
public domain, IPE has been able to attract a significant amount of media interest by 
coalescing it into a single list. This media interest has enabled IPE to hold certain 
enterprises to account. This media interest started in October 2006, when reports revealed 
that IPE had listed approximately 2,700 companies on its website for violating 
environmental protection legislation (Nanfang Zhoumo, 26 October 2006). A second 
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wave of media reports was published in August 2007. These reports revealed that the 
number of companies listed by IPE had grown to approximately 7,000 (Nanfang Zhoumo, 
23 August 2007).  
 
However, despite the fact that the vast majority of enterprises listed by IPE were Chinese, 
journalists were predominantly interested in the appearance of several well-known MNCs 
on the lists (see, for example, Nanfang Zhoumo, 23 August 2007). For example, 33 
MNCs appeared on the 2006 list, and over 100 were listed by IPE in 2007. Some of the 
MNCs listed were household names, including Pepsi, Panasonic, DuPont, and Nestle. 
Their apparent disregard for Chinese environmental regulations caused something of a 
minor backlash in the Chinese media. Several stories about the environmental 
performance of MNCs in China appeared in the media, including an editorial in the 
Renmin Ribao (24 August 2007) entitled, ‘Where has the “environmental responsibility” 
of multinational corporations gone?’. Although it was acknowledged that Chinese 
enterprises represented the vast majority of companies on the list, journalists chose to 
focus on the MNC aspect of the story. IPE continues to maintain its list of enterprises that 
have been named and shamed. As of 7 January 2009, IPE listed on its website a total of 
29,347 and 11,929 enterprises for violations in relation to water and air pollution, 
respectively (http://www.ipe.org.cn). 
 
The ‘Green Choice’ Campaign 
In many ways, the development of the ‘Green Choice’ (Lüse Xuanze) campaign since its 
establishment in 2005 highlights the impact on NGOs of greater access to environmental 
information that has occurred in China in recent years. This campaign was set up by 
several NGOs in 2005 with the aim of educating citizens about green consumption. In 
2006, these NGOs launched a website with information aimed at consumers designed to 
enable them to consume in a more environmentally friendly manner.87 And, NGOs 
involved in the campaign published a ‘green choice’ handbook that advises consumers 
about a range of things such as green food, green tourism, and the importance of 
conserving electricity and water (Friends of Nature, 2008).  
                                                   
87 http://www.greenchoice.cn.   
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In the space of a couple of years, the campaign has moved from advising consumers 
about green lifestyles to targeting polluting enterprises. In January 2008, a second 
campaign website was launched.88 It features a database through which Internet users can 
search for enterprises by name and then, should they wish, avoid those enterprises that 
have poor environmental records when purchasing goods. This development in the 
campaign appears to have been strongly influenced by IPE, which has become involved 
and has brought its tactics and expertise to the campaign. 
 
On World Water Day in March 2007, a group of 21 NGOs involved in the Green Choice 
campaign, including IPE, issued a ‘Green Choice Proposal’ (Lüse Xuanze Changyi Shu) 
(Friends of Nature, 2007b). In a similar vein to other elements in the campaign, this 
proposal urged the public to avoid purchasing the products of enterprises that 
contravened environmental legislation (Ibid.). However, this campaign differed from 
previous activities in that this time the NGOs issued a list of 25 corporations that had 
been listed on local government websites for contravening environmental protection 
regulations (Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao, 24 April 2007).89 This was closely linked to the 
disclosure work of IPE. The list included the names of well-known MNCs and domestic 
companies, including Pepsi and Qingdao Beer (Di Yi Caijing Ribao, 22 March 2007). It 
also detailed the reasons why these companies had been listed by environmental 
protection departments. Again, this type of disclosure attracted a large amount of media 
attention, although once more the Chinese media focused on the MNCs that had been 
listed in the campaign. 
 
Rather than merely publishing lists of companies in violation of environmental 
regulations, the Green Choice campaign, and IPE in particular, has emphasised the 
importance of entering into communication with polluting enterprises. This is motivated 
by the belief that, in the words of Ma Jun (2007b),  
                                                   
88 See http://www.green-choice.org.  
89 The work that IPE does in maintaining its website and the public disclosure elements of the Green 
Choice campaign appear to be interlinked, reflecting the close nature of the NGO community in Beijing. 
Rather than treating them as two separate projects, it is easier, and more accurate, to view them as part of 
the same project. 
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In a modern society, enterprises must communicate with surrounding 
communities. They must introduce the potential environmental dangers of their 
production activities to communities, and explain how they can avoid danger in 
emergency situations. At the same time, they should listen to the requests and 
aspirations that communities hold towards enterprises. 
Both before and after the list of enterprises was published, NGOs involved in the Green 
Choice campaign either contacted or were contacted by over 20 of the companies in 
question (Ibid.). In addition, other companies have been in contact with IPE after having 
been listed on its website. From the point of view of Chinese NGOs, communicating with 
enterprises is based on the hope that the latter will take steps to improve their 
environmental performance and hence be removed from the IPE list. In order to have 
their name removed from the list, firms must follow a three-step procedure.90 First, they 
should explain to IPE why they violated environmental regulations. Second, they should 
provide data to IPE from subsequent government inspections. Materials from the first and 
second steps are to be placed on the IPE website. Finally, for the third, and most 
important step, enterprises must accept a third-party inspection, to be verified by NGOs, 
to prove that they have improved their environmental performance (21 Shiji Jingji 
Baodao, 25 August 2007). All of the NGOs involved in the campaign must reach 
unanimous agreement before a firm can be removed from the list. 
 
The majority of the 20 or so firms listed in the Green Choice campaign provided 
materials in relation to the first two steps. Six firms, all of them MNCs, agreed to third-
party (Ma, 2007b). The first company to follow all three steps listed above, and therefore 
be removed from the list, was a Panasonic factory in Shanghai (see IPE, 2007). On 8 
March 2007, a delegation from Panasonic, including the general manager of the plant in 
question, visited IPE’s offices in Beijing in order to explain why they had been listed by 
the Shanghai EPB and what steps they had since taken to improve. After the meeting, on 
20 March Panasonic provided a written explanation that was uploaded onto IPE’s 
website. Afterwards, on 2 April, Panasonic was inspected by a team from the Shanghai 
                                                   
90 This three step process also applies to firms listed on the IPE website that wish to be removed from the 
list. 
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City Environmental Science Research Institute. Their report found that Panasonic’s 
pollution control equipment was in good working order and that polluted water was being 
treated in accordance with environmental standards. Then, on 29 June Ma Jun and the 
head of a Shanghai-based NGO visited the company in order to verify the results. 
According to the IPE website, the number of firms that have complied with the three step 
procedure and been removed from the Green Choice and/or the IPE list as of 7 January 
2009 totals 15. Of these, the vast majority are MNCs (see http://www.ipe.org.cn). 
 
Another goal of the Green Choice campaign has been to promote and uphold the MEID. 
Since the MEID was promulgated, NGOs involved in the Green Choice campaign have 
attempted to ensure that polluting companies fulfil their information disclosure 
responsibilities and abide by environmental legislation. To date, this has been achieved 
through sending ‘reminder’ letters to companies in violation of the MEID for failing to 
disclose environmental information. In this way, NGOs are making use of the MEID to 
hold enterprises to account, and, in the process, are attempting to help improve its 
enforcement. According to the IPE website, as of 7 January 2009, 32 reminder letters had 
been sent. A typical example concerns a letter sent to the Wuxi Xielian Knitting 
Company.91 On 5 June 2008 the Wuxi EPB conducted a night-time inspection of 
polluting companies across the city and disclosed the results through the media. On 12 
June 2008 the Wuxi Daily reported that an inspection had revealed that the Wuxi Xielian 
Knitting Company was in serious violation of discharge standards. In their reminder letter 
to the company, NGOs pointed out that, according to the MEID, it should release 
information including the names of pollutants, method of discharge, and pollutant 
concentration of discharge, within 30 days. The letter stated that the company had not 
complied with this requirement, and asked it to do so. An appendix was included citing 
the relevant clauses of the MEID, as well as a blank ‘corporate disclosure data form’ into 
which the company was asked to input data regarding its pollutant emissions.  
 
                                                   
91 Available at http://www.ipe.org.cn/uploadFiles/2008-07/1217232357925.doc.  
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Reminder letters as well as company responses to these letters are placed on the IPE 
website. However, to date only one company has responded.92 The others, including the 
Wuxi Xielian Knitting Company, have ignored these letters (http://www.ipe.org.cn). 
 
It could be argued that elements of the Green Choice campaign, as well as IPE’s 
disclosure of problem enterprises, have been fairly successful. IPE has liaised with a 
number of firms and managed to persuade several of them to accept third party 
inspections in order to ensure that their names can be removed from the list of polluting 
firms. Although this only represents a fraction of the number of firms listed, it shows that 
this tactic can be effective in some cases in China. NGOs have also appealed successfully 
to the media, which has clearly played an important part in holding polluting companies 
to account. In addition to the flurry of media reports that detailed the rising number of 
problem companies listed by IPE and the Green Choice campaign, some journalists 
contacted the companies directly in order to question them (Nanfang Zhoumo, 26 October 
2006; Guoji Xianqu Daobao (International Herald Guide), 29 August 2007). China 
Central Television (CCTV) also aired a programme about a company belonging to 
Carlsberg Beer in Gansu Province that had appeared on the list for exceeding pollution 
standards and starting production without having carried out the necessary EIA (21 Shiji 
Jingji Baodao, 25 August 2007). As a result of NGO activity, some enterprises have been 
held to account to a greater extent than they would otherwise have been. 
 
However, this success has been almost entirely confined to dealings with MNCs. Some 
MNCs have come under pressure from the media in their home countries for using 
materials in their products that are manufactured by serial polluters (Wall Street Journal, 
22 August 2007). And, it was reported that some embassies in Beijing, including the 
British and Danish embassies, contacted IPE promising to try to ensure that companies 
from their countries improve their environmental performance (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 
13 December 2007). In addition, it was reported that some companies had suffered from 
reduced orders and came under pressure from upstream and downstream enterprises 
(Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao, 24 April 2007). MNCs are particularly vulnerable to 
                                                   
92 This company was Chongqing ABB. See http://www.ipe.org.cn/news/news_view.jsp?BH=84. 
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informational regulation and civil society due to their reputations and the amount of 
interest they generate in the media, both in China and abroad. These MNCs are also liable 
to be held to account for their actions overseas by consumers in their home countries. 
This is particularly the case where MNCs promote a green image at home but are 
exposed for pollution overseas. There is a fear held by some companies that 
environmental issues could spawn a movement akin to the anti-sweatshop campaign 
(Wall Street Journal, 22 August 2007). Furthermore, the issue of MNCs’ pollution is 
becoming increasingly politicised. For example, when China is criticised for exporting 
unsafe products, it is increasingly responding by highlighting the damage that MNCs and 
their suppliers are causing to the Chinese environment (Ibid).93 Finally, MNCs are 
potentially vulnerable to Chinese nationalist sentiment. The exposure of polluting MNCs 
in the Chinese media did not appear to influence Chinese consumers’ attitudes towards 
these enterprises. Nevertheless, the boycotting of French supermarket Carrefour across 
China in response to French protests that met the Olympic torch relay in Paris shows that 
Chinese consumers are capable of taking action against foreign firms in order to protect 
national interest. 
 
NGOs’ campaign against Gold East Paper 
Better environmental information disclosure and transparency have also facilitated an 
NGO campaign against the application by the Gold East Paper Company (GEP) to list its 
‘A’ shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. GEP was set up in China in 1997 by 
Indonesian paper giant APP, which is the largest pulp manufacturer in Asia. APP has 
courted controversy both in China and overseas due to its allegedly woeful environmental 
record, to the extent that some major retailers such as Staples and Woolworths have 
severed business ties with it. The company has also been accused of environmental 
degradation in China. In November 2004, Greenpeace China accused APP of conducting 
large-scale deforestation in Yunnan Province.94 In doing so, they were supported by the 
Zhejiang Hotels Association, which called on members to boycott APP products. In 
                                                   
93 According to one estimate, production of manufacturing goods that are then exported accounts for 20-30 
per cent of China’s water pollution (Wall Street Journal, 22 August 2007). 
94 For information about the Greenpeace campaign, see 
http://www.greenpeace.org/china/en/campaigns/forests/app-illegal-logging-in-yunnan/greenpeace-china-
exposes-app-s. For a discussion (in Chinese) about the campaign, see Chang (2005). 
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addition, domestic environmental NGOs including Friends of Nature expressed support 
with Greenpeace.95 
 
On 5 August 2008, GEP and six subsidiary companies applied for permission to conduct 
an initial public offering (IPO) on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.96 The Chinese 
government has since 2003 stepped up environmental and disclosure requirements for 
companies applying for IPOs in what is labelled its ‘green securities’ (lüse zhengquan) 
policy. According to the 2003 Notice (as referred to earlier in this chapter), any company 
wishing to be listed on the stock market must first obtain approval from the MEP based 
on the company’s environmental record before applying to the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission for listing (SEPA, 2003). Companies are required to provide 
environmental information to the MEP covering the 36-month period prior to their IPO 
application. Under the 2003 Notice, companies that violate environmental legislation, for 
example by exceeding pollution standards, are prevented from conducting an IPO.97 
 
From 5-14 August 2008, the MEP placed a public notice (gongshi) on its website 
announcing the application (MEP, 2008). According to this public notice, the seven 
companies ‘basically met’ the necessary environmental conditions required in order to 
become listed on the stock exchange. Nevertheless, the public was invited to contact the 
MEP with comments and suggestions in relation to the application during the public 
notice period (Ibid.). This type of public notice inviting feedback is becoming 
increasingly common as the MEP attempts to improve public participation and 
government transparency. 
 
Once the public notice was published, several Chinese NGOs became aware of the 
intention of GEP and its subsidiaries to become public companies (Zhongguo Zhiye Wang 
(Chinapaper.net.), 28 August 2008). A group of six NGOs, namely Friends of Nature, 
                                                   
95 The 2004 campaign is separate from the one examined in this chapter. 
96 The six subsidiary companies were Jinhua Sheng Zhiye; Ningbo Asia Pulp; Ningbo China Paper; Hainan 
Jinhai Pulp; Shenyang Jinxin Pulp; and Guangxi Jin’gui Pulp (for details see MEP 2008). 
97 In a further sign that China wants more openness from public companies regarding their environmental 
records, in December 2007 an official revealed that the MEP was in the process of drafting legislation that 
would require the compulsory disclosure of environmental information from those firms already listed 
(China Daily, 31 December 2007). 
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Global Village Beijing, Green Earth Volunteers, Green Watershed, Green SOS, and the 
Beijing branch of Greenpeace, joined forces to try and block the IPO. They did so on the 
grounds of what they claimed was a woeful environmental record on behalf of APP 
China and its associate companies.98 The six organisations also framed their campaign as 
an attempt to promote the transparency aspect of the government’s ‘green securities’ 
policy by attempting to ensure that GEP and its subsidiaries release information about 
their environmental performance. It is worth noting that throughout 2007, initial requests 
for listing on the stock exchange by 10 other companies had been refused by the MEP on 
environmental grounds.99 However, the case involving GEP and its subsidiaries was the 
first in which NGOs had tried to block an IPO (Di Yi Caijing Ribao, 13 August 2008). 
 
The NGO campaign was based upon writing letters to the MEP and GEP, as well as 
trying to generate media interest. The first step taken by the six NGOs was to write a 
letter to the MEP, which was also distributed to journalists (Friends of Nature et al, 
2008a). This letter was written in response to the MEP’s call for suggestions and 
comments in its public notice. In this letter, sent on 12 August, the NGOs claimed that 
GEP had violated clauses 2.1.1, 2.1.3, and 2.1.8 of the 2003 Notice. These clauses state 
that companies wishing to conduct IPOs must not exceed pollution limits, must accord 
with domestic and industry advanced levels, and that the products and production 
processes of companies must not contain any products that are banned in China (SEPA, 
2003). The NGOs’ letter also included a detailed list of all of the environmental 
violations listed on local government websites that had been committed by the seven 
companies. The NGOs also pointed out that GEP had been accused of destroying virgin 
forests in China. Finally, citing the MEID, the NGOs noted that the companies had failed 
to release any information to the public in relation to their IPO application. The letter 
urged the MEP to ‘carefully handle’ the GEP application and to consider suspending 
approval allowing the companies to go public. 
 
                                                   
98 GEP and its subsidiaries have been cited on IPE’s disclosure list ten times for various violations of 
environmental regulations. 
99 All 10 companies were subsequently allowed to go public after taking rectifying measures (Di Yi Caijing 
Ribao, 13 August 2008). 
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On 12 August, the NGOs also wrote to APP China (Friends of Nature et al, 2008b). The 
purpose of this letter was to request that APP China release environmental information to 
the public, including information relevant to its subsidiaries’ IPO applications, by the end 
of the public notice period. In their letter, NGOs provided evidence to show that APP 
China subsidiaries had repeatedly been accused of violating environmental legislation by 
EPBs. NGOs were aware of these violations because EPBs had placed this information in 
the public sphere. The letter pointed out that, according the MEID (and as noted above), 
any company that is ‘named and shamed’ by the authorities should release various types 
of environmental information within 30 days. However, the companies in question had 
not done so. As a result, the NGOs requested that this information be released and that 
the companies comply with the MEID. APP China did not respond directly to the NGOs’ 
letter. However, the next day it did issue a statement in which it defended its 
environmental record and pointed out its contribution to the Chinese economy (APP 
China, 2008). A few days later, the NGOs maintained the pressure by writing a second 
letter to APP China, expressing disappointment that it had not addressed their concerns in 
its publicly issued statement, and reiterating their request that the company disclose 
information about its environmental record according to law (Friends of Nature et al, 
2008c). 
 
Following on from this, and presumably because the NGO campaign had attracted some 
media interest, APP China launched a counter-campaign in which it published articles in 
the media questioning the accuracy of the NGOs’ claims. For example, part of an article 
that appeared in the China Environment News apparently criticising APP China was 
quoted by NGOs in their first letter to APP as an example of its poor environmental 
practice (Renmin Wang Jingji Pindao (People’s Daily Online Economics Channel), 3 
September 2008). However, APP revealed that the article had in fact gone on to praise 
the company for subsequently improving its environmental performance. This part was 
not included by the NGOs. Based on this, APP was quoted in the press as saying, ‘we 
hope that environmental groups can carry out investigations in earnest, and not only rely 
on quotes taken out of context or use media reports in a one-sided way, thus misleading 
the public into a false understanding of APP China’ (Ibid.). NGOs were also criticised for 
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citing the environmental violations of a firm that was no longer associated with APP at 
the time that it contravened environmental regulations.  Interestingly, NGOs involved in 
the campaign against APP circulated an internal (neibu) document entitled ‘frequently 
asked media questions and answers’. This document contained examples of questions that 
journalists might ask in relation to the campaign, as well as information on how to answer 
these questions (NGO internal document, on file with author). This case suggests that, 
while the media can be extremely important in amplifying NGOs’ messages, it can also 
serve as a double-edged sword. 
 
On 2 September, the NGOs sent a second letter to the MEP (Friends of Nature et al, 
2008d). In this letter they provided more details into the environmental record of Hainan 
Jinhai Pulp, one of the six GEP subsidiary companies applying to conduct an IPO. The 
letter included the details of 26 separate environmental violations that the company was 
alleged to have committed in the 36 months prior to its listing application. In addition, the 
NGOs for the first time brought the public into the debate. Activists visited the area 
around Hainan Jinhai Pulp from 28-31 August, and interviewed local people. The NGOs 
claimed that Hainan Jinhai Pulp had polluted drinking water and negatively impacted on 
fish supplies, damaging people’s livelihoods. Furthermore, they found that people’s 
health had been affected by the company’s pollution (Ibid.).100 
 
During the campaign against APP China, NGOs made good use of information in the 
public domain in order to argue their case more authoritatively. Their correspondence 
with the MEP and APP China included a large amount of data detailing the latter’s 
environmental transgressions. All of this was taken from government or media sources 
that were available as a result of greater environmental information disclosure in recent 
years. In addition, NGOs showed that they are very much aware of the content of 
environmental legislation, and were able therefore to use legislation such as the MEID 
and 2003 Notice to support their position. However, the campaign also shows the 
importance to NGOs of double-checking data before using it. Their failure to do so with 
                                                   
100 In their letter, NGOs claimed that they were in the process of compiling a DVD based on filming in the 
area. This DVD was to be sent to the MEP in due course. 
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all of the data they published in relation to this campaign provided APP with ammunition 
that they used in an attempt to discredit NGOs in the media.  
 
The campaign against APP China shows how environmental information disclosure in 
China can add an extra layer of accountability in environmental governance. The two-
way relationship between regulators and regulated entities has been opened, if only 
slightly. What was previously a closed door has now, in some cases at least, been thrown 
ajar. Through publishing its public notice inviting comments on GEP’s IPO application, 
the MEP opened up the process to outside actors and enabled NGOs to provide input. 
However, this has only provided a very limited level of transparency, and the actual 
decision-making process has been conducted behind closed doors.  
 
An important aspect of the NGO campaign was based on writing letters to the MEP and 
APP China. In the case of the former, no public reply was forthcoming. However, the 
NGOs claimed that the MEP had reassured them it had acted on their concerns and 
requested relevant provinces to carry out investigations into APP China’s subsidiary 
companies (Friends of Nature et al, 2008d). As a result, NGOs managed to add a level of 
accountability to this process. In addition, rather than being given a ‘free ride’, GEP was 
pressurised into responding to the NGOs’ criticisms. It did so by publicly issuing 
statements in defence of its environmental record. In doing so, it had to justify its position 
to the Chinese public, even if it refused to engage with all of the accusations levelled at it. 
At the same time, the NGOs also held the MEP to account, again albeit to a limited 
degree. NGOs were able to question the MEP’s initial decision to give a green light to 
GEP’s listing application. Regardless of the final result, these are positive developments 
in environmental governance in China. Yet there is clearly a long way to go before 
transparency and disclosure become the norm, and as a result government officials and 
companies such as APP will continue to escape real public accountability. 
 
Conclusion 
Informational regulation in environmental protection is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
China. Although disclosure of some environmental information has been required since 
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the late 1980s, this was limited in scope and weakly implemented. Since the turn of the 
century, however, the central government has demanded greater public disclosure of 
environmental information. This is in order to improve accountability of polluting 
enterprises and local officials and therefore reduce the implementation deficit. 
 
In the past few years the MEP has increasingly legislated for better information 
disclosure. The MEID, which came into effect in 2008, is an important piece of 
legislation in this regard. It demonstrates an unprecedented commitment on behalf of the 
environmental protection authorities to improve local government and enterprise 
transparency and accountability. In passing information disclosure legislation, the MEP 
has moved to safeguard the public’s ‘right to know’. It has given citizens added legal 
rights that they can theoretically use to obtain information and play a role in 
environmental supervision. In this respect, parallels can be drawn with governments in 
OECD countries that have also passed legislation designed to preserve the right to know 
(Sarokin & Schulkin, 1991).  
 
However, it is important to recognise that the development of information disclosure and 
the concept of right to know differ in a Chinese context. This in turn influences the 
efficacy of informational regulation as a policy tool. Information disclosure is a recent 
policy direction in China. And yet this chapter has found evidence to suggest that, unlike 
other countries such as the US, it has not ‘fundamentally altered the relationship between 
government, industry and the general public’ (Sarokin & Schulkin, 1991: 184). Despite 
the promulgation of legislation, access to environmental information is still haphazard. 
Part of the problem lies in the difficulties associated with monitoring industrial activity in 
a huge country with limited resources. At the same time, many officials remain sceptical 
about, or even downright opposed to, providing the public with information that was until 
very recently considered secret. This is exacerbated by weak rule of law and a lack of 
mechanisms that can hold officials to account. In many cases, the officials that legislation 
such as the MEID aims to hold to account are the same people with the power to decide 
whether or not to enforce this legislation. As a result, officials can still be very selective 
  
163 
163 
in the type of environmental information they decide to place in the public sphere. 
Transparency is still very much lacking in China’s system of environmental governance. 
 
Information Disclosure and Environmental NGOs 
Despite the limitations associated with information disclosure in China, there is evidence 
to suggest that the government’s promotion of this policy in the environmental sphere 
may have important implications for Chinese environmental civil society. For a start, it 
has opened up a new area of activism for NGOs. Prior to the founding of IPE no Chinese 
NGOs were involved in information disclosure activism. Increased attention to this issue 
from the government, including legislative developments in the environmental state, has 
expanded the space for environmental activism in China. ‘Policy pioneers’ including IPE 
and other NGOs have started to colonise this space. They have mounted campaigns 
against companies that are household names in China, for example through the Green 
Choice campaign. In addition, NGOs launched a focused campaign against a giant of the 
paper-manufacturing industry, APP China. The work of IPE both independently and as 
part of the Green Choice campaign highlights the important role that NGOs in China can 
play in processing information from diverse sources into an accessible form for public 
consumption (Stephan, 2002).  
 
To date, however, Chinese NGOs have been limited in their ability to use information to 
hold polluters to account. This is a major shortcoming of informational regulation in 
China, and highlights the limitations of public interest activism. The small amount of 
political space bestowed upon NGOs defines how they are able to use information. For 
example, the emphasis on patiently communicating with enterprises in order to persuade 
them to improve environmentally is consistent with the non-confrontational attitude that 
NGOs operating in China have had to adopt under the current political system. Global 
Village Beijing founder Liao Xiaoyi was paraphrased by the Zhongguo Huanjing Bao (26 
March 2007) as saying, in relation to the Green Choice campaign, that  
In the process of contacting enterprises, environmental NGOs have not 
used a method of conflict to solve the problem, rather they have used the 
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information disclosure strategy and entered into communication and 
liaison with enterprises through dialogue and negotiation.  
This non-confrontational approach is also in evidence via the way in which NGOs 
involved in the campaign wrote letters to companies that had failed to disclose 
information in line with the MEID. This tactic was also central in the campaign against 
GEP’s IPO application.  
 
Adopting a non-confrontational approach is part of a wider strategy on behalf of many 
NGOs to be loyal to the government. Ma Jun said that, ‘the role that we hope to play is as 
a beneficial supplement to the government’s environmental supervision, to promote 
positive interaction between the government, enterprises, and the public’ (Ban Yue Tan 
(Half Monthly Discussion), 3 February 2008). This correlates with the government’s view 
that NGOs should support the work of the government. This tactic has enabled NGOs to 
hold to account a number of companies that would otherwise probably have escaped 
public pressure. And yet this was only the case in relation to a small number of MNCs. 
Almost without exception, domestic companies have not been affected. Due to their size, 
high profile, and importance with which they view their reputations, it is possible that 
positive developments in relation to MNCs might spread to domestic companies. Yet it is 
also possible that Chinese NGOs under their current approach will only be able to alter 
the behaviour of a few companies that represent the lowest hanging fruit.  
 
One of the main reasons why Chinese NGOs have been unable to effectively hold 
polluters to account is due to a lack of effective channels. Chinese activists operate in a 
much more restrictive political environment compared with their western counterparts. 
For example, despite some important successes in environmental court cases, most 
notably by the Beijing NGO Centre of Legal Assistance for Pollution Victims (CLAPV), 
the judicial system is still very much subservient to the Party-state. In addition, due to 
political constraints, the NGOs examined in this chapter have largely been unable to 
forge links with citizens who have a direct personal stake in cleaning up their local 
environment. One exception was the way in which NGOs involved some citizens in the 
campaign against APP China. Yet in doing so, the NGOs had to proceed cautiously. 
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Mobilising the public to any great degree would be a highly dangerous strategy for 
Chinese NGOs. As a result, NGOs involved in the Green Choice and APP campaigns, 
have been forced to maintain their position of advocating change in a patient and non-
confrontational manner. As a result, this chapter has found that public interest activists 
remain limited in the extent to which they can hold polluters to account. 
 
The previous two chapters have focused on public interest activism. The next chapter 
turns to examine a different facet of Chinese environmental civil society identified by this 
thesis, namely private interest activism. 
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Chapter 6: Private Interest Activism 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 focused on ways in which the central government has attempted to 
extend governance to non-state actors through developments in the environmental state 
designed to increase public participation and information disclosure in environmental 
protection. Part of the rationale for doing so is to stimulate greater participation, 
accountability, and transparency in relation to environmental issues. Chapters 4 and 5 
argued that policies designed to extend governance beyond the bureaucracy have created 
new opportunities for public interest activists to engage in environmental governance. 
However, these chapters also found that these activists remain limited regarding the 
extent to which they promote ‘good governance’. Although NGOs and other public 
interest activists can play an important role in promoting public participation and 
information disclosure legislation, Chapters 4 and 5 found that these organisations have 
not been able to significantly affect environmental outcomes through these emerging 
mechanisms and policies. To a large extent this is due to the political constraints under 
which these activists operate. 
 
This chapter continues to examine ways in which the environmental state and civil 
society interact in China. Unlike the previous two chapters that focused on public interest 
activism, this chapter identifies and examines the concept of Chinese environmental 
‘private interest activism’.101 Whereas NGOs and other ‘public interest activists’,102 tend 
to pursue long-term causes for the greater public interest, private interest activists are 
primarily motivated by short-term localised issues that relate to their own private 
interests. The private interest activism examined in this chapter is distinct from NIMBY 
(not in my back yard) –ism. Unlike the latter, the term ‘private interest activism’ is not 
intended to be used pejoratively.  
 
                                                   
101 This term is borrowed from Benjamin Read (2007: 172) in his study of private homeowner associations 
in China. He distinguishes homeowner groups, which are primarily committed to the private interest, from 
NGOs, which are oriented towards public interest issues. 
102 Throughout this thesis the term ‘public interest activism’ refers to NGOs and/or individual citizens who 
campaign on environmental issues primarily based on what they see as being the public good. 
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This chapter examines how, and to what extent, environmental private interest activism 
can promote ‘good governance’ in China. In order to do this, it examines private interest 
activism in relation to large-scale development projects in the cities of Xiamen, Shanghai, 
Beijing, and Chengdu between 2007 and 2008. In each case, citizens mobilised in 
opposition to the projects. They conducted peaceful demonstrations and attempted to 
ensure that officials respect the public’s right to participate in decisions as set out in the 
public participation legislation examined in Chapter 4. These four cases have been 
chosen due to their high-profile nature. This guarantees that there is a large amount of 
documentary evidence to draw on. Furthermore, the fact that these cases generated a 
large amount of interest also suggests their perceived importance to Chinese 
environmental governance by officials, journalists, and scholars alike. 
 
This chapter has implications for understanding good governance in the environmental 
sphere in China. First, it contributes to understandings of official accountability. The 
peaceful protests organised by private interest activists were attempts to hold Party-state 
officials to account for their decisions. Second, in calling on officials to carry out their 
public participation responsibilities, private interest activists attempted to promote formal 
public participation. In doing so, they also advocated stronger rule of law. Finally, this 
chapter shows how private interest activists can promote transparency. In some cases, 
activists overcame local media blackouts regarding the controversial projects by using the 
Internet to spread information. Furthermore, in some of the cases, activists’ pressure on 
the local authorities ensured a more transparent and participatory decision-making 
process. As a result, this chapter argues that private interest activists can be an important 
force in promoting rule of law, participation, transparency, and accountability. This 
chapter also compares the role of public and private interest activists, as well as the extent 
to which they form links with each other. 
 
Contentious Politics and Social Movements 
Before conducting an empirical examination into China’s private interest activism, it is 
necessary to briefly outline the main features of contentious politics and social 
movements as set out by the wider political science literature, and in relation to China. 
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As Snow et al (2004: 5) note, during the twentieth century there was a significant 
increase in contentious politics to the extent that it became ‘a routinized avenue for 
expressing public collective grievances’. According to Sidney Tarrow (1998: 2), 
‘contentious politics occurs when ordinary people, often in league with more influential 
citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents’. Social 
movements are formed when an episode of contentious politics is sustained over a period 
of time, and sometimes across more than one location (Ibid.). Social movements can be 
defined as, ‘a sustained campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that 
advertise the claim, based on organisations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that 
sustain these activities’ (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 8, emphasis added). 
 
Three interactive factors have been identified as key to the analysis of social movements, 
and contentious politics more broadly. These are political opportunities, mobilising 
structures, and framing processes (McAdam et al, 1996). Contentious politics can emerge 
as a result of changes in political opportunities or constraints (Tarrow, 1998). Mobilising 
structures refers to ways in which citizens gather together and engage in collective action 
(McAdam et al, 1996). Framing processes concern ways in which grievances are defined 
in a movement’s discourse.  
 
Scholars have also discussed the impact of contention on the wider political landscape. 
Contentious politics can create ‘cycles of contention’ whereby successful action by one 
group of actors encourages other groups elsewhere to adopt the same tactics in pressing 
for demands and to ‘test the limits of social control’ (Tarrow, 1998: 24, 142). However, 
contention does not only create opportunities for society’s aggrieved. It can also be used 
by political elites to carry out political reform, repression, or both (Ibid: 24). For 
example, oppositional elites may respond by calling for change in areas that previously 
appeared ‘foolhardy’ (Tarrow, 1998). As a result, it has also been argued that contention 
can be absorbed into and transform the state (Ibid.). 
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Since the onset of the reform era, space has opened up in China for the expression of 
local interests as well as the checking of arbitrary abuses of power (Perry & Selden, 
2003). Contentious politics has grown to the extent that a ‘polyphony of conflict and 
contention’ has emerged (Ibid.: 8). In other words, contention has increasingly become 
part of the political landscape in the PRC, although it remains, for the most part, localised 
and single-issue based (Ibid.; Perry & Selden eds., 2003). Although the Chinese political 
system does allow for some expression of localised grievances, any protests or 
movements that form national linkages are likely to be strongly repressed, particularly 
when they are perceived as threatening towards the Party-state. Arguably the best known 
case relates to the Falun Gong movement that was subject to a severe clampdown in the 
late 1990s due in part to its geographically and socially wide membership base 
(Ostergaard, 2004).  
 
Despite the restrictions that remain, reform era dynamics have created political 
opportunity structures that influence collective action. For example, an improving legal 
system has increasingly led to people mobilising in order to defend their rights. This has 
led some scholars to look at contention as being ‘rightful’. As Kevin O’Brien and 
Lianjiang Li (2006) have shown, people with grievances against officials in rural areas 
are increasingly becoming aware of, and using, the rights bestowed upon them through 
official legislation, policies, and rhetoric. In doing so, villagers use the regime’s own 
vocabulary as a weapon in resisting unruly local officials (Ibid: 5). They do not oppose 
the state’s policies; rather they highlight cases where local officials fail to implement 
these policies. This ‘rightful resistance’ takes place between the boundaries of 
institutional and non-institutional politics, and is reliant on cleavages in the state that 
villagers can exploit (Ibid: 25, 52).103  
 
Although rightful resistance was initially conceived of in relation to rural areas, changes 
in urban dynamics have seen the spread of these tactics to towns and cities. To date, one 
of the most prominent examples of this can be found in so-called ‘homeowner 
                                                   
103 It has been argued that the divisions of power between local and central levels in China have been vital 
in limiting the effect of civil unrest. China’s multiple-layered system helps protect the centre’s image as it 
frequently falls on local officials to carry out repressive actions (Cai, 2008). 
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movements’, in which urban residents engage in contentious action in order to preserve 
their economic (especially property) interests, or quality of life.104 In many of the 
documented cases, homeowners pursue issues that are related to, or are at least framed in 
terms of, environmental concerns (see, for example, Zhu & Wang, 2007-8; Zhu & Ho, 
2008). For example, homeowners in a Shanghai neighbourhood cited environmental 
legislation in a bid to prevent the construction of a facility for old cadres in a park 
adjacent to their properties (Zhu & Ho, 2008). 
 
Although scholars have conducted case studies of instances whereby homeowner groups 
frame their resistance to unpopular development projects in environmental terms, the 
impact that this type of resistance has on environmental governance and the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection’s (MEP) policies in relation to extending governance has not 
been addressed.105 Furthermore, the tactics used by opponents to controversial 
development projects continue to evolve and are becoming more sophisticated. Existing 
studies have not analysed the effect that new technology such as the Internet and mobile 
phones are having on these movements. In addition, the ways in which other civil society 
actors interact with these movements has not been examined by the current literature. 
And finally, no scholarly studies exist that examine the cases of public opposition to the 
development projects in Xiamen, Chengdu, Beijing, or Shanghai, despite much media 
interest in these cases. This chapter attempts to address these gaps in the literature. 
 
Environmental Private Interest Activism in China 
This section examines in detail private interest activism in Xiamen, Shanghai, Beijing, 
and Chengdu. First, it provides detailed information of these four case studies. It then 
considers the significance of these cases, looking at the impact of new technology and the 
                                                   
104 The reform era has seen a trend away from publicly provided accommodation by work units (danwei) 
and an increase in private home ownership, particularly since the mid- to late 1990s (Read, 2007). Many 
urban dwellers have been given the chance to purchase the homes supplied to them by their work units at 
below market prices. In addition, a large number of people have been resettled where old housing has been 
demolished and replaced with new high-rise buildings (Ibid.). 
105 Before 2008, the MEP was referred to as the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). 
For clarity, this chapter uses the term ‘MEP’ when referring to the central level environmental protection 
agency both before and after this bureaucratic reorganisation. 
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emergence of new forms of activism. It also considers the impact of private interest 
activism on environmental governance processes. 
 
Xiamen PX Plant 
Xiamen is a coastal city located in Fujian Province with a population of approximately 
1.5 million people who take much pride in the city’s clean environment. Since the mid-
1990s the Xiamen city government has been developing the petrochemical industry as 
one of three pillar industries in Haicang, a national-level economic and technological 
development zone on the outskirts of the city (China Daily, 16 May 2005). At the same 
time, Haicang has also been designated as an area for the development of non-industrial 
sectors such as housing, tourism, and education (Ibid.). 
 
Plans by the Taiwanese Xianglu Group to construct a huge chemical plant in Haicang 
producing 800,000 tonnes annually of paraxylene (PX), a chemical used in the 
manufacturing of plastics, polyester and cleaning products, were approved by the State 
Council in February 2004 and by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) in July 2006. It was estimated that the PX plant would add 80 billion Yuan to 
Xiamen’s annual GDP of 110 billion Yuan, representing a significant level of investment 
(South China Morning Post, 7 June 2007). However, opposition was expressed, initially 
from senior academics, to the proposed location of the PX plant, which was to be only 
seven kilometres from the city centre and even closer to recently developed residential 
areas in Haicang. This issue was brought into the realm of public debate in March 2007 
after six Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) academics and 105 members of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC) introduced a proposal at the 
annual CPPCC meeting calling for the PX plant to be relocated further away from the 
city due to health concerns. In response to this, the Xiamen government, which had not 
indicated to the public that PX is a potentially harmful substance, stood firm, remaining 
in favour of the plant’s construction (Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolitan News), 
31 May 2007). 
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After news of the potentially damaging health effects of PX started to emerge, many 
citizens became worried. Another cause for concern for homeowners in the Haicang area 
was the resulting drop in property prices that accompanied the news about the plant’s 
location (BBC News, 22 January 2008). The role of the media, and in particular the ‘new 
media’ which in this case refers to information disseminated by individuals through the 
Internet and mobile phones, was vital in raising awareness, as well as mobilising 
opposition against the project. The CPPCC proposal was reported by the traditional 
media, which prompted concerned citizens to engage in debate and awareness-raising 
regarding the possible dangers associated with PX via the Internet. Despite the fact that 
information in Xiamen about the PX project was tightly controlled by officials, many 
local people obtained information via channels such as email or through Internet blogs 
and bulletin boards. Due to the difficulties of censoring information disseminated through 
these channels, individuals were able to challenge the monopoly on information held by 
local officials, filling a vacuum created by a lack of reporting in the traditional media.  
 
‘Cyber’ activists such as Lian Yue were instrumental in disseminating information about 
the PX project. From late March, Lian used his blog in order to urge citizens to publicise 
and oppose the plans to build the PX plant, as well as warning that it would damage 
people’s health and the local economy.106 Hence online discussions moved from talking 
about what the dangers of PX were, to discussing what could be done to prevent the 
project from going ahead. In another demonstration of the importance of how technology 
can bypass Party-state censorship, a mobile phone text message was sent in late May 
which warned people that construction of the PX plant would be akin to exploding an 
atomic bomb over Xiamen (Sichuan Xinwen Wang (Sichuan News Net), 29 May 2007).107 
This message urged citizens to take part in a ‘stroll’ (sanbu) to the city government on 1 
June in order to register their displeasure with the project (Zhejiang Zaixian (Zhejiang 
Online), 25 December 2007).108 Recipients of the message were urged to forward it to 
friends and family, and it reportedly reached almost all of the city’s 1.5 million 
                                                   
106 See, for example, http://lianyeah.blog.com/1647122/.  
107 It is not known from whom this message originated. 
108 It is illegal for citizens to organise a demonstration without government approval, which is rarely 
granted. Going for a stroll is, however, perfectly legal. Therefore, organising a mass ‘stroll’ represented an 
innovative way around this problem. 
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population (Los Angeles Times, 1 June 2007). Others learned about the march from the 
Internet and word of mouth. 
 
News of the planned protest stroll appears to have spurred officials into action, and the 
Xiamen government announced at a press conference on 30 May that the PX project was 
to be suspended pending further investigation.109 This process would include carrying out 
a strategic environmental impact assessment (SEIA) (Xinhua Tongxun She, 13 June 
2007).110 Despite this announcement however, the stroll went ahead, with an estimated 
7,000 people taking part on 1 June and a further 2,000 people marching on 2 June. 
During the strolls, participants called for the Xiamen Communist Party Secretary to 
resign and for the PX plant to be abandoned rather than merely suspended. In a further 
illustration of the importance of new media channels, a real-time blog was maintained by 
an activist who received updates from protestors via SMS messages, therefore enabling 
him to compile a running commentary that could be followed by anyone with access to 
the Internet (South China Morning Post, 3 June 2007). Another notable feature of these 
strolls, and one that distinguished them from the thousands of protests occurring 
primarily in rural areas, was that they were organised in advance and made use of new 
media channels. In addition, the majority of participants were middle-class and well 
educated, and also included a number of government employees.  
 
The strolls were condemned by local officials, with the city mayor Liu Cigui criticising 
participants for not voicing their grievances through ‘official channels’ (South China 
Morning Post, 7 June 2007). Part of the problem, however, is the lack of effective 
channels for participation, as well as the weak implementation of existing public 
participation mechanisms. Although an EIA for the project had been approved by the 
MEP in July 2005, no provisions had been made to allow for public participation, despite 
                                                   
109 There was a suggestion that this decision was taken by the Fujian provincial government (see Xinhua 
Tongxun She, 13 June 2007).  
110 In China, unlike an EIA, which considers projects in isolation, an SEIA considers proposed projects in 
the context of their likely impact on the surrounding area. 
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the existence of provisions in the 2003 EIA Law for the solicitation of public comments 
(see Chapter 4).111  
 
After the strolls, however, there was a marked change in the Xiamen authorities’ hitherto 
secretive and aloof attitude towards the public with regards the PX projecct. Between 7-8 
June 250,000 copies of a leaflet entitled ‘How much do you know about PX?’ were 
distributed to citizens. Around the same time, officials agreed to consider public 
complaints and comments via various channels including emails, letters and telephone 
calls (Nanfang Zhoumo, 19 December 2007). Another significant development related to 
the fact that the SEIA was conducted in a manner largely consistent with MEP’s policies 
regarding public participation in EIAs.112 After the SEIA was finished in late November, 
an abridged version of the report was made available for public comment on 5 December. 
The public comment period lasted for 10 days. It attracted a significant response, with 
691 phone calls and 1,250 emails received by the authorities within the first 24 hours 
(Xiamen City Government, 2007).  
 
Local officials made another significant concession to members of the public. A two-day 
public hearing, broadcast live on the Internet, was held on 13-14 December at which 
approximately 100 citizens were invited to express their opinions. This was the most 
prominent public hearing since the Yuanmingyuan hearing held over two and a half years 
previously (see Chapter 4). Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of participants opposed the 
project.113 Finally, in March 2008, officials announced that the project would not go 
ahead in Xiamen. Instead, it was relocated to the city of Zhangzhou, also in Fujian 
Province (Nanfang Zhoumo, 19 December 2007). 
 
                                                   
111 The MEP subsequently claimed that although the PX project viewed in isolation was worthy of passing 
the EIA, it became problematic because local officials allowed residential areas to be constructed within 
close proximity to the industrial zone in which the plant was to be located. In theory, the SEIA process 
should overcome this type of issue. 
112 The SEIA Law was in the process of being drafted at this time. The exceptional circumstances of the 
Xiamen case enabled the MEP to conduct an SEIA before this legislation had been passed. 
113 For details, see the following article on Lian Yue’s blog: 
http://www.lianyue.net/blogs/rosu/archives/118196.aspx.  
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The Xiamen case represents a successful mobilisation of aggrieved members of the 
public against an unpopular development project. As well as achieving their aims by 
ensuring construction of the PX plant did not go ahead in Xiamen, activists also 
influenced the manner in which government officials interacted with the public. Before 
the public outcry, local officials attempted to hide the project from the public. However, 
due to public pressure, officials subsequently discharged their public participation 
requirements in a way that was unprecedented in modern China. 
 
The decision by officials to open up the project’s SEIA process to public participation as 
a direct result of opposition from netizens and private interest activists represents an 
improvement in environmental governance. Not only were members of the public invited 
to submit comments on the SEIA, they also took part in a relatively transparent public 
hearing. In this sense, parallels can be drawn between the Xiamen government’s handling 
of the SEIA process and the Yuanmingyuan public hearing in Beijing (see Chapter 4). As 
Chapter 4 noted, the 2005 Yuanmingyuan hearing was seen in part as an experiment 
designed to promote provisions contained in the 2003 EIA Law that allowed for a more 
participatory approach to environmental governance through the mechanism of public 
hearings. Through mirroring this process, the Xiamen government abided by what 
represents Chinese ‘best practice’ regarding public participation in a project’s EIA. 
Although it was not their primary goal, private interest activists in Xiamen ensured that 
formal channels for public participation were opened up.  
 
However, the extent to which the public participation channels opened up by the Xiamen 
government facilitated meaningful input into the decision-making process unclear. It has 
been suggested that the decision to relocate the PX plant had been taken before the public 
hearings took place (International Herald Tribune, 21 February 2008), which would 
render the participatory aspect of the SEIA irrelevant. The decision by the Xiamen 
government to embrace public participation in this case appears to have been based more 
on appeasing the public and salvaging its own image rather than any significant attempt 
to improve transparency and public participation in environmental governance. Indeed, 
by December officials were putting a positive spin on the event by stressing the positive 
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way in which they changed their approach by listening to public opinion, implying that 
they had handled the situation well and advanced the governance process at the same 
time. As the city’s CCP Deputy Secretary-General Zhu Zilu said, ‘from June’s “PX 
disturbance” to December’s “public participation”, the Xiamen masses became more 
rational by the day, and the government’s administrative capability improved’ (Nanfang 
Zhoumo, 28 May 2007). On the other hand, it could be argued that the Xiamen case 
highlighted the need for official channels for public participation in order to ensure that 
unrest is internalised as much as possible within the system. This arguably strengthens 
the position of the MEP as it attempts to promote public participation by highlighting the 
necessity of instruments such as public hearings. 
 
Shanghai Maglev Protests
114
 
At around the same time that the Xiamen PX plant incident was playing out, citizens in 
Shanghai were also opposing a new project. The source of dissatisfaction amongst many 
Shanghai residents was centred on the Shanghai municipal government’s plans to extend 
the city’s Maglev line by 34 kilometres to the city’s Hongqiao Airport.115 Shanghai has 
the world’s only commercial Maglev service, which opened in 2003 and runs between the 
suburbs and Pudong Airport. 
 
From the beginning, Shanghai officials were more transparent about the project than 
Xiamen officials had been in relation to the PX plant. Plans for the project were revealed 
to residents in January 2007 via a public notice (gongshi). According to the public notice, 
the proposed extension to the Maglev line meant it would run close to 40 residential 
neighbourhoods (xiaoqu). In some places, the Maglev line would be less than 25 metres 
from people’s homes. As a result, many residents opposed the project due to fears about 
noise pollution and electromagnetic radiation, whilst also questioning the extent to which 
it would benefit the economy. Similar to events in Xiamen, another factor stoking 
opposition was the negative effect of the project on house prices.  
                                                   
114 Unless indicated otherwise, the factual information in this section is based on Xin Jing Bao, 22 January 
2008. 
115 Magnetic levitation, or ‘Maglev’, is an extremely fast train transportation system, whereby trains glide 
above a track, supported by magnetic repulsion and powered by a linear motor. 
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After the plans were revealed, many residents, particularly homeowners, began the 
process of appealing (shangfang) to local authorities, as well as protesting on a small 
scale. Citizens also displayed banners from their windows calling for environmental 
protection and for officials to adhere to the central leadership’s ‘harmonious society’ 
rhetoric. In May, government officials announced that the project was being put on hold, 
and two months later it emerged that the plans for the extension were to be improved. 
Following this, a planning report and an EIA were made public on the Internet on 29 
December 2007 and 2 January 2008, respectively. Members of the public were given 
three weeks to comment on the former, and two weeks for the latter. The planning report 
did contain some apparent concessions to residents. It revealed that the line was to be 
shortened to 31.8 kilometres and that some sections in densely populated areas would be 
constructed underground. The EIA had given the project a clean bill of health.  
 
Despite this, however, citizens remained sceptical. Rather than accepting the planning 
report’s findings, some residents, especially those with scientific backgrounds, argued for 
more research to be undertaken into the dangers of electromagnetic radiation. In addition, 
citizen opposition to the Maglev extension revealed some apparent discrepancies in the 
planning process. Although the proximity of the Maglev line to residential blocks was 
consistent with the Shanghai EPB’s advice that the line should not be closer than 22.5 
metres, opponents pointed out that the original line in Pudong had a safety zone 
extending to 50 metres, which itself was far short of the 500 metre safety zone 
maintained in Germany, which had developed the Maglev technology. Despite 
reassurances from the authorities that 30 metres was a sufficient buffer zone, residents 
remained unsatisfied. A recent media report had stated that residents living close to the 
existing Maglev line in Pudong had complained that it had affected their health, sleep, 
and even television signals (Nanfang Zhoumo, 13 January 2008).  
 
Opponents to the project displayed a relatively high level of organisation in arguing their 
case, and showed familiarity with environmental laws and regulations. On 7 January 
2008 a group of about ten representatives from affected residential communities met with 
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some relevant Minxing district leaders in order to express their opposition to the project 
in terms of its implications regarding the environment, economy, effect on society and 
safety. In addition, the representatives criticised the way in which the planning report and 
EIA had been made available only through the Internet. They argued that details about 
the project should be made known to everyone affected. The following evening, a 
‘communication meeting’ was held between residential committee representatives, 
Maglev experts, and local officials from the planning and environmental protection 
departments. Residential representatives used the meeting to issue a set of requests, 
which primarily concerned with achieving greater governmental transparency. For 
example, representatives called for notices concerning public notification of relevant 
information to be displayed at residential areas, offices, and schools, and via the 
mainstream media. They also argued that the EIA should be published in the media, that 
the time for comments be extended until 5 March, and that residents should be able to see 
the full version of the EIA rather than the abridged version.116 In addition, they also asked 
to be shown scientific data about the health effects from electromagnetic radiation. 
Finally, the representatives suggested that, in accordance with the law, a public hearing 
should be convened. These requests support the argument that citizens are becoming 
increasingly aware of their rights to participate and are seeking to ensure that these rights 
are upheld.  
 
As well as submitting comments through official channels and arguing their case with 
officials, residents also took to the streets. Borrowing the terminology applied in the 
Xiamen case, residents were described as taking part in a series of ‘strolls’. These strolls 
took place in January 2008, during the public comment period, which suggests that 
residents considered the government channels for public participation insufficient. 
Residents were unhappy about the length of the three week public comment period, 
which they considered too short, as well as the fact that it had not been well publicised. 
According to reports, thousands of people converged at the city’s People’s Square in the 
hope of persuading authorities to locate the line extension further away from their homes. 
                                                   
116 As Chapter 4 noted, according to Article 11 of the 2006 Measures on Public Participation in EIA, only 
an abridged version of a project’s EIA need be released to the public. 
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Authorities had, as they did in Xiamen, urged citizens to express their views in a ‘legal 
and rational’ manner. However, Shanghai residents also took the view that only through 
gathering in such a way did they stand a chance at influencing the decision. As one 
newspaper editorial put it, ‘today, only through going to the square for a stroll can people 
bump into a mayor that can be persuaded’ (Nanfang Dushi Bao, 13 January 2008). In 
other words, only through going out onto the street in numbers can citizens hope to 
engage with, and put their case to, officials. To date, opposition appears to have been 
successful. The Maglev extension was not included in the city’s list of major construction 
projects for 2008 (Reuters, 6 March 2008). However, the decision to suspend the project 
may have been made easier by the arrest of disgraced mayor Chen Liangyu on corruption 
charges, with whom the Maglev extension project was closely associated. 
 
The way in which Shanghai residents opposed the Maglev project naturally drew 
comparisons with the Xiamen PX incident. Citizens who strongly opposed the project did 
win some concessions from the authorities. As in Xiamen, officials were forced to engage 
with them to a greater degree than they would otherwise have done. After the initial 
opposition from residents and the temporary suspension of the project, officials increased 
channels for the public to comment on the plans and EIA, and stressed the importance of 
public input. However, this was only forthcoming after strong opposition from citizens, 
who organised a delegation of representatives to meet with officials and argue their case. 
In addition, these representatives called on officials to discharge their public participation 
duties. In doing so, residents actively sought to protect their own rights, about which they 
were aware, and hold the government to account. Indeed throughout the whole process, 
activists were distrusting of the government and questioned it on a number of issues, 
including the accuracy of the EIA report. Although Shanghai officials did not hold a 
public hearing, as was the case in Xiamen, they released both the planning report and 
EIA to the public. However, although this enabled citizens to submit comments, the 
procedure was criticised by some for lacking in ease of use and transparency. Similar 
with Xiamen, there is no way of knowing the extent to which public comments through 
official channels influenced the final decision. However, it appears likely that, in both 
cases, the main factor driving change was the large-scale protests.   
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Finally, technology also played an important role in the Shanghai case. Opposition to the 
Maglev extension appears to have been organised primarily through the personal 
networks of homeowners in the affected neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, participants 
made use of the Internet. Opposition may have been heightened after participants learned 
of a protest march involving 13,000 people in Munich based on their opposition to plans 
to construct a Maglev line. In addition, residents also used the Googleearth programme 
on the Internet in order to overcome a lack of detail in the information released by the 
government, and verify exactly which residential areas were to be affected by the Maglev 
extension. Participants also uploaded videos of their strolls onto Youtube in order to 
provide a record of these activities. 
 
Opposition to the Liulitun Waste Incineration Plant in Beijing 
The third case of private interest activism examined by this chapter focuses on opposition 
against the construction of a waste incineration plant in the Haidian district of Beijing. In 
1995, the Beijing municipal EPB expressed concern regarding plans to construct a 
landfill site in Haidian district’s Liulitun. Despite this, the EPB eventually caved in to 
pressure and agreed to the project. At the same time, the EPB suggested that no housing 
should be built within 500 metres of the site, and that residents already living in the area 
should be relocated (Sichuan Zaixian (Sichuan Online), 8 June 2007). However, this 
suggestion was ignored, and the surrounding area continued to be developed for 
residential purposes. 
 
After the first phase of the project’s construction was completed in 1999, residents in 
Liulitun started to complain about the stench from the landfill site that filled the air. 
Furthermore, it was claimed that the site was contaminating groundwater and had led to 
health problems among local residents, including increasing cases of cancer (Liu, 2007c). 
Partly in response to these complaints, and also because the landfill was set to be filled by 
2012, in 2005 the Beijing municipal government announced plans to build a waste 
incineration plant next to the Liulitun landfill. This plant, with an investment of 
approximately 750 million Renminbi, would be able to incinerate 1,200 tonnes of rubbish 
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per day. The Beijing EPB approved the project’s EIA in November 2005, and the 
authorities planned to begin construction of the plant in March 2007, ensuring that it 
would be completed before the start of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.  
 
The decision to construct the waste incineration plant was greeted with strong opposition 
from local residents, who were fearful about the environmental and health implications of 
the project.117 The Beijing and Haidian EPBs, on the other hand, supported the project. 
The former compiled a report defending the project’s EIA (Xinjing Bao, 10 May 2007). It 
also claimed that there would be no environmental impact from the project, and that 
residents’ health would also be unaffected (Ziyou Yazhou Diantai (Radio Free Asia), 8 
February 2007). Despite this, there remained strong opposition to the plant from residents 
who previously had been reassured that the landfill site would have no negative impact. 
Residents and local businesses petitioned the government and wrote letters of complaint 
to central level officials. Opposition to the project led to interest from the print media, 
and China Central Television (CCTV) aired several reports (see, for example, CCTV, 
2007). In January 2007, officials from the Haidian district government met with several 
concerned residents. However, according to residents, officials displayed an aloof 
attitude, and the former’s concerns were dismissed out of hand (Nanfang Zhoumo, 11 
July 2007).118  
 
Local residents were unhappy with the local government’s lack of transparency in 
relation to the project. On 23 November 2006, they convened a meeting and decided to 
request that the Beijing EPB release the project’s EIA report (Di Yi Caijing Ribao, 14 
June 2007). The Beijing EPB acquiesced, and released the report in January 2007. 
However, residents found fault with the report. Moreover, residents were supported by 
experts, including CPPCC delegate Zhou Yinfeng, who, in a similar vein to Zhao Yufen, 
submitted a report to the CPPCC in which he argued against the waste incineration 
project (Renmin Zhengxie Wang (People’s CPPCC Net), 25 June 2007). In February and 
                                                   
117 Many people had moved to the area due to its relatively good environmental conditions. In addition, 
residents were concerned about the health implications, especially those related to the emission of 
carcinogenic dioxin from the plant. 
118 According to the Nanfang Zhoumo (11 July 2007), when one expert present at the meeting dismissed 
residents’ concerns as ‘rubbish’ (xiashuo), residents grabbed him by the collar. 
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March 2007, several residents applied to the MEP for an administrative review of the 
Beijing municipal EPB’s decision in November 2005 to approve the EIA for the Liulitun 
incineration plant (Renmin Ribao, 13 June 2007c). The application for administrative 
review was submitted based on two main premises. First, it claimed that, for various 
reasons, the proposed site for the plant was not suitable. And second, the applicants 
argued that the EIA process had violated the 2003 EIA Law by virtue of lacking 
sufficient public participation (Ibid.). The applicants threatened to sue the authorities if 
their request for a review was turned down (Ziyou Yazhou Diantai, 8 February 2007). 
 
In relation to the second point, in 2005 the Beijing EPB had included public participation 
in the EIA process. Yet this was extremely limited. It consisted of convening an experts’ 
meeting and distributing 100 questionnaires to local residents. Of these questionnaires, 
the EPB claimed that 85 were returned, with 71 per cent of respondents indicating 
approval (Nanfang Zhoumo, 11 July 2007). In addition, the Haidian district government 
selected several people from businesses in the area and took them to examine a waste 
incineration plant in Shanghai. However, according to one participant, officials used the 
visit to extol the virtues of waste incineration, and participants found the content of the 
visit too technical (Ibid.). 
 
The affected residents clearly felt this level of public participation was insufficient and 
that they had been unable to express their views in a fair manner. They received support 
from experts, one of whom was quoted on CCTV as saying that, in relation to the 
questionnaires, ‘100 people is too few, it’s totally possible [for the constructors] to get 
people they know or people with no connection to the project to fill in the questionnaire, 
it has no meaning’ (CCTV, 15 April 2007). In their administrative review application, 
residents revealed that they had, in cooperation with environmental experts and lawyers, 
distributed 400 copies of their own survey regarding the project (SEPA, 2007b). In 
contrast with the official questionnaire, of the 358 completed surveys that were returned, 
97.5 per cent stated that proposed pollution control measures were unreliable; 96.9 per 
cent expressed the belief that the plant would create severe pollution that would exceed 
the carrying capacity of the surrounding area; and, 93.2 per cent and 94.9 per cent of 
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completed surveys stated that the project would be detrimental to the local economy and 
people’s living standards, respectively (Ibid.).  
 
The MEP accepted the administrative review application and published its decision on 12 
June (SEPA, 2007b). However, it is unclear whether or not the decision to carry out the 
administrative review was prompted by a peaceful protest by residents.119 On 5 June, 
World Environment Day, approximately 1,000 Liulitun residents surrounded the MEP’s 
headquarters in Beijing in order to express opposition to the waste incineration plant. 
This prompted official action. On the same day, four residents were invited to discuss the 
issue with the vice-head of the Haidian district. They met for two hours, and this time the 
residents’ concerns were carefully listened to (Sichuan Zaixian, 8 June 2007). The MEP 
also took action. Two days after this protest, the MEP issued a statement on its website 
calling on Beijing municipal government officials to suspend the project pending further 
investigation and greater levels of public participation (SEPA, 2007c).120 In the same 
statement, Pan Yue was quoted as saying that, ‘we hope that all levels of government will 
provide a platform to enable the public to enjoy sufficient right to know, right to 
supervise, and right to participate in large-scale environmental affairs’ (Ibid.). 
 
One week after the protest, the MEP publicly issued its administrative review decision 
(see SEPA, 2007b).121 It found that the plants location was in violation of the NDRC’s 
2006 ‘Decision Regarding Strengthening the Management Work of Environmental 
Impact Assessments for Organic Electricity Generation’. However, since the project’s 
EIA had been carried out in 2005, before this decision was promulgated, this legislation 
was deemed irrelevant. In addition, the MEP found that the level of public participation 
in the EIA had been sufficient, because the 2006 ‘Measures on Public Participation in 
Environmental Impact Assessment’ that provided clear guidance regarding public 
involvement in the EIA process (see Chapter 4) had not been in force at the time. As a 
                                                   
119 The results of the administrative review were published one week after the protest, which suggests that it 
might have been a reactionary move by the MEP. 
120 As a non-cabinet level ministry, SEPA ranked half a notch below the Beijing municipal government, 
and was therefore unable to impose binding orders on it. This statement was therefore a suggestion, not an 
order. 
121 Given SEPA’s rank, this administrative review decision was also not binding in relation to the Beijing 
municipal government. 
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result, the administrative review decision cleared the Beijing EPB of any wrongdoing in 
relation to the two charges levied at it by the administrative review applicants. Rather, it 
blamed Beijing municipal government officials for ignoring the EPB’s advice that it gave 
in 1995 regarding the unsuitability of locating a landfill site so close to residences.  
 
Although it exonerated the Beijing EPB, the MEP also attempted to perform a delicate 
balancing act. It used the administrative review decision to reiterate its view that the 
incineration plant should be suspended pending greater deliberation. It claimed that, in 
between the project’s EIA in 2005 and the start of construction in 2007, many people had 
moved to Liulitun. The MEP cited the fact that these new residents had not been 
consulted about the project, as well as the significant amount of opposition expressed 
through tactics such as petitions and the 5 June protest, as reasons why public 
consultation should be reopened (SEPA, 2007b). In response to this, one resident was 
quoted as saying, ‘apparently another assessment will be organised, which will include 
public participation. We are waiting for this public participation opportunity’ (Feng, 
2007). The Beijing government decided to suspend the project pending further 
investigation. In October 2008 it was reported that the site for the waste incineration plant 
had been chosen, and preliminary work on the EIA had been completed (Beijing Wanbao 
(Beijing Evening Post), 10 October 2008). In addition, the report stated that a wider range 
of public opinions would be solicited (Ibid.). 
 
Chengdu Citizens Oppose Ethylene Plant and Oil Refinery in Pengzhou 
The city of Pengzhou is located approximately 35 kilometres north of Chengdu, the 
provincial capital of Sichuan Province. In the early 1990s, Pengzhou was identified as 
being a potential site for an oil refinery. Subsequently, in the ‘Chengdu City Overall Plan 
(1995-2020)’, Pengzhou was designated as a petrochemical base. In 2005, plans to 
construct an ethylene plant with an output of 800,000 tonnes per year were approved by 
the MEP and the NDRC, and approval to build an oil refinery with an annual output of 10 
million tonnes was granted in 2008 (Nanfang Dushi Bao, 7 May 2008). 
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Public opposition to these two projects started, initially slowly, on the Internet, and 
culminated in a stroll on 4 May 2008. In many ways, events in Chengdu mirrored the 
events in Xiamen. Starting in 2006, several Chengdu residents used the Internet in order 
to learn about, and spread news of, the proposed projects. They warned about the 
potential health and pollution consequences that could affect the area. Chengdu is 
situated in a basin and is therefore particularly susceptible to air pollution. Internet posts 
warned of potential health repercussions, including leukaemia and deformed foetuses 
(Nanfang Dushi Bao, 7 May 2008). However, opposition remained low-key and many 
residents remained either in the dark about the project, or somewhat apathetic (Ibid.).  
 
One of the key protagonists in online discussions was the well-known outspoken local 
writer and blogger Ran Yunfei. Initially too busy to dedicate much time to the subject, 
Ran subsequently took a greater interest after several friends and other concerned parties 
had contacted him about the projects. Worried by the projects, which he saw as the latest 
in a long line of developments detrimental to the city and region, Ran registered his 
opposition in blog articles published on 26 October (Ran, 2007a) and 22 November 
2007.122 In doing so, Ran made the link between what was happening in Chengdu and the 
earlier successful intervention of Xiamen residents opposed to the PX plant. He wrote, 
‘the harm from an 800,000 tonne ethylene project can be placed on a par with the Xiamen 
PX project. The people of Xiamen including intellectuals such as Lian Yue can stand up 
and oppose, even not hesitate to take a stroll. Can it be that we the people of Chengdu are 
so easily bullied?’ (Ran, 2007a). 
 
Indeed, in the run-up to the stroll, discussion became livelier. As well as using the 
Internet to disseminate information, opponents also distributed text messages in late April 
2008 (Nanfang Dushi Bao, 7 May 2008). One message compared the danger to Chengdu 
with the dropping of an atomic bomb, just as SMS messages had in Xiamen. Throughout 
the campaign, Ran Yunfei played a similar role to Lian Yue. In a subsequent and widely 
read blog posting entitled ‘Stand Up Those People of Chengdu Who Have Bravery’, he 
warned that Chengdu could become a waste city, or even a dead city, if the two projects 
                                                   
122 This second article is referred to in another blog (see Ran, 2008a). 
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were allowed to proceed (Ran, 2008a). However, in attempting to encourage Chengdu 
residents to stand up in defence of their interests, Ran recognised that, unlike the Xiamen 
case when well-connected and influential experts such as Zhao Yufen became involved, 
no experts from Chengdu had stepped forward to question the Pengzhou projects. He 
therefore used his blog and personal connections to urge experts to join in the debate in 
order to lend greater credibility to the campaign to prevent the construction of the two 
projects. He also called upon journalists, both domestic and overseas, to report the story. 
In addition, Ran suggested ways in which ordinary citizens could take action. He urged 
people to disseminate information about damage done to Chengdu’s environment in the 
recent past, and suggested that people share this information with the foreign and 
domestic media. Ran also suggested that people formulate petitions and ‘even take part in 
a stroll’ (Ran, 2008a). He reiterated this sentiment in a later posting when he once again 
called on people to take part in a ‘peaceful and reasonable’ stroll (Ran, 2008b). 
 
Following this, a stroll was indeed organised, although the precise details regarding how 
it came about are unclear. In another similarity to Xiamen, text messages were distributed 
in order to organise the stroll. The text read as follows: 
Chengdu, I breathe for you! We have the right to choose, we have a 
peaceful and reasoned means of expression: on 4 May afternoon between 
15:00 and 17:00 there will be a stroll between Jiuyan Bridge and 
Wangjiang Building. No banners, no slogans, no rally, no 
demonstration…123 
The stroll took place as planned, albeit on a much smaller scale than the Xiamen stroll. 
One participant put the number of people at 500 at the stroll’s peak124, although Chinese 
media sources quoted a figure of just below 200 (Xin Jing Bao, 6 May 2008). Participants 
went to great lengths to avoid appearing confrontational, at times with almost comic 
effects. For example, at one point when being told to move on by police, participants 
                                                   
123 See http://www.happycalgary.com/cached/39/n-47439.html.  
124 See http://www.blogoutdoor.com/user1/1203/archives/2008/39489.html.  
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gathered by a bus stop and pretended to wait for a bus. A couple of participants provided 
live updates of the stroll to bloggers via text message.125   
 
Following the stroll, Ran uploaded a blog entry expressing his support (Ran, 2008c). He 
also called on officials to open up the decision-making process by organising a forum 
whereby supporters and opponents of the projects could have a debate (Ran, 2008d). Ran 
urged officials to abide by the ‘People’s Republic of China Government Information 
Disclosure Ordinance’ promulgated by the State Council in 2007 and release relevant 
information. It was claimed by officials that members of the public had already been 
offered the chance to submit their comments on the two projects through the EIA process 
(Nanfang Dushi Bao, 7 May 2008). However, if this was indeed the case it appears to 
have not been noticed by the vast majority of people. A representative from the Beijing 
NGO Centre for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) suggested in one media 
report that citizens use the MEP’s ‘Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure’ 
in order to compel officials to release the EIA reports for the two projects in order to 
verify whether or not public comments had been collected in the process (Ibid.). It is not 
clear whether or not any official requests for information were made in this fashion. 
 
Although the tactics of the Chengdu campaign mirrored those that were used in Xiamen, 
the result was different. The local government response to the opponents of the Pengzhou 
projects differed from those of officials involved in the the Xiamen, Shanghai, and 
Beijing cases. Even after this opposition culminated in a stroll, Chengdu government 
officials did not interact with citizens or show any outward signs that they were willing to 
grant concessions.126 Indeed, the government in Chengdu may have been influenced by 
and learned from the Xiamen incident that in many ways closely mirrored events in 
Chengdu. They preferred instead to ignore the protestors and use oppressive tactics. 
Officials moved quickly to try and counteract the opponents. Several blogs were blocked, 
including Ran Yunfei’s, and indeed remain so at time of writing (Nanfang Dushi Bao, 7 
May 2008). Steps were also taken to control the content of SMS messages. One journalist 
                                                   
125 See ‘Report of the Chengdu 4 May Stroll’, at http://www.happycalgary.com/cached/39/n-47439.html.  
126 The construction company did, however, issue a notice designed to allay fears about the projects’ safety 
(Nanfang Dushi Bao, 7 May 2008). 
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interviewed a woman who had been unable to send text messages designed to raise 
awareness of the projects from her mobile phone. When she called her phone server to 
ask why this had happened she was told that her text contained sensitive words, and that 
her phone would be out of use for the next 24 hours (Ibid.). In addition, several people 
were arrested, most of whom were netizens (Sichuan Zaixian, 11 May 2008). For 
example, one blogger spent ten days in prison for ‘spreading rumours’ and ‘causing 
trouble’ (nao shi). It was also reported that blogger Chen Yunfei was arrested, 
imprisoned and beaten for urging people to organise a second stroll (Aboluo Xinwen 
(Aboluo News), 23 May 2008). Perhaps fearing an escalation of tension between officials 
and citizens, especially in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Ran posted an article 
online urging people not to organise a second stroll (Ran, 2008d). 
 
In the end, the Chengdu campaign does not appear to have been successful in suspending 
the two projects. However, the projects have been temporarily suspended pending further 
enquiry due to the tragic 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Pengzhou was seriously affected by 
the earthquake and, despite claims that the projects are safe, officials admitted that this 
may not be so in the case of natural disaster. It is unclear to what extent the activists 
involved in opposing the projects influenced this decision in any way, if at all. The 
earthquake may have presented officials with a face-saving way of cancelling the 
projects. However, officials did not come under the same amount of pressure as those in 
Xiamen, where much larger numbers of people expressed opposition. This might be due 
to difficulties in mobilising people who did not have a direct financial stake in opposing 
the projects. It also reflects the fact that local officials were successful in containing the 
issue at a local level. Although the public opposition was reported in the national media, 
it only received a fraction of the coverage given to other incidences of private interest 
activism examined in this chapter, and was largely dealt with at the local level. 
 
One interesting feature of the Chengdu campaign was that, unlike in Shanghai, Beijing 
and Xiamen, it was not primarily organised by homeowners. Activists acted purely out of 
a concern for Chengdu’s environment. Admittedly, the campaign was based a personal 
interest in living in a clean city rather than a concern for environmental issues more 
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broadly. And yet this is a significant departure from previous campaigns. It challenges 
the claim made by Benjamin Read (2007: 172) in relation to private interest activists that, 
‘their purposes are first and foremost economic’. The Chengdu case, and indeed the 
Xiamen, Beijing, and Shanghai cases, suggest that citizens are increasingly placing value 
on a clean environment and are willing to oppose projects that threaten this whether or 
not there are financial implications. In this sense, a wider environmental movement might 
develop out of homeowner movements. 
 
Significance of Private Interest Activism 
This section considers the significance of private interest activism and the linkages, or 
lack thereof, between public and private interest activists. 
 
Influence on governance outcomes and processes 
The four cases examined in this chapter share various similarities. In all four cases public 
consultation in the projects’ planning stages was either minimal or non-existent. Despite 
the existence of legislation that requires public participation in the EIA process, weak 
rule of law and a lack of accountability meant that this legislation was either ignored, as 
was the case in Xiamen, or public participation was included as something of a token 
gesture, which appears to have been the case in Beijing and Shanghai. However, in all of 
the cases examined above, Party-state officials came under pressure from private interest 
activists who partly framed their grievances as stemming from the lack of procedural 
correctness in terms of public participation and transparency. 
 
As a result of pressure from private interest activists, officials in Xiamen, Shanghai, and 
Beijing took steps to address public grievances. On one level, this led to the Xiamen PX 
plant being relocated, and the Shanghai Maglev and Liulitun waste incineration plant 
projects being suspended. On another level, addressing public grievances led to changes 
in the way in which the decision-making process was handled, at least in the public 
sphere. In all three cases, local officials responded to public pressure by adhering much 
more closely to public participation elements of environmental planning legislation. It 
was only after public demands for greater involvement that the officials in Xiamen, 
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Beijing, and Shanghai took steps to solicit public opinion. In Xiamen, officials provided 
channels through which citizens could express their opinions regarding the PX project, 
including a two-day public hearing that mimicked the ‘best practice’ example set by the 
Yuanmingyuan hearing as described in Chapter 4. Officials in Shanghai and Liulitun 
engaged with the public through holding discussions with residents. Also in Shanghai, the 
second EIA report was made available for public comment. In Beijing, private interest 
activists’ pressure led to the MEP’s administrative review. It should also ensure that the 
public will be consulted far more widely before a decision is made regarding the final 
location of the waste incineration plant. 
 
In the Chengdu case, however, private interest activists were not successful in changing 
the way in which local officials handled the project’s decision-making process. Rather 
than offering concessions to citizens by carrying out their public participation 
responsibilities, the local Party-state suppressed the activists instead. Security services 
appear to have successfully nipped dissent in the bud through arresting netizens and 
restricting mobile phone usage, even if they could not prevent several hundred residents 
from engaging in a stroll. This was also partly the case in Xiamen, where officials 
considered the possibility of tightening Internet controls through banning anonymous 
web postings (Associated Press, 6 July 2007), and some netizens were placed under 
house arrest. Yet in this case, support from local elites such as Zhao Yufen, substantial 
media interest, and a successful campaign that spread news of the PX plant all across the 
city that meant that opponents to the project mobilised in much greater numbers. The 
Chengdu case did not generate the same level of public support and/or media attention 
that was present in the other three cases. In any case, the Xiamen and Chengdu cases 
show that oppressing opponents rather than engaging with them through public 
participation mechanisms still appears to be the default setting for local officials, who, as 
Chapter 3 discussed, face considerable pressures and incentives to grow their economies. 
 
Linkages between public and private interest activists 
The cases examined in this chapter also reveal something about the nature of 
relationships between public and private interest activists. For example, Xiamen only has 
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one registered environmental NGO, Green Cross. It publicly stated its commitment to 
‘three no’s’ (san ge bu) in relation to the PX protests: ‘no’ to support, ‘no’ to opposition, 
and ‘no’ to participating in organisation (bu zhichi, bu fandui, bu canyu zuzhi) (Nanfang 
Zhoumo, 19 December 2007). In distancing itself from the private interest activists and 
refusing to become involved, Green Cross was criticised online by those who favoured a 
more contentious approach (Ibid.). In the Beijing case, residents from Liulitun did seek 
out NGO support (Feng, 2007). In January 2007, environmental NGO Global Village 
Beijing held a training session on harmful chemicals. Liulitun residents learnt of this in 
advance, and sent three representatives to take part. The three residents made use of 
experts who were present at the training session, repeatedly asking them about the 
potential dangers of waste incineration. In addition, the residents appealed to 
participating journalists to report on the incident, as well as asking NGOs to get involved 
(Ibid.). However, NGOs did not become involved in the incident, and the same was true 
of organisations in Shanghai and Chengdu. This suggests that NGOs are more concerned 
about maintaining a good relationship with Party-state officials rather than forming links 
with the ‘grassroots’. 
 
Although environmental organisations did not become involved in the cases discussed in 
this chapter, the presence of other actors suggests that the distinction between public and 
private interest activism is sometimes not so clear-cut. In Xiamen and Chengdu, bloggers 
who did not necessarily have a direct financial interest in events nevertheless played an 
important role. Both Lian Yue and Ran Yunfei could be described as ‘public interest’ 
bloggers in that they blog on a variety of subjects in the hope of promoting the public 
good. In the Xiamen and Chengdu cases, Lian and Ran helped mobilise citizens against 
the unpopular projects. In this sense, they crossed the divide between public and private 
interest activism and reach out to the ‘grassroots’ in a way that NGOs were unable to do. 
In China, netizens are better placed to form links with growing environmental discontent, 
due in part to their ‘fluid’ existence, than conventional NGOs. The Internet allows these 
individuals to pursue goals in ways that NGOs, which are easily identifiable and 
vulnerable to being closed down, cannot. 
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It is also important to note the role played by a small number of elites and experts. In 
Xiamen and Beijing, CPPCC members and scientific experts including Zhao Yufen and 
Zhou Yinfeng added legitimacy to the private interest activists’ campaigns by filing 
reports against the projects. It did so by indicating that there was elite sympathy for the 
activists. In addition, the reports provided authoritative sources of evidence supporting 
the activists’ positions. As noted above, the absence of similar support in relation to the 
Chengdu campaign was seen as a limiting factor in this case. 
 
A new prototype for environmental activism in China? 
The private interest activists examined in this chapter may not be recognisable as 
environmentalists, but they have campaigned for the right to enjoy a clean environment in 
the place that they live. The incidences of opposition to unpopular projects were very 
much localised, and activists did not campaign on behalf of people in different localities. 
In this sense, private interest activism in China does not amount to a genuine social 
movement. And yet there are important links between the cases studied in this chapter. 
Most notable among these is the similarity in terms of tactics. Thanks in part to a large 
amount of traditional media interest, and also due to the campaign’s successful outcome, 
the tactics employed by private interest activists in Xiamen, including the ‘stroll’ tactic 
and use of technology to overcome a lack of information, has become a prototype127 that 
has been copied elsewhere, most notably in Chengdu.128 One newspaper coined the 
phrase ‘discuss online, stroll offline’ (wang nei taolun, wang wai sanbu) to describe this 
new prototype for environmental activism.  
 
Another aspect that the four cases had in common was that participants partly framed 
their grievances with regards the poor enforcement of accountability, participation, and 
transparency mechanisms. This could have significant implications in the future. Private 
interest activism might continue to exert pressure on authorities to conduct more open 
                                                   
127 For a discussion on the significance of ‘prototypes’ in social movements, see Hill & Rothchild (1992). 
128 Citizens in Nanjing also cited the Xiamen case when confronted with the construction of a proposed PX 
plant in 2008. According to one Hong Kong media report, some citizens used the Internet to urge people to 
oppose the project in a similar fashion to the Xiamen residents (Singtaonet.com, 2 January 2008). However, 
there has been no large-scale protest in Nanjing along the lines of what occurred in Shanghai, Beijng, and 
Xiamen. 
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decision making processes with regards urban planning in the future. The case studies 
examined in this chapter suggest that it is becoming ever more difficult for officials to 
introduce controversial projects through the back door. Since the Xiamen PX incident, 
there is at the very least a very real possibility that citizens in other cities might be 
emboldened into adopting carefully organised contentious tactics. As certain citizens in 
Chengdu stated, if people in Xiamen can successfully oppose a huge PX plant, why can’t 
we? 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has found that private interest activism can be an important factor in 
promoting accountability, transparency, participation, and rule of law in China. In all four 
cases, activists attempted to hold officials to account for decisions to construct large-scale 
projects that would significantly affect people’s lives. Officials originally attempted to 
implement these projects with a minimum of public interference. And yet in each case, 
citizens mobilised in order to challenge these projects and demand that officials be 
responsive to their grievances. In Xiamen, Beijing, and Shanghai, officials responded in 
part by adopting a more transparent decision-making process that sought to incorporate 
public opinion. Levels of transparency and public participation were still low, and there is 
no indication that public comments as delivered via official mechanisms had any impact. 
However, ensuring greater transparency and participation is very important, especially in 
China where public involvement in decision-making is still extremely rare. From this 
perspective, the fact that officials in Xiamen, Beijing, and Shanghai changed their 
behaviour in relation to the three projects, should be seen as significant. By compelling 
officials to discharge their public participation requirements as mandated by law, citizens 
in these three cases also contributed to strengthening the rule of law. It is possible that 
private interest activism as described in this chapter will promote new, more participatory 
and transparent, governance norms. Officials may increasingly solicit public opinion in a 
meaningful way in order to pre-empt possible opposition. 
 
Despite the fact that officials in Xiamen, Beijing, and Shanghai sought greater formal 
public participation following the strolls, the large-scale protest element of the campaigns 
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had the greatest effect on officials’ behaviour. For example, although residents in Liulitun 
started to take action against the waste incineration plant from late 2005, it was only after 
their peaceful protest to the MEP’s headquarters that the latter took action and called for 
the project to be suspended pending further investigation. Similarly, officials in Xiamen 
and Shanghai also engaged with the public following citizens’ strolls. This suggests that 
merely calling on officials to consider public opinion is unlikely to be successful in China 
at present unless citizens can place pressure on officials through tactics such as highly 
publicised strolls. Indeed the solicitation of public opinion in these three cases was likely 
used as a way to placate citizens. As noted earlier, it was suggested that the decision to 
move the PX project away from Xiamen had already been taken before the public hearing 
took place. Carrying out public participation requirements also served as a delaying tactic 
and enabled officials to save face. This was particularly so in relation to the Xiamen case, 
where officials were subsequently praised for listening to public opinion and conducting 
an ‘open’ decision-making process. Hence, public participation legislation also plays a 
part in limiting social unrest. 
 
The four cases examined above show that public unrest can arise precisely because there 
are no effective channels allowing for meaningful public participation in planning 
decisions in China. Arguably the only viable option open to citizens wishing to oppose 
the projects was to mobilise and take to the streets in peaceful, but nevertheless clear, 
shows of disapproval. That they were able to mobilise, and were willing to take to the 
streets in what were, in Shanghai and Xiamen at least, fairly large scale gatherings, 
suggests that citizens have become emboldened in standing up to unpopular development 
projects. Due to a lack of opportunity to voice opinions through official channels, this 
type of tactic, although risky, is still appealing for citizens who may feel they have no 
other effective recourse to action. 
 
In all three cases, participants exhibited strong similarities with the rightful resistors 
identified by O’Brien and Li (2006), and also homeowner activists (Read, 2007; Zhu & 
Ho, 2008; Zhu & Wang, 2007-8). The netizens and private interest activists examined in 
this also displayed a strong awareness of their rights and relevant pieces of legislation, 
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and frequently cited these when promoting their cause. Another similarity with rightful 
resistance and homeowner groups was the relatively contentious tactics that activists 
employed. At the same time, however, private interest activism differs from these other 
forms of contentious politics. First, the incidents examined in this chapter move beyond a 
simple dichotomy of central government versus local government. Some of the decisions 
that activists attempted to overcome had often been made at the local and central levels. 
The projects in Xiamen, Shanghai, and Chengdu were all approved by central 
government ministries. Second, private interest activists examined in this chapter used 
the latest technology in the shape of mobile phones and the Internet in order to spread 
information and organise opposition. Netizens such as Lian Yue and Ran Yunfei played a 
key role in online discussions that spread information and helped coalesce and mobilise 
opposition. This new technology enabled citizens to overcome shortages in information 
arising from a tightly controlled local media. It also enabled greater numbers of citizens 
to join together in opposition. In Shanghai and Xiamen, this creative use of media 
attracted attention beyond the local level and ensured that central level officials 
intervened. This appears to have been an important factor in the success of these 
campaigns. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Since the start of its reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China has enjoyed 
remarkable success in terms of economic growth that has lifted tens of millions of people 
out of poverty and helped re-establish the country as a dominant force in global affairs. 
And yet, as the first chapter of this thesis noted, this has come at a huge environmental 
cost. Since the onset of the reforms, China’s environmental problems, including severe 
air and water pollution, desertification, and biodiversity loss have intensified. These 
environmental problems not only have growing implications for public health and social 
order, but also threaten China’s ability to sustain economic growth. Moreover, due to its 
size, rapid economic growth, and great demand for natural resources, the environmental 
implications of China’s economic miracle have truly global implications. How China 
resolves, or whether China can resolve, the tensions between increasing its people’s 
material living standards on the one hand, and providing an acceptable level of 
environmental protection on the other, is of fundamental importance to the country’s 
continued development. It is a subject that has captured the attention of commentators 
both domestically and internationally. 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that China suffers from a substantial environmental 
protection ‘implementation deficit’ (Weale, 1992), where legislative intent is not 
translated into action (Chan et al, 1995; Economy, 2005, 2007; Lo et al, 2006; Van Rooij, 
2006a; OECD, 2006). And yet, as various scholars have correctly pointed out, the 
Chinese government is currently in the process of reforming its system of environmental 
protection in order to improve environmental conditions and reduce the country’s 
environmental protection implementation deficit. As Neil Carter and Arthur Mol (2006) 
have argued, China’s environmental governance reforms partially reflect a ‘shift in 
governance’, whereby traditional regulatory policies are replaced, or supplemented, by 
new, more flexible policies and arrangements that do not solely rely on the authority of 
state actors and institutions (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). This conclusion is 
supported by a variety of other studies that highlight a growing diversity in China’s 
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system of environmental protection (Lo & Leung, 2000; Ho, 2001; Rock, 2002a, b; 
Economy, 2004a; Carter & Mol (eds.), 2007). These studies have greatly improved 
understandings of governance reforms and policy innovations designed to successfully 
resolve China’s environmental problems. However, there are still numerous gaps in our 
understanding of these reforms. This is partly due to the rapid pace at which these 
environmental governance reforms are emerging, which in itself highlights the growing 
seriousness with which environmental issues are being viewed. This in turn creates even 
greater demand for further detailed empirical research in this area. By presenting a 
detailed empirical examination of environmental governance reform in China, I have 
attempted to make a contribution in terms of addressing this demand. 
 
This thesis has employed an analytical framework based on ‘good governance’ criteria. It 
has analysed important developments in environmental governance processes in the PRC 
in the context of accountability, participation, transparency, and rule of law. In doing so, 
it has focused on the environmental state, which includes state agencies and their 
policies, and civil society, which incorporates ‘public’ and ‘private’ interest activism, and 
the media (Mol & Carter, 2006).  
 
I have shown that the Chinese Party-state’s policy of introducing new governance 
processes that go beyond a purely regulatory approach has gathered pace in the past few 
years. It has analysed important developments in the environmental state. The 
promulgation in 2003 of the EIA Law created the conditions necessary to incorporate 
public opinion into project planning through establishing formal public participation 
channels. The rights of the public to participate in the EIA process were clarified further 
with the 2006 promulgation of the Measures on Public Participation in EIA (Trial 
Version). Also in the past few years, the Party-state deepened its policy of information 
disclosure. In recent years, information has increasingly been used in order to pressurise 
polluters, for example through ‘naming and shaming’. Another important part of the 
government’s effort to promote greater transparency in environmental protection was the 
promulgation in 2008 of legislation that stipulates conditions and responsibilities for the 
disclosure of environmental information. Moreover, this thesis has shown how Ministry 
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of Environmental Protection (MEP) officials have attempted to take advantage of a policy 
window created by heightened concern for the environment among leadership elites since 
2002.129 The MEP has done so by introducing initiatives such as green GDP and 
environmental storms designed to change the behaviour of local officials through 
subjecting them to a higher level of accountability with regards environmental issues.  
 
This thesis has also revealed how civil society reacts to, and promotes, the MEP’s 
governance agenda as set out in the previous paragraph. It has shown how civil society 
actors playing the role of ‘policy pioneers’ can help consolidate governance reforms and 
promote new governance norms. It has demonstrated that public interest activists have 
attempted to advance governance reform within the one-party system. Both public and 
private interest activists have promoted accountability, transparency, participation, and 
rule of law in Chinese environmental governance. However, this has only been achieved 
to a limited degree. It could be argued that many of the developments in the 
environmental state and civil society examined in this thesis are highly significant in the 
PRC, and show how environmental issues can stimulate gradual political reform within 
the framework of an authoritarian political system. And yet, because of this authoritarian 
political system, these new governance processes are endowed with Chinese 
characteristics that ensure they differ significantly from governance reforms that have 
been introduced by other countries in order to better respond to environmental challenges 
(Weale, 1992; Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002; Durant et al (eds.), 2004; Fiorino, 2006). 
 
When examining the concepts of ‘shifts in governance’ in China, it is vital to understand 
how governance processes play out in the country’s one-party state. Failure to do so may 
result in the drawing of distorted or incorrect conclusions. In contrast to the argument 
advanced by Carter and Mol (2006: 341; Mol & Carter, 2006; Mol, 2006) that 
environmental governance reforms represent convergence with those carried out in 
advanced industrialised nations, I have found that there are serious limitations to using a 
‘governance’ approach in China. Based on thorough empirical research of several case 
                                                   
129 Before 2008, the MEP was referred to as the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). 
For clarity, this chapter uses the term ‘MEP’ when referring to the central level environmental protection 
agency both before and after this bureaucratic reorganisation. 
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studies, this thesis has argued that China’s authoritarian political system represents a 
major constraint on the promotion of a more inclusive environmental governance system 
in a similar vein to those systems adopted in advanced industrialised nations. For these 
reasons, I argue that the level of convergence between China’s system of environmental 
governance and those commonly found in OECD countries is likely to be very limited. 
 
This chapter is arranged as follows. First, it reviews the main findings from each chapter 
in this thesis. It then considers the implications of these findings for China’s 
environmental state and environmental civil society. Next, it examines obstacles that 
limit the effectiveness of a governance approach to environmental protection in China. 
This chapter then considers the implications of this thesis in terms of wider political 
reform in the PRC. Finally, this chapter discusses the limitations of this dissertation, 
before suggesting ways in China might attempt to develop its environmental governance 
in the future.  
 
Main Findings 
As Chapter 1 discussed, one of the most intractable problems associated with 
environmental governance in China is the existence of a serious environmental protection 
‘implementation deficit’. Chapter 2 mainly drew on secondary materials in order to 
analyse the evolution of China’s environmental state and civil society. It noted that the 
Chinese Party-state has gradually strengthened the environmental state in order to 
overcome this implementation deficit. China’s environmental state has been 
progressively improved since the early 1970s by raising the bureaucratic position of the 
central government’s environmental protection agency and its local level incarnations. 
Since the beginning of the reform era more, and better, environmental legislation has 
been promulgated. Chapter 2 confirmed that this process has continued up to the present. 
As of early 2008, the MEP has enjoyed full ministerial status. This means that it now has 
more formal authority than at any time in its history, and can participate in all State 
Council meetings and decisions. At the provincial level, a limited number of 
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) have been promoted to become departments 
(ting) in the local government. In addition, several supervision stations that report directly 
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to the MEP have been established. These stations do not come under the influence of pro-
growth local officials, and should in theory be able to improve the enforcement of 
environmental legislation. However, Chapter 2 found that the tension between vertical 
and horizontal levels has not been resolved. The MEP still does not enjoy direct control 
over EPBs. And even if direct control was achieved, it is unlikely that it would represent 
a ‘cure-all’ for China’s poor compliance record, because economic growth remains the 
top priority for local officials. Merely strengthening the environmental state has been 
insufficient to overcome the implementation deficit. 
 
Chapter 3 focused on the issue of official accountability. It did so by focusing on attempts 
to make local officials more accountable to higher levels of government. This chapter 
began by arguing that since 2002 the fourth generation leadership has emphasised 
environmental issues to the extent that there has been a paradigm shift in how the 
environment is perceived by leadership elites. Environmental issues are central to the 
Scientific Development Concept (SDC) and featured prominently in the 11th Five-Year 
Guidelines. In one sense, these developments support the observation made by Carter and 
Mol (2006: 341) that China has become more reflexive about its modernisation path and 
has recognised the need to shift to a more balanced mode of development. However, 
Chapter 3 found evidence to suggest that achieving this in practice is likely to be 
extremely difficult, and highly unlikely in the short term at least. This chapter examined 
two high profile initiatives launched by the MEP, namely attempts to calculate green 
GDP, and a series of so-called ‘environmental storms’ in which the MEP showed a 
previously lacking determination, backed up by the central leadership, to improve the 
enforcement of environmental legislation.130 Both were designed to influence the 
behaviour of local officials in order to help establish a new, more balanced development 
approach. The two initiatives also aimed to subject local officials to a greater degree of 
accountability for the environment. However, Chapter 3 found that neither initiative is 
likely to achieve this. 
 
                                                   
130 SEPA was promoted to become the MEP in 2008. 
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As Chapter 3 argued, the green GDP and environmental storm initiatives were made 
possible by a ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 2003) created by the new leadership’s 
paradigm shift. Both initiatives were closely related to the environmental protection goals 
of the SDC, and both were predicated on support from the central leadership. Despite 
having won support from political elites including Hu Jintao, however, the green GDP 
initiative has failed to achieve its goals. Opposition to green GDP from government 
officials at both central and local levels has proven sufficient to significantly downscale 
the project. Although the green GDP project is continuing, the unpopular decision to 
publish results and rank provinces was reversed indefinitely due to fierce opposition from 
provincial Party-state officials. In contrast, the three environmental storms that the MEP 
launched between 2005 and 2007 have arguably achieved their goals. However, by their 
very nature these are one-off campaigns that are based on ‘command-and-control’ tactics. 
Although environmental storms can hold officials and companies to account in the short-
term, they fail to address long-term issues of non-compliance with environmental 
legislation. Despite drawing public attention to the serious issue of poor environmental 
enforcement, the need to launch environmental storms merely highlights deeper-seated 
shortcomings in environmental law enforcement and official accountability. Both of these 
cases demonstrate the difficulties associated with attempts to hold local officials to 
account for environmental issues when economic growth continues to trump other goals. 
So far, the SDC and policies influenced by it have been largely unable to persuade local 
officials to develop in a more sustainable manner. If accountability for environmental 
protection is to be improved within the Party-state, a more fundamental restructuring of 
the cadre assessment system is required. 
 
Chapter 4 examined the issues of participation and accountability in Chinese 
environmental governance. It did so by analysing legislation promulgated by the Party-
state designed to facilitate formal public participation in environmental planning 
decisions. It focused on the environmental administrative licensing and EIA procedures. 
In 2003, clauses were included in the EIA Law that provide mechanisms to solicit public 
opinion, which can then be incorporated into the EIA process. This represents part of a 
policy to extend governance beyond the environmental state in order that non-state actors 
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can play a greater role in environmental protection. Chapter 4 examined this policy in the 
context of China’s first ever national level environmental public hearing at Beijing’s 
Yuanmingyuan (Old Summer Palace). The public hearing provided a platform where 
members of the public and government officials could openly debate the issues 
surrounding a controversial ‘leak prevention project’ (fangshen gongcheng) 
commissioned by Yuanmingyuan officials.  
 
The Yuanmingyuan hearing was carried out in a transparent manner. It was broadcast live 
on the Internet, the EIA report for the project was made publicly available, and there was 
extensive media coverage. Despite representing an example of ‘best practice’ in terms of 
Chinese public hearings however, the Yuanmingyuan case suggests that the extent to 
which the public can participate meaningfully in decision-making processes via such 
mechanisms is still very limited. Even though the hearing was supposed to showcase a 
more participatory decision-making process, the final decision was apparently not 
affected by the public hearing. This in turn suggests that formal public participation 
channels need to develop further and more independently if they are to effectively hold 
officials to account. 
 
Chapter 4 also examined formal public participation in hydropower development in 
Yunnan. In 2005 and 2008, public interest activists had tried and failed to persuade the 
central authorities to carry out formal public participation in relation to proposed dam 
construction on the Nu River. However, the level of transparency and participation in a 
decision-making process concerning a hydropower project at Ahai in Yunnan, starting in 
2008, was unprecedented in the PRC. NGO representatives were invited to take part in an 
experts’ meeting, and the EIA report was made available for public comments. And yet 
this case also highlighted weaknesses in formally mandated public participation in China. 
Activists complained that the EIA report was, in line with legislation, only an abridged 
version. This affected their ability to provide comments. In addition, the project was 
already well underway at by the time the experts’ meeting was convened. This suggests 
that, rather than being an effective channel through which to hold officials to account, 
this meeting only facilitated tokenistic participation. 
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Despite the deficiencies associated with formal public participation identified in Chapter 
4, the Yuanmingyuan and Yunnan hydropower cases highlighted and tested a new type of 
decision-making process. This is important in terms of improving environmental 
governance in the longer-term. In this regard, civil society has played an important part in 
promoting the implementation of new governance processes. Environmental NGOs and 
the media were very active in the Yuanmingyuan incident. As ‘policy pioneers’, they 
helped publicise the public hearing process through organising meetings and producing 
newspaper articles. Furthermore, activists at Ahai also broke new ground in taking part 
in, and therefore helping advance, a more participatory and transparent governing process 
regarding hydropower development. Although in the short term formal channels for 
public participation are relatively poor avenues for public input, activists’ promotion of 
these new mechanisms by taking every opportunity to put them into practice may 
contribute to better governance processes taking hold in future. It is possible that this 
could lead to greater official accountability, transparency, and participation in the long 
term. However, if this does occur, it is likely to be a very gradual process. 
 
Chapter 5 focused on how transparency is being improved in Chinese environmental 
protection. It found that since the turn of the century, the Party-state has significantly 
stepped up its policy regarding environmental information disclosure. Although still low, 
the amount of environmental information in the public sphere has increased in the past 
few years. Environmental protection authorities are increasingly using ‘naming and 
shaming’ tactics in order to pressurise polluters that escape censure from the regulatory 
system. Since May 2008, when the Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure 
(MEID) came effect, the policy of disclosing environmental information has gathered 
further pace. The MEP hopes that providing the public with greater access to information 
will enable citizens to ‘supervise’ polluters and boost accountability. 
 
Chapter 5 also looked at how environmental NGOs have responded to the recent Party-
state emphasis on increasing transparency. It also examined the extent to which 
information disclosure can be used by NGOs to promote greater accountability. 
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Deepening the policy of information disclosure has enabled NGOs to move into new 
areas of activism. The activities of the NGO Institute of Public and Environmental 
Affairs (IPE), founded in 2006, are based on information disclosure. Chapter 5 also 
examined two NGO campaigns: the ‘Green Choice’ campaign, as well as a campaign that 
aimed to prevent the paper manufacturer Gold East Paper (GEP) and six of its 
subsidiaries from listing shares on the Shanghai stock exchange due to the companies’ 
poor environmental records. Both campaigns were strongly reliant on accessing publicly 
available environmental information. These cases, as well as the establishment of IPE, 
show that developments in the environmental state have provided additional space for 
environmental activism.  
 
However, although legislation such as the MEID is intended to facilitate public 
supervision of officials and polluting enterprises, the channels for exercising this 
supervision remain limited. The two NGO campaigns analysed in Chapter 5 did not 
significantly improve accountability. The ‘Green Choice’ campaign did have some 
success in targeting multi-national corporations (MNCs), several of which agreed to be 
subjected to third-party inspections in order that the companies’ names would be 
removed from the NGOs’ ‘name and shame’ list. Yet the campaign has had a negligible 
impact on domestic companies. The campaign against GEP and its subsidiaries did hold 
parent company Asia Pulp and Paper Company Limited (APP) to a greater level of 
account than it would otherwise have been subjected to. APP China denied NGO 
criticism of its environmental performance through several media articles. In this sense, it 
engaged with the Chinese public. However, Chapter 5 found that NGOs were unable to 
exert significant pressure on APP China. 
 
The NGO campaigns examined in Chapter 5 also demonstrate how public interest 
activists attempt to pioneer policies by promoting new governance norms and legislation. 
Although many enterprises ignored the calls from NGOs to adhere to information 
disclosure legislation, activists were still able to bring attention to these policies and 
attempt to put them into practice. Although the Green Choice campaign has failed to hold 
domestic firms to account, it was more successful with regards MNCs. In the longer term 
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it is possible that this could lead to a trickle-down effect and stimulate better adherence to 
environmental legislation by domestic companies within and beyond the MNCs’ supply 
chains. On the whole, however public interest activists have been unable to put 
significant pressure on the vast majority of enterprises via the use of publicly disclosed 
information. The reliance on non-contentious tactics reflects a major limitation in 
Chinese public interest activism. Unlike NGOs in liberal democracies, Chinese NGOs 
purely rely on non-contentious tactics. Engaging in activities such as boycotts or 
demonstrations is politically risky for Chinese NGOs. In addition, pursuing polluting 
enterprises through litigation is fraught with difficulties due to the influence that Party-
state officials exercise over the courts. As a result, Chinese environmental NGOs are 
limited in the extent to which they can use publicly available information to hold 
polluters to account. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 focused on the extent to which environmental ‘private interest 
activism’ can promote ‘good governance’ in China. It examined four cases of how private 
interest activists in Xiamen, Shanghai, Beijing, and Chengdu organised relatively large-
scale peaceful protests between 2007 and 2008 against planned projects that they saw as 
detrimental to their own private interests. Through taking to the streets in peaceful 
marches that were dubbed ‘strolls’ rather than demonstrations, activists put pressure on 
officials and won significant concessions. Activists in three of the cases managed to 
change outcomes in relation to the projects. The Xiamen PX plant was eventually 
relocated to another Fujian province city. The Shanghai Maglev project and waste 
incineration project at Liulitun were both put on hold. This shows how private interest 
activists’ use of contentious tactics that are located at the boundaries of acceptability in 
China, can be effective in terms of changing decisions and holding officials to account. 
Not all cases were successful, however. The authorities in Chengdu managed to limit the 
size of the stroll, and although the projects in Pengzhou were scrapped, this was 
apparently due to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. 
 
As well as changing outcomes in some cases, private interest activists also had an impact 
on governance processes. In all four cases detailed in Chapter 6, activists demanded 
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greater accountability, transparency, participation, and adherence to legislation from 
Party-state officials. In Chengdu, local officials ignored these demands and the decision-
making process in relation to the Pengzhou projects was not changed to incorporate 
public opinion. However, in the other three cases activists were successful in persuading 
local officials to open up previously closed decision-making processes. In Xiamen, 
officials responded to the activists’ stroll by soliciting public opinion on the PX plant and 
convening a public hearing. In Shanghai, officials provided opportunities for public 
comment on the Maglev project’s second EIA report, and also met with local residents. 
And, in Beijing, the MEP accepted a request for administrative review into the decision 
by the Beijing municipal EPB to approve the Liulitun waste incineration plant’s EIA 
report. Additionally, in the Xiamen case, activists made use of modern communications 
technology in order to break the monopoly on information that officials had attempted to 
preserve. In doing so, these activists became a force for transparency by ensuring that 
relevant information about the project was circulated. Chapter 6 showed that private 
interest activists can help to reinforce new governance processes and, potentially, aid in 
the establishment of new environmental governance norms and promote good 
governance. 
 
Developments in the Environmental State 
As well as strengthening the environmental state through bureaucratic promotions and 
better legislation, it is also being improved in other ways. The current leadership’s 
emphasis on a new development paradigm has raised the profile of environmental issues 
and has enabled the MEP to introduce unprecedented policies such as green GDP and 
environmental storms. In addition, and as discussed below, since 2002 the Party-state has 
placed issues such as public participation and government transparency on the Chinese 
political agenda. These two factors have helped facilitate policies to strengthen the 
environmental state by promulgating legislation that extends governance to non-state 
actors. The aim is to enable the public to hold officials and polluters to account regarding 
the implementation of environmental policies. Although these developments have 
strengthened China’s environmental state and should therefore be viewed positively, so 
far they have not gone nearly far enough towards addressing the implementation deficit. 
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China’s New Development Paradigm 
The seriousness with which China’s ‘fourth generation’ leadership views environmental 
issues is unprecedented in the history of the PRC. Since 2002, environmental issues have 
been given a new ‘strategic’ place in China’s development strategy. Leadership elites 
have attempted to change the trajectory of China’s economic development by making it 
more environmentally sustainable. This is evident through policies such as the SDC and 
the 11th Five-year Guidelines that emphasise environmental protection and energy 
conservation. Central leadership support has undoubtedly contributed to a strengthening 
of China’s environmental state, as well as raising the profile of environmental issues. 
And yet putting these ambitious policies into effect has proven difficult. 
 
The MEP has been able to place itself at the forefront of the creation of a more balanced 
development path. It is likely that this partially represents a strategic move on behalf of 
the MEP in order to increase its bureaucratic clout. So far, this appears to have been 
successful. Support from central elites enabled the MEP to carry out its green GDP and 
environmental storm initiatives. This was significant because through these schemes, the 
MEP has challenged powerful vested interests that it would otherwise have been 
powerless to confront. Although these two schemes are unlikely to change the behaviour 
of local officials, they do show that the MEP is in a position to benefit from growing 
concern among the country’s elites for environmental issues by contributing to the 
forging of a more balanced development path in China. 
 
Another important consequence of the growing support for environmental issues among 
China’s leadership elites is that responsibility for environmental protection is increasingly 
moving beyond the sole domain of one ministry. Powerful ministries such as the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) are increasingly taking environmental 
issues more seriously. This was apparent in the NDRC’s support for the MEP’s 
environmental storms, which in itself sent out a powerful signal against careless and 
unrestrained development. Another sign of growing resolution to tackle environmental 
issues in the NDRC was the appointment in 2007 of former MEP head Xie Zhenhua as a 
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vice-minister.131 Xie was given responsibility for overseeing work to improve energy 
efficiency and reduce sulphur dioxide emissions (Associated Press, 7 January 2007). This 
indicates a strong determination on behalf of the central leadership to meet these targets. 
The energy efficiency and pollution reduction targets contained in the 11th Five-Year 
Guidelines are being taken very seriously by leadership elites. To date, however, results 
regarding these targets have been mixed. As Chapter 3 noted, initial targets to reduce 
energy intensity have not been met. This echoes previous failures to meet environmental 
protection targets set by the central authorities. This suggests that these targets need to be 
backed up with more concrete action in order to persuade local officials to develop their 
economies in a more environmentally sustainable fashion. Whether or not this will 
happen is open to debate. 
 
Public Participation and Information Disclosure 
Since 2003, environmental public participation has been firmly on the MEP’s agenda. 
The Chinese Party-state has promulgated legislation in public participation and 
information disclosure designed to extend governance to non-state actors. This forms part 
of an attempt by the MEP to establish a ‘comprehensive social supervision structure’ 
(jianquan shehui jiandu jizhi). This framework does not aim to provide the public with a 
platform from which to challenge the Party-state. Rather, it represents a top-down attempt 
to prescribe, based on legal rights, a rather narrowly defined role for the public in 
environmental protection in order that the public can improve the efficacy of the centre’s 
environmental policies.  
 
The promulgation of the 2003 EIA Law was a watershed in terms of the promotion of 
formal public participation in China. One of the most significant aspects of this law (and 
its implementing measures) was the way in which it provided channels, such as public 
hearings, surveys, and questionnaires, for public participation in the EIA and 
administrative licensing processes. Since 2003, the policy of promoting formal public 
participation has undoubtedly gathered pace. The promulgation of the EIA Law was 
followed by the issuance of the ‘Temporary Measures for Environmental Protection 
                                                   
131 Xie Zhenhua stepped down from the MEP in the wake of the Songhua River Disaster in late 2005. 
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Administrative Licensing Hearings’ (hereinafter ‘ALL Measures’) in 2004. And, in 2006, 
the Temporary Measures on Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment’ 
(hereinafter ‘EIA Measures’) were promulgated. One important effect of this legislation 
has been to give legal backing for the public to play a limited role in environmental 
protection.  
 
The environmental state has also increased the role of information disclosure in 
environmental protection. For several years before 2008, the MEP had increasingly 
sought to use tactics such as ‘naming and shaming’ in order to exert pressure on polluters. 
In the 1990s, information disclosure had been mainly limited to ‘state of the 
environment’ reports that did not target polluting enterprises. The MEID, which came 
into effect in 2008, represents a further deepening of the policy of using information in 
order to overcome China’s implementation deficit.  
 
There is significant support within the MEP for extending governance to non-state actors 
via innovative legislation. At the same time, this is still a relatively new policy in China 
that has not been uncontested. Implementation of this legislation is very limited at 
present. This limits the extent to which members of the public can participate in 
environmental governance through formal channels in order to hold officials to account. 
Effective capacity building, as well as a significant cultural change in how officials 
interact with the public, are arguably required if the latter is to play a greater part in 
environmental governance through formal channels. At present, incorporating public 
opinion into decisions through formal channels is very much the exception rather than the 
rule. And while disclosure of information has increased in recent years, transparency in 
environmental governance remains limited. High profile cases such as the Yuanmingyuan 
and Xiamen public hearings discussed in this thesis are very important in terms of raising 
awareness among officials and citizens about formal public participation mechanisms in 
China. However, the policy of extending governance through legislation has to date 
proven far from sufficient in order to overcome China’s immediate environmental 
concerns. 
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The Role of Pan Yue 
MEP Vice-Minister Pan Yue has played a central role in advocating a new style of 
environmental governance in China. Pan’s background places him as one of China’s 
political elites. His parents have reportedly been close to former president Jiang Zemin 
for several decades. In addition, Pan’s former father-in-law Liu Huaqing used to be vice-
chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party (Asia Times 
Online, 16 March 2005). Pan is considered to be both outspoken and also something of a 
political reformer. For example, in 2001 he presented the then president Jiang Zemin with 
a controversial report in which he argued for reform of the CCP (Ibid.). He has also been 
forthright in admitting the scale of China’s environmental problem (see, for example, 
Spiegel, 7 March 2005). According to an article in Business Week (11 July 2005), ‘Pan 
can take credit for igniting an important national debate on whether China is sacrificing 
its environment to its runaway growth’. 
 
It is difficult to determine exactly how influential Pan has been in pushing for a new form 
of environmental governance in China. However, it is clear that Pan is closely associated 
with the various governance initiatives examined in this thesis. He appears to have played 
a central role in each of them. For the past few years, Pan has continuously argued that 
China needs to enlist the support of the public and the media in environmental protection. 
He has played a prominent role in promoting public participation (including the 
Yuanmingyuan public hearing). Pan has also been one of the main advocates for greater 
transparency in environmental governance. He has been at the forefront of the MEP’s 
drive to increase public disclosure of environmental information. In addition, Pan was 
closely associated with the green GDP and environmental storm initiatives. As Chapter 3 
noted, he fielded numerous interviews and earned the nickname ‘whirlwind Pan’ from 
journalists due to his role in launching the environmental storms. The publicity that these 
environmental governance reform initiatives enjoyed appears to have been largely a 
result of Pan’s efforts.  
 
The key role played by Pan might have implications for the future sustainability of 
environmental governance reform in China. According to one reporter, the current 
  
211 
211 
leadership’s decision to pursue a new development path has made it easier for an 
‘individual’ (gexing) official such as Pan to emerge (Nanfang Zhoumo, 9 February 2006). 
Pan has enjoyed political support for his outspokenness due to his family background but 
also because the Hu/Wen leadership is more committed to environmental issues (New 
Statesman, 18 December 2006). However, Pan has also ruffled a few feathers during his 
time at the MEP. Some cite this as a reason why he has not been promoted above the rank 
of Vice-Minister (The Weekly Standard, 9 April 2007).132 Pan’s prominence with regards 
environmental governance reform might be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, and 
as argued below, many of the reforms advocated by Pan have consequences for political 
reform. If allowed to continue, they might ultimately result in a more transparent and 
participatory system of environmental governance based on rule of law, citizens’ rights, 
and greater official accountability. However, if Pan was removed from office or became a 
victim of political circumstances, reforms designed to hold the CCP to greater account for 
environmental protection might stall. The role of elites such as Pan in environmental 
governance reform in China is poorly understood, and is an area deserving of future 
research. 
 
Implications for Environmental Civil Society  
Environmental Protection ‘Policy Pioneers’ 
As Chapter 1 noted, various studies have examined environmental activism in the context 
of state-society relations (and state-NGO relations in particular). Existing studies focus 
on the power relationship between the Party-state and environmental activists. For 
example, Tony Saich (2000) has claimed that NGOs are engaged in a symbiotic 
relationship with the Party-state. Although NGOs rely on the Party-state for legitimacy, 
the former have been able to ‘negotiate the state’ and carve out a position for themselves 
whilst minimising state penetration into their activities (Ibid.). Peter Ho and Richard 
Edmonds have further developed understandings of this symbiotic relationship between 
state and civil society through their ‘embedded activism’ concept (2007; Ho, 2007). They 
argue that environmental activists are ‘embedded’ in the Party-state. As long as activists 
                                                   
132 After MEP Minister Xie Zhenhua stepped down in the wake of the Songhua River disaster, he was 
replaced by Zhou Shengxian. Zhou’s background was as an official in the State Forestry Bureau, and he 
was seen as lacking strong environmental protection credentials. 
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practice self-censorship and do not challenge the central Party-state, they are allowed to 
operate relatively unobstructed in China’s authoritarian political milieu. By developing 
close personal ties (guanxi) with officials, environmental activists can be effective in 
China (Ibid.).  
 
The concepts of negotiating the state and embedded activism are revealing about the 
power relationship that exists between environmental activists and the Party-state. They 
reveal the extent to which the Party-state tolerates the existence of a Chinese non-state 
sector. And, as noted above, these approaches acknowledge the important role that 
informal personal connections play between Party-state officials and environmental 
activists. At the same time, these approaches fail to capture the ways in which 
environmental civil society in China is developing in response to new environmental 
policies. The ‘governance’ approach employed by this thesis highlights the ways in 
which environmental activists respond to innovative developments within the 
environmental state designed to create a more participatory style of environmental 
governance. By examining interactions between the environmental state and civil society, 
the governance approach reveals how environmental activists can promote and 
consolidate new governance processes and/or policies that originate in the environmental 
state. Hence, this thesis has shown that activists do not only cultivate personal ties with 
Party-state officials, they also react to, and exert influence on, the emerging 
environmental ‘governance’ agenda that this thesis has documented. The concept of 
‘policy pioneers’, introduced by this thesis, captures this role. Although it is not in 
conflict with the notion of ‘embedded activism’, the policy pioneers concept reveals how 
state-society relations in China’s environmental sphere are developing in new ways. 
 
Policy pioneers is a new conceptualisation that highlights a different aspect of state-
society relations from those that have been articulated in existing studies. In the wider 
literature concerning environmental governance, the term ‘policy pioneers’ has been used 
to describe countries that introduce new and untested environmental policies (see, for 
example, Jänicke, 2005). Others have conflated the term with John Kingdon’s (2003) 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Stead, 2008). I argue, however, that the two terms are 
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distinguishable from one another. Moreover, the concept of policy pioneers as applied by 
this thesis to Chinese environmental civil society differs from these previous uses of the 
term. 
 
Chinese policy pioneers can also be distinguished from the environmental activist ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ introduced by Andrew Mertha (2008) in his investigation of Chinese 
hydropower politics. Policy entrepreneurs have been defined as, ‘advocates willing to 
invest their resources … into a problem in order to gain benefit’ (Kingdon, 2003: 179). In 
the Chinese context, Mertha (2008) suggests that cleavages in China’s fragmented 
political system that occur, for example, along territorial or jurisdictional lines, can be 
used by environmental activists in order to advance their own agendas. In contrast, 
‘policy pioneers’ contribute to strengthening policies designed to extend environmental 
governance by putting these policies into practice. The term ‘pioneer’ captures the way in 
which these activists are forerunners who explore and sometimes ‘colonise’ new territory 
created by policies originating from the environmental state. Through their actions, 
policy pioneers can ‘bring to life’ policies that might otherwise be ignored by local 
officials. In so doing, these activists can pave the way for others to follow by helping to 
establish new environmental governance norms based on developments in the 
environmental state. 
 
This thesis has further contributed to understandings of state-society relations in China by 
disaggregating Chinese environmental activism into public and private interest activism. 
This is an important distinction, because these activists behave, and potentially influence 
governance processes, in different ways. And yet previous studies of Chinese 
environmental civil society have largely ignored the impact that private interest activists 
have (for a rare exception see Zhu & Ho, 2008). By differentiating between public and 
private interest activism, it is possible to assess how different types of activist influence 
environmental governance, and ‘pioneer’ environmental protection policies in China.  
 
The environmental governance reforms examined in this thesis have enabled public 
interest activists to move into new areas of activism. They have been able to do so due to 
  
214 
214 
new policies, rather than through a reliance on personal connections. This is an important 
finding, as previous studies have not examined the link between environmental 
‘governance’ policies and civil society.133 For example, the deepening of the 
government’s environmental information policy as discussed in Chapter 5 has provided 
new space for environmental activists to move into. Since 2006, NGOs have attempted to 
use publicly disclosed information to hold polluting enterprises to account. The most 
notable of these organisations is IPE, which only exists because information disclosure 
has been promoted by the environmental state. In other words, the emergence of a 
Chinese NGO dedicated to the dissemination of environmental information has only been 
made possible due to the deepening of the government’s environmental information 
disclosure agenda. Following the emergence of IPE, other organisations such as Friends 
of Nature and Global Village Beijing have also joined campaigns that use publicly 
disclosed information. These campaigns also rely on the legitimacy that has been 
provided as a result of the governmnet’s information disclosure policy. This has enabled 
environmental NGOs to move into, and ‘colonise’ space that has been opened up by 
developments in the environmental state. In doing so, these organisations arguably raise 
the profile of information disclosure and help to ensure that this policy is put into practice 
in real-life situations. 
 
Since 2004, public interest activists have also attempted to promote formal public 
participation. Stimulating governance change within China’s one-party political system 
has become a goal in itself for many public interest activists. NGOs that played an active 
role in the Yuanmingyuan incident were more focused on helping pioneer the policy of 
public hearings than they were about the outcome in this case. In one sense, it appears 
that these NGOs wished to lend support to the MEP and its policy of public participation. 
In another sense, however, public interest activists view the creation of a more 
participatory approach to environmental protection as a key long-term goal. This is 
because they believe that public participation is a vital element of China’s environmental 
                                                   
133 Peter Ho (2001) has linked the emergence of Chinese environmental NGOs with what he terms the 
‘greening’ of the Chinese state. However, he does not refer to any specific policies. Rather, he bases his 
finding on the perceived link between greater governmental concern for environmental issues and the 
emergence of a space for NGOs to operate in. 
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protection strategy and that it will ultimately lead to better environmental outcomes. As a 
result, they have shown an eagerness to promote new governance policies. Public interest 
activists also highlighted the lack of public participation and transparency in the Nu River 
case. This appears to have contributed to the opening up of formal public participation 
channels in relation to the Ahai hydropower project. Through taking part in the Ahai 
experts’ hearing and by submitting comments on the project’s EIA, activists ensured that 
public participation procedures were carried out in practice, even though this represented 
an unsatisfactory level of participation. Through patiently engaging with new governance 
processes, public interest activists aim to play a long-term role in gradually affecting 
better environmental governance within China’s authoritarian political environment. 
 
Private interest activists can also act as policy pioneers, although they fulfil this role in a 
different way from public interest activists. In contrast to public interest activists, private 
interest activists do not view the establishment of new governance norms as a goal in 
itself. Neither do private interest activists hope to pioneer environmental governance 
policies in the long-term. For these activists, short-term outcomes are the most pressing 
issue. They are not interested in long-term environmental protection. Yet in pursuing 
these short-term goals, private interest activists can nonetheless help pioneer new 
governance policies. The private interest activists that I have examined have called on 
Party-state officials to enforce public participation and information disclosure legislation. 
This is not based on a desire to consolidate governance reforms per se. Rather, it is based 
on the hope that a more participatory decision-making process will help further these 
activists’ goals. In some cases, pressure exerted by activists on local officials through 
their ‘stroll’ tactics was sufficient to make the latter adopt a more consultative stance 
regarding the projects in question. This was most notable in the case of Xiamen, where 
public pressure led to a two-day strategic EIA public hearing. Activists also changed the 
way in which officials interacted with the public in the Beijing and Shanghai cases. By 
pressing officials to discharge their public participation responsibilities, private interest 
activists can raise the profile of new governance policies and promote the enforcement of 
these policies that would otherwise go unenforced. This is the case despite the fact that, 
for private intererst activists, the consolidation of new governance norms is not an end in 
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itself. In this sense, private interest activists also pioneer new policies because they can 
also help ensure that public participation and information disclosure policies are carried 
out in practice.  
 
Finally, the role of the media in pioneering new policies has also been identified as 
important by this thesis. Chapter 3 noted how a large amount of media reporting raised 
the profile of the green GDP and environmental storm initiatives. The media has also 
been important in raising awareness of new policy instruments such as public hearings. 
Media coverage generated by incidents such as the Yuanmingyuan public hearing is 
arguably vital in terms of helping establish new policy mechanisms. Organisers of the 
Xiamen hearing, for example, had a precedent on which to draw due to the high profile 
nature of the Yuanmingyuan hearing. Additionally, participants could learn about the 
hearing process through reference to the widely reported Yuanmingyuan case. This might 
have been a factor in demands from private interest activists that authorities convene a 
public hearing. Furthermore, the media has also played an important part in promoting 
environmental information disclosure. It has exposed companies through ‘naming and 
shaming’. In addition, it was an integral part of the NGO campaigns against polluting 
companies described in Chapter 5. 
 
Limits to Convergence 
One of the central questions that I have sought to address is the extent to which the 
Chinese central government can use a ‘governance’ approach in order to achieve better 
environmental outcomes. It has been argued that a more flexible and diverse governance 
approach can lead to better environmental protection when replacing, or working 
alongside, a traditional regulatory approach (Fiorino et al (eds.), 2004). As discussed in 
Chapter 1, there is a growing realisation that governments alone cannot solve the 
increasingly complex, diverse, and severe nature of many environmental issues. In 
addition, the traditional policy paradigm is prone to implementation deficit. As a result, it 
has been suggested that governments should reach out to non-state actors, as well as 
adopt policies that go beyond a regulatory approach, in order to improve environmental 
protection efforts. To what extent are we witnessing new governance processes and 
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structures in China, and how effective are these in terms of improving the country’s 
environmental governance system? These questions have important implications not just 
for China, but also for the wider governance literature. 
 
This thesis has identified examples of how a governance approach to environmental 
protection is continuing to emerge in China. In this sense, I have found added evidence to 
support the argument put forward by Neil Carter and Arthur Mol (2006) that China is 
developing a more diverse governance approach to environmental protection. As Carter 
and Mol (2006: 334) state, employing a wider range of policy instruments is indicative of 
a governance approach to environmental protection. As this thesis has noted, the Chinese 
Party-state has introduced various new policy instruments designed to improve officials’ 
accountability for environmental issues, promote public participation via mechanisms 
that incorporate public opinion into planning projects, and advance environmental 
information disclosure. These measures go beyond a purely regulatory approach to 
environmental protection.  
 
At the same time, however, China’s authoritarian political system naturally exercises a 
huge influence on the emergence of new governance processes and structures. This 
guarantees that, to the extent that China is moving towards a more diverse governance 
approach to environmental protection, it is one that will be endowed with Chinese 
characteristics. China’s one-party political system presents sizable obstacles to a 
governance approach that allows non-state actors to play a greater role in environmental 
protection. Weak rule of law and lack of transparency inhibit the extent to which the PRC 
can implement a governance approach at present. In addition, officials have been able to 
resist attempts to hold them to account for environmental issues, and public participation 
remains tightly restricted by the Party-state. For these reasons, this thesis finds that 
convergence between China’s system of environmental protection and those of OECD 
countries has been very limited, and that this is likely to remain the case for the 
foreseeable future. 
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Environmental Protection in China: Towards ‘Good Governance’? 
Accountability, transparency, participation, and rule of law have been conceptualised by 
the World Bank (1992) as ‘good governance’. The good governance framework is useful 
because it enables analysis and evaluation of governance reform based on a break down 
of these four constituent parts. 
 
The Chinese Party-state has taken steps to improve official accountability to higher levels 
of government for environmental protection. Greater central leadership support for 
environmental protection is helping facilitate this trend. Ensuring greater official 
accountability is vital if the central leadership is to successfully set China onto a more 
environmentally sustainable development trajectory. However, only very limited progress 
has been made in this regard. Attempts to make officials more accountable to higher 
levels for environmental protection through the green GDP initiative met with strong 
resistance because officials are still encouraged to pursue rapid economic growth. This 
highlights the difficulties of introducing greater official accountability when economic 
growth remains one of the country’s primary goals. 
 
The Party-state has also taken steps towards empowering the public to hold officials to 
account for environmental issues. Since 2003 it has promulgated important legislation 
that for the first time provides formal channels for proactive public participation in 
decision making processes. Despite these reforms, however, public participation in 
environmental protection remains limited. As I have argued above, these formal channels 
for public participation have so far failed to give the public a meaningful role in decision 
making processes. To a large extent, citizens’ participation in public hearings and through 
submitting comments on EIA reports has been tokenistic. In addition, formal public 
participation in decision making processes is still very much the exception rather than the 
rule. At the same time, participation in China’s environmental sphere is developing in 
other ways. As others have noted, public complaints have increased significantly and can 
be an effective form of participation (Dasgupta & Wheeler, 1996; Brettell, 2008). The 
growth of private interest activism also suggests that reactive participation is still by far 
the most effective means of influencing policies and holding officials to account. 
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Members of the public are developing innovative means for participation that make use 
of modern technology for mobilisation and awareness raising purposes. It is possible that 
in future the Party-state will try to pre-empt this type of activity by improving channels 
for public participation in order to internalise unrest within the system. Despite some 
notable successes, reactive participation tends to be ad hoc and subject to local and 
circumstantial variations. It is therefore not always a reliable form of public participation. 
 
Improving transparency in environmental protection has been identified as another 
important area of environmental governance reform by the Chinese authorities. There has 
been some progress with regards information disclosure. Since the mid-1990s the media 
has played an important role in publicising pollution incidents. More recently, officials 
have increasingly ‘named and shamed’ polluters. Arguably the most high profile example 
of this was during the environmental storms, which MEP officials carried out to a large 
extent in the public sphere via the media. Since the late 1990s there has been an increase 
in the amount of environmental information available to the public, particularly regarding 
pollution levels in urban areas. In some cases this is demand-driven, as the public is 
increasingly demanding greater transparency from government officials. Citizens can be 
an important force in promoting greater transparency in China. The private interest 
activists in this dissertation were successful in pressurising officials to operate more 
transparently. These success stories were, however, isolated cases based on single issues. 
On the whole, transparency remains limited, particularly when officials want to ensure 
that lucrative but potentially controversial projects meet a minimum of public opposition. 
Although the MEID is a significant symbolic step towards greater transparency in 
environmental protection, there have been difficulties enforcing it. The MEID also has 
various loopholes that companies have already exploited. Although progress has been 
made in the promotion of greater transparency, much more still needs to be done. 
 
The governance reforms in this thesis also have implications for rule of law in China’s 
environmental sphere. Public participation and information disclosure are increasingly 
being conceptualised as legal rights that officials are duty-bound to respect. The public’s 
‘right to know’, ‘right to supervise’, and ‘right to participate’, however, are a long way 
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from being institutionalised in China. In some cases, environmental activists have 
attempted to enforce these rights. This arguably contributes to a strengthening of the rule 
of law, even if activists fail to ensure that these rights are upheld. Rule of law has also 
been promoted in other ways, albeit again to a limited degree. For example, campaigns 
such as environmental storms can stimulate adherence to environmental legislation. 
However, this is only the case in the short term for the duration of the campaign. On the 
whole, rule of law is still weak in relation to environmental protection. 
  
Governance deficits 
This thesis has found that only very limited progress towards ‘good governance’ has been 
made in China’s environmental protection sphere. One of the main obstacles to China 
adopting a more diverse environmental governance approach is a series of ‘governance 
deficits’ (Howell, 2004b: 227), which persist as a result of reluctance to submit the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to greater checks and balances.134 Governance deficits 
continue to negatively impact on environmental governance reform, as officials have 
been able to resist any reforms that threaten to undermine short-term economic growth. 
For example, attempts to improve officials’ accountability for environmental issues are 
liable to face strong opposition if they threaten to clash with the economic growth 
imperative. This is also the case in relation to attempts to improve rule of law, 
participation, and transparency. In China, where the Party-state apparatus dominates 
environmental enforcement, local officials can pursue vested interests relatively free of 
the influence of state and non-state mechanisms and actors.  
 
A key reason why local officials can resist attempts at environmental reform is due to the 
fragmented nature of China’s political system (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). When the 
central leadership is united in pursuing a policy, it is much harder for local level officials 
to resist. Conversely, when conflicting signals emerge from the central authorities, there 
is greater scope for local level resistance (Ibid.). Although environmental issues are being 
promoted more than at any other point in the PRC’s history, maintaining economic 
                                                   
134 Governance deficits refer to a lack of accountability, transparency, participation, and rule of law 
(Howell, 2004b). 
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growth and social stability are still the CCP’s top priorities. Party-state officials are 
divided regarding the level of seriousness with which environmental protection should be 
taken. The policy of enlisting public support is also contested within the Party-state due 
to the perceived threat that citizens might pose to the CCP’s monopoly on political 
power. 
 
Governance deficits also impinge on attempts to improve environmental protection 
through extending governance to non-state actors. The same government officials that are 
responsible for incorporating public opinion into project decisions are often strong 
supporters of these projects. Weak accountability mechanisms mean that local officials 
often attempt to implement projects with minimum public involvement, as evinced by 
Chapter 6. The case of hydropower development in Yunnan, examined in Chapter 4, is 
also illustrative of this. Although formal environmental public participation has been 
introduced to China via new legislation, Party-state officials still largely decide whether 
or not to implement this legislation. The lack of predictability regarding the 
implementation of mechanisms designed to incorporate public opinion into planning 
processes is a major weakness that seriously limits the extent to which the public can use 
these mechanisms to hold powerful economic interests to account. 
 
I have shown that environmental civil society in China can be important in terms of 
promoting, or pioneering, new policies aimed to extend governance. Activists and the 
media have had some success in ensuring that new governance norms are given a higher 
profile and, in some cases, have ensured that new policies are implemented. Civil society 
in China can be a force for good governance. And yet in the PRC, unlike in liberal 
democracies, civil society remains significantly constrained by the Chinese Party-state.135 
Empowering civil society to act as a genuine counterbalance to the Chinese Party-state is 
arguably vital if a more transparent and participatory governance approach to 
environmental protection is to be implemented in China. However, this is unlikely to 
occur soon within the present political system. The lack of independent oversight that a 
                                                   
135 For a discussion on the merits of a liberal democratic system to environmental protection, see Payne 
(1995). 
  
222 
222 
vibrant civil society can provide is another major obstacle to environmental governance 
reform in China. This is true for top-down as well as bottom-up governance reform. 
 
Tension between governance and CCP control 
A significant amount of tension exists in China between the need to reform governance 
processes and strengthen the capacity of the central government to ‘steer’ society on the 
one hand, and an aversion on behalf of the CCP to losing its monopoly on political power 
on the other. Attempts to empower the public to play a greater role in environmental 
protection are also frequently opposed by ‘special interests’ at the implementation stage, 
particularly in the case of those local officials that practice local protectionism in order to 
maximise revenue. This tension represents an obstacle to the ability of the public to hold 
officials to account by playing a greater role in environmental protection. 
 
In order to provide the public with the necessary tools to participate meaningfully in 
environmental protection, the Party-state arguably needs to adopt a less ‘hands-on’ 
approach to governance. This would include empowering civil society in order that it can 
better hold officials and polluting enterprises to account. It might also mean improving 
existing public participation and environmental information disclosure legislation and its 
implementation. And yet this would represent a significant change in the way in which 
the CCP exercises its power. At present, the authorities attempt to closely control public 
participation in order to ensure that citizens do not mobilise against the Party-state. 
Indeed, another way of looking at these reforms is that they constitute an attempt to 
extend the environmental state in order to incorporate citizens into closely regulated top-
down public participation mechanisms. As Chapter 6 suggested, public participation 
mechanisms can serve the function of buying time for the authorities by temporarily 
appeasing social unrest. 
 
Another obstacle to environmental governance reform in the PRC relates to weaknesses 
in legislation designed to promote greater public involvement in environmental 
protection. This also reflects tensions within China’s political system regarding the extent 
to which non-state actors should be able to check the power of Party-state officials. As 
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this thesis has shown, even if officials do discharge their public participation 
requirements, this often leads to ineffective and tokenistic participation. Due to the 
prevalence of bargaining in China’s legislation drafting process, clauses allowing for 
greater public participation can be watered down by other departments, as Chapter 4 
illustrated. As a result, the incorporation of effective public participation into China’s 
authoritarian political system has proven a difficult undertaking when powerful 
development-oriented ministries are able to limit its scope in new legislation.  
 
Implications for Wider Political Reform 
This thesis also has implications for understandings of wider political reform in the PRC. 
As it attempts to move from being a revolutionary party to a ruling party (Fewsmith, 
2004; 30), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) increasingly derives its source of 
legitimacy from its level of competency in governing the country rather than relying on 
communist ideology. As Yongnian Zheng (2006) notes, at present the CCP is officially in 
favour of pursuing good governance, specifically in a managerial sense. In contrast to the 
instigation of radical political reform such as democratisation, the promotion of a 
managerial form of good governance is viewed as a relatively moderate way of 
ameliorating some of the social and political problems that have emerged or intensified 
during the reform era. Weiwei Zhang (2006; 162) has argued that a consensus has 
emerged among the country’s leadership that cultivating rule of law, increasing media 
supervision, and improving institutionalised supervision are necessary, and are preferable 
to introducing a model of western liberal democracy. It has been argued that through 
pursuing the former, the CCP can circumvent pressure to instigate the latter (Heberer & 
Schubert, 2006). In short, China’s leadership accepts the need for political reform within 
the current one-party political system in order to render it more efficient (Zhang, 2006; 
154). 
 
Furthermore, the ‘Harmonious Society’ rhetoric promoted by the Hu/Wen leadership 
appears to be consistent and compatible with aspects of good governance as understood 
by international development agencies such as the World Bank. The ‘Harmonious 
Society’ concept has been closely linked with good governance by some Chinese 
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commentators, and there are certainly areas where the two overlap. In an essay entitled, 
‘Social Justice and Good Governance are the Bedrock for Constructing a Harmonious 
Society’, director of Peking University’s Centre for Chinese Government Innovations Yu 
Keping (2006) states that a harmonious society should be ‘democratic’ (within China’s 
one-party system), possess good governance, rule of law, justice, tolerance, and honesty. 
He argues that good governance is about cooperation between government and society in 
the management of public life. Yu includes participation, rule of law, official 
responsibility, fairness, stability, transparency, and absence of corruption in his criteria of 
what constitutes good governance.  
 
Although the term ‘good governance’ has not received nearly as much attention in 
Chinese discourse as the highly publicised ‘harmonious society’ rhetoric, it has been 
argued that the spirit of good governance has nevertheless been embodied in many recent 
government policies (Zhang, 2007). Since coming into power in 2002, the current ‘fourth 
generation’ leadership has stressed the need to improve governance in China, for example 
by promoting concepts such as transparency, public participation, and rule of law. This 
has been articulated through, for example, the 2004 State Council ‘Comprehensive 
Strategy to Implement the Promotion of Administration According to Law’, as well as the 
2007 ‘People’s Republic of China Ordinance on Governmental Information Disclosure’ 
(hereinafter referred to as the State Council’s ‘Information Disclosure Ordinance’) that 
promotes government transparency (State Council, 2007).  
 
Top-down governance reform 
In many ways, this vision of political reform towards a Chinese version of good 
governance is informing, and being promoted by, the developments in China’s system of 
environmental governance examined by this thesis. The question of whether or not 
environmental governance reform can act as a ‘laboratory’ for more comprehensive 
political reform in China is an important one that has not been raised directly in the 
literature on Chinese environmental governance.136 Speaking in 2005, Pan Yue said that,  
                                                   
136 Jennifer Turner (2006) does, however, identify it as an important issue. 
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The environment touches on every person’s vital interests. However, it is 
different compared with other areas. Its political risk is relatively low, and 
because of this it is fairly easy to achieve mutual agreement and benefit in 
society. It is the best entry point for exploring socialist democracy and 
fairness. We therefore need to design a set of environmental protection 
public participation mechanisms that are more open and transparent, and 
that can better concentrate the knowledge of the people in order to 
represent the will of the people (Renmin Wang, 19 May 2005, emphasis 
added). 
The environmental governance reforms that I have analysed can also be treated as a prism 
through which to examine more general questions of governance reform in the PRC. 
They can help shed light on the path that China’s leaders envisage governance reform 
taking, and enable initial conclusions to be drawn as to the likely effect of carefully 
controlled reforms within China’s authoritarian political system. 
 
This thesis has found that China’s environmental challenge has stimulated a limited 
amount of political reform from the top-down. In an attempt to overcome the country’s 
environmental protection implementation deficit, the Party-state has introduced policies 
and initiatives that promote accountability, transparency, participation, and rule of law. 
Some policies, such as demanding greater official transparency through information 
disclosure, and providing channels for public participation in environmental issues, are 
largely unprecedented in the PRC. At the same time, these policies do, notionally at least, 
redefine the relationship between citizens and the Party-state. One notable feature of 
policies designed to facilitate environmental public participation and information 
disclosure is that they are conceived of in terms of individual rights accorded to citizens 
that Party-state officials have an obligation to recognise. Although I have found that, in 
many cases officials do not respect citizens’ rights to know, participate, and supervise, 
the discourse that is emerging from the MEP in particular is one that advocates a role for 
the public in holding officials to account.  
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It is debatable, however, whether or not the slow pace of political reform towards a more 
accountable and transparent style of governance will be sufficient in order to overcome 
China’s environmental challenge. Although it has been argued that ‘revolutionary 
bottom-up political and economic reforms’ are required in order to halt environmental 
deterioration in China (Economy, 2007), this is highly unlikely to happen as long as the 
CCP remains in power, barring a major change in CCP policy. Rather, the most likely 
means through which governance reforms might occur is via a gradual transition to a 
Chinese version of good governance as outlined above. And yet, as I have shown, there 
are considerable obstacles to introducing measures that attempt to promote checks and 
balances on local Party-state officials, both within and outside of the bureaucracy. And 
yet, in the context of China’s significant environmental problems, failing to implement 
even limited political reform might be more damaging to the CCP than implementing it. 
 
Bottom-up political reform 
As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis subscribes to the ‘states in society’ approach that 
emphasises the mutually transformative nature of state-society interactions (Migdal et al, 
1994). It has found evidence to suggest that environmental issues are also contributing to 
limited bottom-up political reform.  
 
Environmental issues appear to be gradually stimulating growing awareness of citizens’ 
rights and public participation in China. Activists, be they public or private interest, are 
increasingly framing their activities in terms of citizen rights and government 
responsibilities. This chapter has already suggested that this in itself can help promote 
political reform, albeit to a limited degree, by putting into practice and consolidating new 
governance processes. This is partially a mutually reinforcing phenomenon, consistent 
with the ‘states in society’ approach (Ibid.). One of the reasons why environmental 
protection activists cite public participation and transparency legislation is because this 
legislation has been promulgated and advanced by state officials.  
 
In part, the top-down environmental governance reforms examined in this thesis are in 
themselves a response to public pressure arising from environmental issues. Part of the 
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rationale behind introducing new channels for public participation is to reduce the 
likelihood of social instability arising from poorly planned projects. In addition, 
mechanisms such as public hearings have been introduced partly to act as a ‘safety valve’ 
that can partially dissipate public pressure. In other words, the threat of social unrest 
related to environmental conditions is stimulating a limited amount of governance reform 
that is to an extent designed to incorporate unrest and internalise it within the political 
system. 
 
I have also found that environmental civil society in China can stimulate good 
governance. In calling on officials to carry out their obligations as stipulated in 
environmental legislation, whether that be via arranging a large-scale ‘stroll’, or through 
writing letters and/or expressing opinions through the media, activists are taking a lead in 
promoting rule of law. This thesis has identified several instances whereby environmental 
civil society has attempted to hold officials and polluting enterprises to account for their 
actions, advance government transparency, and ensure that the public’s right to 
participation is observed. Although they are still operating under difficult conditions, 
civil society actors in their role as policy pioneers can be an important force for limited 
governance reform from the bottom-up. 
 
Limits to this Thesis 
Inevitably, there are limitations to the argument put forward in this thesis. First, the 
findings in this thesis are based on a limited number of case studies. The case studies that 
I chose were all relatively high-profile cases. Although it is important to examine such 
cases, and despite the fact that these case studies are revealing about certain aspects of 
Chinese environmental governance reform, conclusions arising from them should not be 
taken too far. Generalisation is a pitfall that should be avoided, particularly in such a vast 
and diverse country as China.  
 
Second, the case studies that I examined are limited in that they focus on just two 
components of China’s system of environmental governance, namely the environmental 
state and civil society. I did not examine the effect of international linkages on 
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environmental governance, nor did I look at market-based policy instruments emerging in 
the PRC. Moreover, this thesis focused on policies and activism that attempts to promote 
good governance in order to improve environmental outcomes by ensuring that local 
officials comply better with environmental legislation. In addition, this thesis has mainly 
focused on developments at a national, rather than a local level. Focusing on national 
level developments is vital in terms of understanding environmental governance in China. 
However, there are also many important developments and variations in environmental 
governance at local level that I have not examined. An important area of future research 
would be to carry out detailed studies of how some of the policies designed to extend 
governance are being taken up at the local level. There is a need for in-depth localised 
case studies in order to examine which types of governance initiative are most successful, 
and why. 
 
Third, to the extent that this thesis has examined Chinese environmental activism, it has 
focused on high-profile episodes of private interest activism and on well-known NGO. 
The latter could be described as the ‘elites’ in Chinese environmental civil society, and 
often pursue cases on a national level in that they become involved in activism outside of 
the location in which they are based. As well as being well-known within environmental 
circles, some of these NGOs’ leaders such as Friends of Nature’s Liang Congjie and 
Green Earth Volunteers’ Wang Yongchen have good connections with officials in the 
central government. They may not be representative of many less well-known, local level 
NGOs.  
 
Prospects for Environmental Governance in China 
This thesis has identified some positive developments in Chinese environmental 
protection. The trend in China appears to be one towards more, and not less, 
environmental protection. The fact that the central leadership has displayed heightened 
concern for environmental issues is a positive step. It seems likely that support for better 
environmental protection and energy conservation will, if anything, deepen in the future. 
Leadership elites do acknowledge that ‘careless and unrestrained’ development can 
jeopardise the sustainability of China’s economic growth. Furthermore, environmental 
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governance reform is clearly on the agenda in China. The challenge, however, is 
translating this into better environmental outcomes. At present, this appears to be a 
difficult undertaking. And yet at some point effective action will need to be taken in order 
to compel local officials to accord greater priority to the environment.  
 
Given the Party-state’s suspicion of non-state actors, it appears certain that environmental 
protection in China will continue to rely heavily on regulatory measures. The ‘command 
and control’ approach still fits well with China’s political system. As Chapter 2 noted, the 
Chinese authorities have shown a certain amount of commitment to strengthening the 
environmental state. This process is still continuing. Although regulatory approaches to 
environmental protection have been criticised in the literature, it has also been 
acknowledged that they can be effective up to a point. If the Chinese leadership continues 
to be serious about environmental issues, there is much scope for improving the current 
regulatory system. This in turn could ameliorate some of the country’s environmental 
degradation. 
 
I have found that environmental civil society in China still operates in a restrictive 
political environment. However, room for the public to stand up to egregious examples of 
official neglect appears to be increasing. Citizens appear are more and more standing up 
for their rights and demanding a cleaner environment. This phenomenon is reinforced by 
public participation and transparency legislation that provide added legitimacy for 
activists.  Ultimately, environmental activism, and private interest activism in particular, 
might compel officials to introduce genuine public participation into decision-making 
procedures. One interesting area for further research relates to the linkages between 
public and private interest activists. This thesis has shown that in many cases NGOs 
decline to associate too closely with private interest activists. And yet there are signs that 
space for linkages might develop in China. This was evident in the NGO campaign 
against GEP and its subsidiaries when NGO activists actively sought out aggrieved 
citizens. In addition, netizens, who could be seen as public interest activists, have 
mobilised citizens with grievances. Interaction between public and private interest 
activists, as well as experts and other ‘intermediaries’ is potentially highly important in 
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terms of the development of China’s environmental civil society, and deserves further 
study.  
 
Finally, the fact that environmental issues are highly prominent on the international 
agenda, especially in relation to the issue of climate change, arguably bodes well for 
China’s environmental protection efforts. China must be part of any co-ordinated global 
action on climate change, and there is likely to be much effort expended in persuading 
China to sign up to commitments to reduce its carbon emissions. As China works to show 
that it is a responsible global actor, it is likely that it will feel greater compulsion to take 
more action with regards the environment. This is likely to be an important factor in 
helping China move towards a more environmentally sustainable future. 
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